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 Abstract 
 
Africa’s Unresponsive Democratization: the Relationship between Regime Type and the Quality of 
Life in Africa 
 
by 
Caryn Peiffer 
 
Claremont Graduate University: 2012 
 
 
Scholars and policy makers alike argue that leaders of democracies should find it in their 
interest to provide high levels of social services due to a fear of being voted out of office. Yet, I find 
that Africa’s newer democracies provide levels of social services strikingly similar to what the 
continent’s existing non-democracies supply. This dissertation seeks to explain why this is the case.  
I start by exploring the determinants of Africa’s most recent wave of democratization, and 
find that much of Africa’s 1990s democratic wave can be attributed to changes in foreign 
circumstances rather than from pressures from domestic democratic movements.  I argue 
democratization has become disassociated with social services on the continent because of this 
exogenous nature of political liberalization. Rather than institutionalizing electoral incentives to 
provide social services, leadership of exogenously derived democracies become principally 
accountable to the foreign actors for whom political change was meant to appease.  However, 
foreign actors are effectively unable and unwilling to demand political reforms that will 
institutionalize a more responsive democracy. This dynamic threatens any electoral incentive a ruling 
party might have to produce higher levels of social services. I test this argument quantitatively and 
find support for the notion that exogeneity of political change has dampened the impact that 
democratization has had on social service delivery in Africa.  
Additionally, through in-country, qualitative fieldwork I examine how citizens demand social 
services and how the government responds to such demands in Zambia, a country whose 
democratization was heavily influenced by foreign pressure. There, I found that while there were 
 important initial strides made by Zambia’s post-transition government to institutionalize a higher 
level of responsiveness in social services, later erosions in Zambia’s checks and balances undermined 
these gains. Finally, using Afrobarometer’s cross-national survey data, I explore what impact foreign 
influenced democratization has on citizens’ attachment to and satisfaction with democracy. I find 
that exogenously derived democratization has a small negative impact on people’s attachment to 
democracy and satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. I conclude by discussing 
some of the policy implications of these findings. 
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Chapter One: Democratization and Social Services in Africa 
 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, most of Africa was a bastion of authoritarianism and 
repression. However, by the mid-1990s more than thirty regimes had been persuaded by foreign aid 
donor-countries and domestic actors to hold multiparty elections. Democracy’s “third wave” had 
surprised many by sweeping across the continent. Richard Joseph observed that because Africa 
lacked the conditions that most believed to be standard pre-requisites to democracy, like a strong 
middle class, sufficient capitalist economy, and civic culture, the potential for democracy to take root 
in Africa was written off by notable comparative democracy specialists, like Samuel Huntington and 
Robert Dahl, as well as established Africanists, like Crawford Young and Michael Bratton (Joseph 
1997: 363-364). And probably at least in part because of the absence of many of these “pre-
requisites,” the depth of the democratic changes that occurred varied significantly across the 
continent. While many regimes have institutionalized regular and multiparty elections, some 
“transitions” were halted before they ever truly materialized. Togo, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea 
are just a few examples where regimes announced multiparty elections only to later repress their 
possible opposition and steal victory at the polls. Several other regimes have continued to hold 
multiparty elections, but have undermined a deepening of the democratic experiment by rigging the 
political playing field. A particularly egregious example was in Zambia, where, prior to the second 
presidential election, the Chiluba regime, which had gotten to power carried by a genuinely 
democratic tide, changed the presidential candidacy rules to effectively make his biggest competitor, 
Kenneth Kaunda, ineligible to run.   
Africa’s democratic progression might be easy to understate, given that most of its new 
democracies have failed to resemble “consolidated” or “liberal” democracies. However, optimism 
might come from the fact that a majority of the regimes that had multiparty elections after the end 
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of the Cold War institutionalized the process (Posner and Young 2007). Sustained improvements in 
civil liberties also mark another indicator of progress.  According to Freedom House, the region’s 
strongest democratizers like Mali, Benin, Cape Verde, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, and 
Seychelles, all of which had low civil liberty scores in 1989, were at the other end of the spectrum by 
1995 and have remained there since. In fact, in 22 of the continent’s new democracies a positive 
shift, of some size, in civil liberties and political rights is observed over the same period.   
These positive shifts in democracy levels confronted scholars, policy makers, and citizens 
with as many questions about the source of the change as it did with questions about how these 
changes would impact the quality of life, stability, economic trajectories, and state capacity on the 
continent. While, at a minimum, multiparty elections offer people a say in who will run their 
government, several felt that democracy’s effects would ripple in other directions. For example, 
many Africans expected that economic development would accompany democratic change (Bratton 
and Mattes 1999). Hopes were also raised in some policy circles that peaceful democratic 
competition could manage and replace conflict in socially divided countries (see Paris 2004: 44 for 
examples). UN peacekeeping operations often viewed the holding of elections as the final stage in 
efforts to transition a country away from violent conflict to peaceful politics (Sisk and Reynolds 
1999: 1). 
But one of the most widespread and basic expectations of democratization was that political 
liberalization would institutionalize responsive governments. It is a foundation of democratic theory 
and a legitimate aspiration of citizens in democracies that their leaders will be more inclined than 
their authoritarian counterparts to provide social services, like healthcare and education, because of 
their fear of being voted out of office for not doing so (Deacon 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2004; Meltzer and Richard 1981).  What is the 
empirical record in this respect?  Are Africans in countries that have progressed democratically living 
3 
 
a higher quality of life than their counterparts in countries where regimes have stayed authoritarian? 
Beyond voting regularly in multiparty elections, how has the democratic progress impacted the 
material lives of Africa’s new voters?  To my knowledge, these questions have not been addressed by 
previous literature1 and are at the core of this dissertation.  
This chapter lays the stage for my investigation.  In order to establish a comparative 
benchmark of what we might expect to find in Africa, I begin with a review of the academic 
literature on the relationship between democratization and social service provision. Next, I draw an 
empirical sketch of the continent’s comparative performance on social service and quality of life 
indicators. Two trends emerge:  while the continent performs relatively badly on average, there is in 
fact a tremendous amount of variation across countries. In the following step, I inquire whether this 
variation can be explained by variations in levels of democracy and in patterns of democratization, 
the core question of my research. I reproduce econometric models used by others in other contexts 
to test for the presence of a link between social services and democracy. Paradoxically, while such a 
link has been well established elsewhere, I find that Africa’s “third wave” has not correlated with a 
rise in social services. This is the central puzzle that the rest of the dissertation seeks to solve.   
 
Democracies, Social Services and Quality of Life 
The quality of life for many around the world rests on their access to goods that are usually 
provided by the state, such as access to clean water, education and healthcare. When states provide 
these services they invest in their nation’s development and capacity to engage in the international 
                                                        
1
 David Stasavage’s (2005) work might come closest, as it examined the relationship between education spending and the 
level of democracy in Africa. However, that research still does not directly address whether the change in democracy has 
impacted a change in social service delivery. Also, Stasavage (2005) limits his analyses to expenditures and not outcomes 
and only to education and not a suite of social services. As I point out later, focusing on expenditures may hit on a 
different question than whether democracy is responsive. 
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economy. The question of whether or not democracies are better suited than authoritarian regimes 
to provide these services has been at the center of many analyses (Nelson 2007).  
For those who argue that democratic governments are better at social service provision than 
their non-democratic counterparts, the rise to and maintenance of political office through 
competitive elections is the primary mechanism which binds democratic leadership to social service 
provision (Ross 2006; Nelson 2007; Deacon 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2004).2  Through democratic elections, voters have the 
opportunity to either sanction or reward incumbent’s governing performance and/or select policy 
makers that they perceive will work in their own interest (Fearon 1999). As a result, democratic 
leadership should be incentivized to act in the public interest for fear of being voted out of office 
(Barro 1973).   
Yet, the incentive to redistribute state resources to secure the necessary support to maintain 
political office is not unique to democratic leadership. What is assumed to differ in democracies is 
the audience that redistribution is targeted to.  Autocrats generally fear a loss of power through force 
from specific sectors of the elite, and redistribute state resources specifically to these elites. In this 
manner, they reward loyal supporters or co-opt possible opposition groups. This co-option tactic is 
extremely limited in its utility for democratic leaders. Democratic leaders remain in power only by 
being re-elected by a large percentage of people,3 thus strictly rewarding elites may hinder their 
chances of being re-elected. Instead, the theory goes, democratic leaders find it in their interest to 
                                                        
2
 Sen’s (1999) work on press freedom and responsive regimes also highlights another mechanism through which 
democratic governance might impact social service performance. Sen (1999) argued that democracies are more effective 
than autocracies at broadcasting information from the people to the government, due to a freer press. A freer press can 
embarrass the government by publicizing facts of gross inequalities or extreme injustices, which would pressure action 
from the center. 
3
 Depending on the institutional and party make-up within a polity, democratic leaders can garner a minority of the vote 
and secure their position in office. Arguably, however, they still have to capture the support of a larger group of people 
than autocratic regimes.   
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redistribute state resources in a form that will please as many prospective voters as possible (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003).  
The theory that links democracy to social service provision not only must take account of 
the re-election ambitions of politicians, but also of the preference of voters.  It assumes that voters 
will be in favor of the redistribution of state resources through broad based public goods, and be 
willing to sanction elected officials if they do not enact such policies. Africa’s relatively high levels of 
income inequality and poverty may bring particular relevance to this point. Meltzer and Richard’s 
(1981) work illustrates that in countries with high levels of poverty and income inequality, politicians 
are more likely to provide redistribution in the form of broad based social services. Extending 
Downs’s (1957) theorem, they argue that, in the context of high levels of inequality and widespread 
poverty, the “median voter” has a lower income level than the mean income in the country. She is 
thus most likely to benefit from increased access to social service delivery and will favor such 
policies, even if they come at the expense of higher taxes on wealthier co-nationals.  
However, other factors might undermine Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) expectation in Africa.   
The pervasiveness of neopatrimonial politics in Africa, for example, has been argued to decrease 
citizens’ expectations that the state should provide broad serving public goods.  A neopatrimonial 
system is characterized by public officials offering personal favors (like public sector jobs, licenses, 
contracts and/or projects) in return the mobilization of political support. Thus, in this system, the 
maintenance of political authority is essentially reliant much more upon doling out patronage then it 
is on ideology or even the law (Bratton and van de Walle 1994: 458; Jackson and Rosberg 1984; 
Chabal and Daloz 1999).   As Michael Bratton (1992: 93) argues, authoritarianism and 
neopatrimonialism may have bred a passive and/or a “patrimonial political culture” wherein people 
come to perceive that their own access to state resources will come only from their ability to draw 
upon personal ties with powerful political officials. Put differently, the effects of living for decades 
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under authoritarian rule and within political systems based upon patron-client relationships may 
have affected Africa’s new democratic citizens’ view of the role of the state and their own vote (van 
de Walle 2003). In political systems dominated by clientelism, voting is less about providing 
mandates on policy platforms than about exchanging votes for material rewards from relatively more 
powerful patrons running for office (van de Walle 2003: 312).  
In addition, a history of entrenched authoritarianism may have impacted the extent to which 
citizens are willing to interact with the state or demand responsiveness from their elected officials; 
norms created in such environments might reinforce loyalty to political leaders, regardless of their 
performance in providing social services (Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Bratton 1994: 9). Finally, ethnic 
considerations are also likely to blur voting motivations in several African countries (Bates 1983; 
Horowitz 1985; Young 1976; Dowd and Driessen 2008; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). Given a 
common perception that only a co-ethnic will protect one’s interests (Habyarimana et al. 2009), 
voters might prefer a co-ethnic even when tangible benefits are not likely to result from such a vote 
(van de Walle 2003: 313; Keefer and Khemani 2005).  All these mechanisms would then conspire to 
create a structure of unaccountable democracy:  when voters do not use their vote to sanction or 
reward social service providers, the electoral accountability linkage between democracy and higher 
social service provisions cannot be reliably counted upon.    Yet, although several scholars have 
indeed called attention to the possibly different political logics of the functioning of African 
democracies, there has so far been no systematic testing of whether the relationship between 
democracy and social service provision is robust to the African context.  I turn to this question next. 
 
A Review of Evidence 
Even outside of Africa, the cross-national evidence on whether democratic governance 
impacts social service provisions is somewhat mixed. Scholars have analyzed the relationship 
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between democracy and expenditures on social service programs, quality of life, or social service 
outcomes. Several have found that, holding all else equal, democracies in various settings do in fact 
spend more than autocracies on social services (Rudra and Haggard 2005; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003; Przeworski et. al. 2000; Avelino, Brown and Hunter 2001; Brown and Hunter 1999; Huber, 
Mustillo and Stephens 2004; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004; Nooruddin and Simmons 2009; 
Stasavage 2005).  Only Boix (2001) finds that in poorer countries, regime type has no effect on 
public goods expenditures.  But the record is less clear when it comes to outcomes.  As Nelson 
(2007:80) remarks, “Better outcomes also require reallocating resources and institutional reforms—
changes in sector organization, administration, and incentive systems,” which increased expenditures 
alone do not guarantee.  Examining the effects of health expenditure allocation and health 
outcomes, Mcguire (2006) failed to find a robust relationship. Instead, he argued that the main 
explanatory variable in determining health outcomes was the coverage and provision of services. 
Thus, if expenditures were raised but people were not seeing an increase in services and hence 
markedly improved outcomes, they might still be inclined to punish their leaders at the polls. For 
this reason, examining the relationship between outcomes and regime type is more appropriate.  
While several scholars have found a positive link between democracy and public good 
outcomes, the evidence at this level is certainly more mixed than with expenditures. Some have 
found that democratic governance is associated with higher levels of primary and secondary school 
enrollment, life expectancy, doctors per capita, hospital beds per capita, access to clean water and 
improved sanitation, immunization coverage, literacy, and lower infant mortality rates (Rudra and 
Haggard 2005; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Deacon 2003; 2009; Brown 1999; Frey and Al-Roumi 
1999; Shandra et al. 2004; Baum and Lake 2003; Lake and Baum 2001). Others, however, have failed 
to find such an association. Specifically, Ross (2006) and Shandra et al. (2004) find no relationship 
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between democratic governance and infant mortality rates, and Ross (2006) fails to find that 
democracy has an impact on maternal mortality rates.  
These mixed findings may be explained by variations in cases selected, control variables, and 
time frames used.  Such variations are more than mere methodological discrepancies, however, as 
they might be picking up differences among the democracies they examine. In this respect, Keefer 
(2007) argues that the age of democracy within a country may differentiate those democracies that 
are likely to provide high levels of social services from those that are not. From a large sample of 
developing and developed democracies, he finds that younger democracies are more corrupt, exhibit 
less rule of law, have lower levels of bureaucratic quality and secondary school enrollment, and have 
more restrictions on the media. Younger democracies, he argues, are more likely to suffer from a 
“low credibility” political environment, wherein political competitors are unable to “make credible 
promises to citizens about broad public policies” (Keefer 2007:805) because of the little time they 
have had so far to establish themselves as credible actors. In a low credibility political environment, 
the political incentives to provide public goods or to campaign on the promise of public goods are 
weak.  Instead, in such an environment, the incentives to provide private or targeted goods to feed 
into established clientelist networks to secure political support are relatively stronger (Keefer 
2007:806). 
Associating the age of democratic rule to the provision of social services or the likelihood of 
political actors relying on clientelist networks imposes a somewhat deterministic question: as a 
democracy ages, should we expect that politicians will be viewed as more credible in their policy 
promises, and resort less to targeting resources towards clientelist networks? Indeed, as Keefer 
(2007) acknowledges, “the acquisition of political credibility is not inevitably correlated with age. 
Building up a policy reputation with broad groups of voters is expensive and politicians may prefer 
to use patrons. If patrons are cheap enough, politicians may postpone indefinitely the decision to 
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invest resources in directly convincing large segments of the voting population of their credibility” 
(806).  
However, this argument fails to account for a couple issues. First, a low credibility 
environment might be endogenous to the fact that the regime is newly democratic, and not a simply 
a product of its democratic youth. Put differently, the fact that these countries had not become 
democratic before might be a function of a pre-existing low credibility environment. Second, Keefer 
fails to address under what circumstances new democracies can and will break from patronage based 
low credibility equilibrium. Without doing so, he weakens any association age might theoretically 
have with the persistence of a low credibility environment .  
Thus the question remains of what the age of a democracy might be capturing.  The paradox 
of age might be approximating another causal relationship altogether, as nations that democratized 
in the post Cold War era, or the relatively “younger” democracies share several features. Many 
regimes, and especially in Africa, that took steps to democratize during this period received an 
inordinate amount of foreign pressure to do so. As I argue later, democratic change rooted more in 
foreign and less in domestic pressures may have a dampening impact on the development of 
accountability mechanisms.  
 
Africa’s Social Services in a Comparative Perspective 
Negative generalizations about the quality of life and governance in sub-Saharan Africa are 
common.  Life in Africa is often portrayed to be rife with the perils of abject poverty and vulnerable 
to the dangers of political instability (Stith 2005). While most aggregate regional comparative 
statistics reinforce these stereotypes, it is the tremendous variation of quality of life in the region that 
confronts us with a more complex picture of government performance on the continent.  
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the provision of various education and healthcare-related social 
service by region. Almost across the board, Sub-Saharan Africans have the worst access to social 
services and the lowest quality of life. Indeed Africans are less likely to be literate, get a primary 
school education, have access to clean water and sanitation, and are more likely to live a shorter life, 
be undernourished and die as an infant. In fact, only in immunization rates does Africa come second 
to last (and this is as much a reflection on the provision of this service by donors than on any 
intrinsic performance by African governments).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet, it would be a mistake to interpret this aggregate performance as representing a 
homogeneous situation across the continent.  Indeed, in countries like the Seychelles, primary school 
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enrollment rates are 99%; in Botswana, 96% of the population has access to “improved water 
sources;” and Mauritius boasts a life expectancy above 70 years. 4 In figures 3 and 4, I compare the 
standard deviations of each indicator across regions. While Africa does not have the highest degree 
of variation in all indicators, it has either the highest or the second highest in eight out of the ten.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+data for all four tables is taken from the World Bank’s Development Indicators database. 
 
 
Hence, while Africa performs poorly on average with respect to social service delivery and 
quality of life, there is immense variation within the region.  While the extent of Africa’s variation is 
somewhat unavoidable, given the large number of countries it holds, these descriptive findings still 
                                                        
4
 These figures are for 2005 (most recent) from the World Banks Development Indicators 
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beg the question: what accounts for divergent trends in social service provisions and quality of life 
on the continent? Why is it that some Africans live longer, healthier and more enriched lives than 
others? Can this variation be accounted for by the continent’s equally large variation in regime type?  
Puzzle: Democratization and Social Services in Africa, 1990 to 2005 
While several authors have argued that democracies are better suited to provide a higher 
quality of life and better social service coverage, others have doubted that this relationship can apply 
in the African context where several variables, like neopatrimonialism, the legacy of 
authoritarianism, and the salience of ethnicity, may prevent democratization from returning social 
service dividends (see supra).  These claims have not been empirically tested, however, and a 
superficial survey of the continental variations in levels of democracy and of social services suggests 
that the question deserves greater scrutiny.  Is African democracy likely to promote higher quality of 
life and better social services?  Has the post-1990 wave of African democratization contributed to 
improvements in social services?  
In this section, I examine the relationship between democratization and changes in social 
services and quality of life by running a series of cross-sectional Ordinary-Least-Square regressions.  
Changes in various social service and outcome indicators from 1990 to 2005 are the dependent 
variables, and change in a country’s Freedom House score is the primary independent variable of 
interest.5 What I test here is whether a country’s change in democracy score is significantly and 
positively related to the change in various social service and quality of life outcomes.  
I used different dependent variables for a couple of reasons. First, as Kramon and Posner 
(2010) point out, regimes might perform in drastically different ways across various types of social 
                                                        
5
 I used the average between the civil liberties and political rights scores. Also, the original Freedom House scores were 
changed to be more intuitive. Originally, they are coded so that the largest score (7) is the smallest level of freedom or 
democracy. I subtracted these scores by 8 to obtain a more intuitive scale where large numbers reflect a more free 
democracy. Therefore, the change in Freedom House scores are now intuitive so that positive change reflects a move 
away from undemocratic rule towards democratic rule. 
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services. For example, a regime may use some social services to reward clientelist networks, but 
distribute other services more evenly. If there are systematic trends across the continent regarding 
the motives that regimes use to distribute a certain good, studying democratization’s effect on just 
one indicator might not uncover the entire picture of the relationship I am after. Additionally, if 
change in democracy levels has an effect with most indicators, we can be more confident in the 
robustness of the relationship.   
African data on social service provisions and outcomes are severely limited, however. Many 
indicators that approximate different dimensions of the quality of life are spotty in terms of country 
and, especially, temporal coverage. Yet, many indicators have at least some data available for two 
common time frames: around 1990 and 2005. Using data from these two periods allows me to 
approximate a time prior to the democratization wave (1990) and one after the democratization 
wave seems to have reached an equilibrium (2005).  Even so, these indicators still lack coverage of 
the most troubled or closed regimes, like Somalia and more recently, Zimbabwe, a problem that is 
more starkly observed in 1990 than in 2005. These limitations force me to focus on five indicators 
which have sufficient observational coverage to run basic analyses and represent both health and 
education related measures. They are: 
 Infant Mortality Rate 
 Life Expectancy 
 % of population that is considered undernourished 
 Primary Enrollment School Rate (net) 
 Secondary Enrollment School Rate (gross) 
 
 I control for the effects of other plausibly important variables that would either help or 
impede a government in providing social services. First is GDP per capita which approximates a 
country’s wealth and ability to self-fund social service delivery. I use an average of GDP per capita 
for the country over the entire period (1990-2005) because using any single year might capture a 
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particularly high or low point in the economy. Next I include the percent of the population that lives 
in an urban area to account for the fact that an urbanized population might facilitate a government’s 
job in delivering services. In urbanized countries a higher percentage of the population will be within 
one specific area where infrastructure is likely to be more developed. Again, I use the average of this 
measure. Third, I control for the size of the country to account for the difficulty that larger countries 
would have in providing social services to their citizens (Herbst 2000). This control is especially 
important in Africa where large countries like the Sudan and the DRC co-exist with small countries 
like Lesotho and Cape Verde. I also use average population for a similar reason:  governments in 
more populous countries might have a more difficult and expensive task at providing services. 
Finally, I control for whether the country experienced a civil war from 1985 to 2005, as such 
conflicts would have negative effects on political stability, government capacity and infrastructure; all 
of which are likely to decrease a government’s ability to provide social services.  Aside from this 
latter variable, my control variables replicate those used in Lake and Baum’s (2001) analyses of social 
service provisions.6 Additionally, because my dependent variable measures change, I control for the 
initial level of the dependent variable to capture the fact that nations performing well on these 
indicators initially would have less room for improvement. In the table 1, I report a summary of the 
change in democracy level’s effect on the change in the various quality of life indicators. 
                                                        
6
 In Lake and Baum’s (2001) study these variables were used in different forms. Instead of looking at the impact of 
democratization, they were analyzing the impact of the level of democracy. For this reason, they used similar variables 
but not as averages over the entire period, like I needed to do. 
Table 1: The Relationship between Change in Democracy and Change in Quality of Life 
 ∆ Democracy Coefficient  P-value N R² F-test 
∆ Infant Mortality Rate -0.37 0.818 47 0.26 0.08 
∆ Life Expectancy 0.36 0.577 47 0.27 0.07 
∆ % Undernourished -1.44 0.336 42 0.23 0.19 
∆ Primary Enrollment (net) 0.94 0.477 39 0.70 0.00 
∆ Secondary Enrollment (gross) 1.36 0.279 34 0.47 0.01 
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The results, which are remarkably consistent across all five indicators, indicate that 
democratic improvements in Africa after 1990 are not significantly associated with 
improvements in social services and related outcomes. One can interpret this to imply that 
during this time frame, Africa’s democratic progress has not coincided with changes in policy that 
would directly impact the quality of life in Africa. These results lead to another essential question: 
have regime type and social services ever been related in Africa? As mentioned earlier, several 
authors have pointed out that certain prominent African political characteristics, like ethnic voting 
and clientelism, might undermine electoral accountability. Thus democracy might never correlate 
with social service coverage and quality of life in Africa irrespective of the time period.  In other 
words, if this is the case, we would not only see no effect of democratization on change in social 
service provisions, but we should also expect that social service levels in any given year and country 
are not related to democracy levels at that time. 
 To investigate this question, I explore in a second set of analyses the relationship between a 
country’s levels of democracy and social services at two moments in time: 1990 and 2005. This 
approach allows me to explore whether democracy impacts social service levels and compare its 
effect across one period, before democratization, and another, after.  Because I am interested in 
comparing democracy’s impact on social services and outcomes across two time periods, I run two 
separate OLS cross-sectional regressions for each quality of life indicator, using the indicator’s level, 
instead of change, for each year (1990 and 2005) as the dependent variable.  
For the measurement of democracy, I again refer to the Freedom House indicators, but I 
recode the standard scores. Countries considered “not free” are rescored as a 0, while countries 
considered partly free and free are scored as a 1 and 2 respectively.  The primary theoretical 
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reasoning why democracy is supposed to positively influence public goods provisions is electoral. 
Democracy indicators from Freedom House and Polity are subjective scores based on many 
different criteria, and so it is not clear that two countries with scores of a one unit difference would 
have markedly different levels in the potential to have electoral accountability. It is likely that 
regimes coded as a 6 and 7 (most authoritarian) are similarly unthreatened by a public’s negative 
evaluation of their performance. By simplifying the more continuous democracy scale I introduce 
categories between which differences in government behavioral expectations are likely to take place.  
Other studies have also recoded democracy in a similar manner for the same reason. Scholars have 
found it useful to use dichotomous (democracy/no democracy) or trichotomous 
(democracy/autocracy/mixed regime) variables (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001, Brown and 
Hunter 1999, Ross 2006, Huber, Mustillo and Stephens 2004), or indices that measure specific 
institutional characteristics of executive promotion and political inclusiveness when analyzing 
democracy’s proposed effect on public goods provisions.7  
I use the same controls as in the previous regressions, albeit sometimes in a different form.  
Instead of using averages over a time frame for GDP per capita, percent of population that lives in 
an urban area, and population size, I simply use the amount/percentage for each year of the 
regression to control for the specific context of that given time period (1990 or 2005 respectively). 
The civil war dummy variable was recoded to reflect a 1 if the country had a conflict in the 
preceding ten-year period, to control for any negative lingering effects conflict may have on social 
service delivery (since 1980 for 1990 regressions, and 1995 for 2005 regressions).  
                                                        
7
 One might argue that the previous analyses (the effects of democratization on change in social services) should also be 
recoded, as small changes in democratization will not likely impact changes in social services. I did rerun these 
regressions with a different coding of Freedom House scores as well. Specifically, countries that had a change of only 1 
point, were recoded to have zero change at all; countries that had a change of 1.5 to 3.5 points were recoded to have had 
a change of a 1 (adjusted for the direction of the change, i.e. negative changes of this magnitude were given a negative 1; 
and countries that had changes of anything above 3.5 were given a 2 on the recoded change in democracy scale. The 
results remained the same, however, democratization was still not found to be significantly related to change in social 
services. One might also argue that this should also be captured by the reported regressions as the dependent and 
independent variables are both change, thus it is sensitive to the differences in magnitude to change already. 
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Table 2: The Relationship between Democracy Levels and Quality of Life Levels at 1990 
and 2005 
 
 Year Democracy Coefficient P- value N R² F-test 
Infant Mortality Rate 
1990 -18.11 0.017 46 0.37 0.00 
2005 -11.11 0.040 47 0.29 0.03 
Life Expectancy 
1990 4.20 0.014 46 0.40 0.00 
2005 1.96 0.193 47 0.21 0.14 
% Undernourished 
1992 -7.59 0.048 42 0.30 0.04 
2004 -3.27 0.353 44 0.41 0.00 
Primary Enrollment (net) 
1991 13.16 0.018 41 0.33 0.03 
2005 4.71 0.206 43 0.31 0.03 
Secondary Enrollment (gross) 
1990 9.03 0.014 44 0.33 0.02 
2005 8.89 0.030 44 0.39 0.00 
 
 
The results in table 2 are as interesting in their own right as they are in contrast to those of 
table 1, and offer important insight into the nature of the relationship between democratic rule and 
social service provision in Africa. The results show consistently that there was a relationship 
between democracy and social outcomes in 1990 but that it had largely evaporated by 2005.  
Specifically, the relationship weakens for infant mortality and secondary enrollment and altogether 
loses significance for life expectancy, undernourishment and primary enrollment rates.  Additionally, 
at first glance, a comparison of the slope coefficients shows that the estimated impact of democracy 
decreased from 1990 to 2005. In three out of the five analyses (life expectancy, undernourishment, 
and primary enrollment rates), democracy’s effect is estimated to be at least 50% less in 2005 than it 
was in 1990. In the case of infant mortality it is around 40% less.8 However, in the case of secondary 
enrollment rates it remains about the same throughout the two periods.9 
                                                        
8
 A further analysis wherein I pooled the two years and tested an interaction between a dummy variable for the 1990s 
observations and change in freedom house scores revealed that the estimated coefficients were not statistically different 
from each other across both years.  
9 Full democracies might not have the same “gap” between themselves and non-democracies if the full democracies 
reached their potential in 1990 and had little room to move to 2005, and non-democracies converged. A descriptive look 
at the data shows some support for this. On average non-democracies do improve a lot over the 15 years in question, 
and some of the free countries in 1990 seemed to reach impressively high coverage rates for many of the public goods. 
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 These results reveal another important puzzle. On the one hand, they testify to Africa’s 
normality, the banality (Bayart 1993) or universality of its politics as they help dismiss the idea that 
African political and societal features hinder a relationship between democratic governance and 
responsiveness through social services.    On the other hand, however, they beg the question of why 
democracy’s impact on the quality of life eroded after the wave of democratization. Put differently, 
the different findings across periods highlight the possibility that the wave of democratization in the 
1990s transformed the relationship between regime type and social services in the region. Despite 
the fact that more of Africa’s leaders now face the threat of being voted out of office, I find that 
these new democrats have failed to distinguish themselves in terms of providing their citizens a 
certain quality of life to the same extent that their predecessors did in Africa’s older democracies. 
How can this disassociation be explained?  What does it reveal about the substance of the third wave 
of democratization in Africa?  What political differences can we find between Africa’s newer and 
older democracies to account for the variation in their respective performance? 
 In this dissertation, I explore a hypothesis that might account in part for the observed 
discrepancy. My argument relies on the concept of “strategies of extraversion” developed by Bayart 
(1993; 2000). According to Bayart, regimes in Africa have used their dependence on, and access to, 
the international system to extract resources in order to remain in power at home. They have 
historically instrumentalized their international weakness to gain domestic political advantages.  For 
example, governments have unique access to resources like foreign aid and rents from the 
international market wherein nationalized natural resources are sold. Governments are then able to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Yet to depict that Africa is converging on high equilibrium of public goods provisions is not accurate at all. On average 
for both periods and across most indicators the average coverage of public goods of free African countries is lower than 
that of the world average. It might be possible that they have converged towards a high equilibrium for their income 
group though. To control for a possible convergence, I re-ran all of the above 2005 analyses controlling for the 1990s 
levels of the indicators. If the countries were just converging, then democracy should come out significant with this 
added control. In none of the analyses was this found.  
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translate their access to resources derived from the international system into domestic strategies, like 
repression and coercion, which help them secure their power domestically. 
 While regime change is certainly in large part a function of domestic economic, social and 
political developments, the paradigm of extraversion highlights the crucial role that changes in the 
international system might also play on the proclivity of extraverted regimes to succumb to 
democratization. In this light, the 1990s democracy wave that several regimes were impacted by, I 
argue, can be interpreted as a function of a changed international system. With the end of the Cold 
War, the United States and other European countries detracted from their program of supporting 
Cold War allies in the region and instead focused on promoting and pressuring for democratization 
in Africa, in exchange for foreign aid and other resources (Carothers 2006). Thus, in the post-Cold 
War world, many regimes that were particularly dependent on foreign support and domestically 
weak found that they had to concede democratic political reforms for the foreign support that they 
previously were heavily reliant on.  
Thus, the democratic change that most regimes underwent during the early 1990s can be 
characterized as more exogenous than endogenous, meaning that the driving force behind the timing 
and substance of political liberalization came from foreign, rather than domestic forces. With their 
accountability tilted towards foreign patrons rather than domestic constituencies, extraverted 
democratizers are less likely to develop responsiveness to their citizens through social service 
delivery.   In other words, post 1990 democratic changes lack accountable substance; the spread of 
elections and civil rights do not translate into more responsible governments in terms of policy 
performance.  Leadership of these “exogenous” democracies remain primarily accountable to 
foreign actors which pressured the political change.  However, donors lack the willingness and 
ability to generate a higher degree of domestic responsiveness from abroad. Additionally, while 
exogenously pressured democratic reforms usually include the institutionalization of formal 
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democratic practices, like multiparty elections, they are also likely to result in giving the ruling party a 
near political monopoly, due to the lack of a strong domestic democratic watch dog, all of which 
decreases the electoral incentive to produce higher levels of services.   
 
This dissertation chapter has highlighted several descriptive findings and summarized the 
academic literature on the role that regime type might play in determining social service provisions. 
Comparatively, African governments perform poorly when it comes to providing their citizens with 
social services, and thus the quality of life for many Africans has been compromised. When one 
unpacks the continent, some shining stars do emerge, as reflected in the great deal of variation in 
social services on the continent. In the literature, cross-national variation in social services 
provisions has been explained to be at least partly the product of variations in regime types: 
democracies generally provide higher levels of social services than non-democracies. Yet, when I 
examine this relationship in the African context, I find an empirical puzzle. Democratization has not 
been associated with increases in social service delivery. Additionally, a country’s level of democracy 
is less associated with social service provisions after the wave of democratization then it was before.  
In the next chapter I examine the trends and determinants of the 1990s democratization 
wave; a better understanding of the democratic wave gives insight into the central puzzle of this 
dissertation. Descriptively, I unpack the democratization wave and I document that while some 
countries experienced a dramatic shift towards more democracy, for the majority of countries 
liberalization was more modest or non-existent. Additionally, the “democratic wave” on the 
continent was largely experienced in just the first five years after the Cold War; subsequently, most 
regimes have consolidated at the level of democracy that they ended up at in the mid 1990s. These 
descriptive findings beg the following questions: what can explain the variations in the degree of 
political liberalization during the 1990s on the continent? And, why have many regimes consolidated 
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at the level of democracy they ended up at in the mid 1990s? With respect to these questions, I find 
that variation in the degree of initial liberalization and subsequent consolidated regime type can be 
better explained by a country’s vulnerability to new foreign pressures to adopt democratic reforms, 
which arose after the Cold War, than to domestic sources of pressure.  
Chapter three expands upon the lessons from chapter two on the determinants of 
democracy trends on the continent into an argument that addresses the dissertation’s central 
question, why was the 1990s democratization not associated with a positive change in the quality of 
live on the continent? Specifically, I argue that it is the exogeneity of democratization on the 
continent that has disassociated political liberalization from changes in the quality of life. Further, I 
develop a measure of exogenous political change and illustrate that once exogenous political change 
is accounted for, democratic change in Africa is associated with positive changes in social service 
delivery. This finding directly addresses the puzzle presented in this chapter and supports my 
argument that the foreign nature of democracy on the continent has disassociated political 
liberalization with social service increases. 
In chapter four I summarize the findings from in-country, qualitative fieldwork in Zambia, a 
country where foreign influence was important to the regime’s decision to concede multipartyism. 
There I examined how citizens demand social services and how the government responds to such 
demands. This research allows an “on the ground” look of the mechanisms, which are supposed to 
bind citizen demand to political incentives in a foreign influenced, multiparty setting. There, I found 
that multipartyism ushered in institutional changes meant to decentralize and increase local 
government responsiveness post-transition, however their effectiveness at inducing a greater degree 
of responsiveness was undermined by democratic backsliding and a lack of political will to 
decentralize power from the center. The current political situation in Zambia, best characterized as 
an unresponsive and hybrid multiparty system, I argue, is partly a product of the extraordinary 
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influence that foreign actors had on the impetus to democratize and Zambia’s subsequent 
consolidation as a hybrid multiparty democracy.  
 In chapter five I turn to a slightly different question: how has foreign influenced 
democratization impacted public support and satisfaction with democracy? I use Afrobarometer’s 
cross-national survey data to explore these issues and find that exogenously derived democratization 
has a small negative impact on people’s attachment to democracy and satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in their country. Any negative impact that exogenously derived democratization 
may have on public support for democracy, I argue, may be detrimental to the future of democracy 
on the continent, as foreign pressure to main a certain level of democracy may wane in the future.  
I conclude by pulling together the findings of each chapter to inform a discussion of the 
future of democracy on the continent and the agency of foreign actors in affecting the nature of 
democracy in Africa. Descriptively and analytically, this dissertation has a lot to offer, as it highlights 
an understudied topic of the influence of various types of transitions on long-term government 
responsiveness and, more to the point of policy implications, the unintended consequences of 
foreign influenced democracy movements.  
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Chapter Two: Determinants of Democratization and Regime Consolidation in Africa 
 
Any policy repercussions that one might expect to be born out of political change will be 
affected by the nature of the change itself. As evidenced in the previous chapter, democratic political 
change does not necessarily produce increases in coverage of social services or in the quality of life. 
Instead, I found that Africa’s most recent wave of democratization correlated with a disassociation 
between regime type and social service delivery. Insight as to why this was the case, I argue, can be 
found in examining the determinants of the post-Cold War democratic changes. The nature of a 
country’s democracy is a product of its own unique evolution. The factors that push for political 
liberalization will be reflected in how a country’s democracy functions, including its likelihood of 
being responsive to its citizens’ social service needs.  Thus, the question of why Africa’s newest 
democracies are not providing higher levels of social services?, necessitates exploring what factors 
led to this wave of democratic change. 
Aside from gaining perspective on the question of why such widespread political change did 
not impact social services, the post-Cold War democratization wave in Africa provokes several other 
important questions. Between 1990 and 1995 39 countries in Africa held multiparty elections, 32 of 
them their first ones in over a decade. In contrast to previous democratic experiments on the 
continent, the new African democracies have exhibited surprising staying power. By 2000, thirty-five 
countries had held more than one cycle of competitive elections (van de Walle 2002). Since most 
African countries lack much of what is commonly thought to be democracy’s prerequisites, like a 
powerful middle class (Joseph 1997: 363), the question arises: what brought on this wave of political 
change?  Moreover, why have democratic trajectories on the continent generally followed a similar 
trend over time as this chapter will show? In the early 1990s there was intense, but divergent regime 
change which has been followed by a largely static period with most regimes consolidating at 
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whatever level of democracy they had reached by 1995. Thus an answer for what explains variations 
in democratization across Africa must account for the fact that African democratization has 
occurred in these two phases.  
In this chapter, I offer a theory of African democratization that is able to explain variation in 
the extent to which it occurred during the first half of the 1990s and the relative subsequent stability 
in regime type. I focus on the dependence that African elites have on the international system and 
rely on the idea of extraversion, i.e. their propensity to convert their international dependence into 
domestic benefits. Variation in democratization is partially accounted for by the fact that regimes 
vary in the type of international resources they are dependent on, foreign aid being only one of 
them. I develop the concept of extraversion portfolios to distinguish the different assets that states 
can rely on in their extraversion strategies.  In addition, I discuss the fact that foreign aid donors 
have mixed motives, value democracy differently at different levels of democracy, and face 
difficulties in monitoring setbacks.  When these donor idiosyncrasies are considered, I show that 
different degrees of vulnerability of extraversion portfolios to donor demands account for variations 
in both initial regime changes and subsequent consolidations across Africa.  This discussion allows 
me to highlight the idiosyncratic nature of Africa’s most recent democracies and offers a causal step 
in my analysis of the weakening of linkages between democracy and social service in Africa over 
time. 
 I begin with a discussion of the empirical patterns.  I then review prominent theories of 
democratization and their applicability to the African context. I discuss the notion of extraversion 
portfolio, of its relationship to aid, and of certain peculiarities of donor behavior with respect to 
democratization, and develop an argument as to how variations in these variables and their 
interactions correspond to regime variations.  I then compare a model of transition based on 
variables derived from this theory of extraversion and democratization to one based on more 
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commonly used variables, and do the same for a model of consolidation.  In each, variables which 
capture vulnerability in extraversion portfolios have greater explanatory power than prevailing 
models.  In the next chapter I discuss how these findings shed light onto the disassociation between 
democratization and social services in Africa. 
 
Transitions and Consolidations 
One cannot make sense of democratization in Africa without first picturing its changing 
nature over time.  The period immediately following the end of the Cold War was characterized by a 
rapid positive average change in the level of democracy across the continent.  Since 1995, however, 
African democratic performance has largely stagnated.  While this overall “end of transition” pattern 
(Carothers 2002) is well known, a more detailed look reveals that the initial transition itself differed 
broadly across African countries, from radical democratization to increased authoritarianism, and 
that the subsequent consolidation has largely taken place at all levels of democracy.  In other words, 
the current regime distribution across the continent—with nine “free,” 23 “partly free” and 16 “not 
free” countries—has been steady for almost two decades.  About 90% of the countries that were 
democratic in 1995 were still democratic in 2009, and about 75% of the partly free ones were still 
partly free.  Altogether, some 64% of total democratic change across the continent between 1989 
and 2009 can be imputed to changes between 1989 and 1995.10  
While it is not unusual for regime characteristics to correlate over time within regions, such 
consolidation is surprising in Africa, not only because its few democracies endure despite missing 
several of the alleged prerequisites of democracy, but also because its “hybrid” regimes seem to be in 
a state of equilibrium, neither transitioning towards more democracy nor reverting to the full-fledged 
                                                        
10
 Results based on robust bivariate regression of overall change in civil liberties on initial change between 1989 and 
1995.  We use Freedom House’s civil liberties index as our indicator of democracy throughout this paper.  Although it 
does not fully capture all dimensions of democracy, it helps us better compare our findings with that of other studies 
which also use it  Our results are not substantially different when using Freedom House’s political rights index instead.  
26 
 
authoritarianism they displayed before the 1990s.  Typical of these regimes is that they hold regular 
elections and provide their citizens with some liberties, while nevertheless using autocratic and 
clientelistic means to maintain their effective monopoly over power (Joseph 1998; Diamond 2002; 
van de Walle 2003; Tripp 2010).  Thus, the large proportion of partly free or hybrid countries in 
Africa (at 48% the largest of any region in the world) has become a steady feature of its regime 
distribution rather than a stage in the continent’s course towards or away from democracy.   
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this empirical pattern by highlighting the trajectories of five groups of 
countries, which differ in their initial trajectories and subsequently tend to behave similarly. 
Specifically, in the figure, countries are categorized by how much their freedom house score changed 
from 1989 to 1995. Put differently, they are grouped by the degree of democratization the country 
experienced during the early 1990s. As the figure shows, by and large, each category stays at the level 
of democracy they ended up at in 1995. Breaking down the pattern by group highlights the degree to 
which country experiences are similar within each group.   
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Figure 1: Trends by Performance During the Early 1990's 
Consistent Democrats
(N=5)
+3 change over 89-95
(N=7)
+1-2.5 change over 89-
95(N=19)
0 change over 89-95
(N=10)
Negative change over
89-95 (N=6)
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The “consistent democrats” of Figure 2 are the countries that had multi-party political 
systems before 1989—Botswana, Mauritius and Senegal—as well as Namibia (which becomes 
independent as a democratic country in 1991) and South Africa (for which I do not include data 
before the end of apartheid).    The essential feature of these countries is their constant level of 
democracy:  they are solidly democratic throughout the transition and after.  As Figure 2 suggests, 
they tend to move together in a narrow band around scores of 5-6, although Senegal was responsible 
for a temporary dip in the 1990s. 
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The second group, “strong democratizers,” consists of countries with an increase of at least 
3 points on the Freedom House index between 1989 and 1995.  Such an increase guarantees a 
qualitative jump from one category to another (from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” or from “Partly 
Free” to “Free”).  These countries are Benin, Cape Verde, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome 
and Principe and the Seychelles.  With the exception of Malawi, which subsequently fell back by one 
point, these countries all stayed where they were as of 1995 or continued to improve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The third group consists of countries that showed a small (.5 to 2.5 points) initial 
improvement.  Their transition also tended to be shorter and was largely over by 1992.  This is the 
largest group, with 19 observations.  It comprises Angola, Burkina Faso, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Niger, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.  Ghana alone 
becomes democratic and, together with Tanzania, is one of only two countries among this group to 
show improvement after the initial transition to eventually climb by 3 points.  All other countries 
have stayed close to their 1992 level. 
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A similar pattern is visible among the category of countries that displays no net change in the 
initial period (a few of them display a small positive change between 1989 and 1992 followed by a 
reversal before 1995).  By and large, nothing happens to them subsequently either, although their 
average creeps up from close to 2 to close to 3.  These countries are Burundi, Cameroon, Congo-
Kinshasa, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last group consists of countries that had an initial negative change.  They moved in the 
opposite direction from the rest of the continent during the 1989-95 period.  On average, they 
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ended in 1995 about a point and a half below their 1989 level.  Unlike other groups that stayed flat, 
they subsequently recouped their losses and eventually converged with countries that had shown an 
original small gain.  Although they do display change after 1995, it should be stressed that they 
stabilized around their original level of democracy pre-transition.  Several of these countries actually 
experienced civil conflict or other forms of state failure in the initial transition, which was 
responsible for their drop.  Post-conflict multilateral interventions and donor-sponsored elections 
were largely responsible for their subsequent catch-up.  These countries are the Gambia, Kenya, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.  Nigeria experienced a dictatorial drift after 1993, 
followed by a late democratization after 1998, which apparently ran out of steam within about five 
years. 
With very few exceptions, each category displays a pattern of consolidation at its own level 
of democracy following 1995.  As mentioned earlier, initial change largely predicts overall change.  
Of course, there remains some variation within each group.  Ghana and Tanzania’s later transitions 
particularly stand out among the hybrid category.  In general, however, this within-group variation is 
much smaller than between groups. In other words, the aggregation of countries by initial transition 
explains more variation than there is altogether within each group.  This is shown in Table 1 by 
using an analysis of variance, which measures and tests the significance of variations among groups 
as a ratio of average variations within the groups.  If one compares the eventual levels in freedom 
house scores as of 2009, the between-group variation is more than 15 times bigger than the within-
group variation.  If one compares, instead, overall freedom house scores between 1989 and 2009, 
the ratio is about 9.  Both ratios are very statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 1:  Analysis of variance of 2009 freedom house scores by initial change (1989-95) 
Group N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consistent Democrats 5 5.8 0.57 5 6.5 
Strong Democratizers (3+ Change) 7 5.5 0.91 4.5 7 
Hybrids (1-2 Change) 19 3.45 1.23 1.5 6.5 
Authoritarians (0 Change) 10 2 0.85 1 3.5 
Initially Worsening Regimes (< 0 Change) 7 3.35 1.34 1 5 
      
ANOVA F Test for level of freedom house score in 2009: 
F (4, 43) = 15.91*** (Prob > F = 0.0000) 
ANOVA F Test for change in freedom house score, 1989-2009 (sample means not shown): 
F (4, 42) = 8.98*** (Prob > F = 0.0000) 
 
 
Democratization Theory and Africa 
 What can explain the variation with which regimes adopted democratic institutions?  How 
can we understand the consolidation of regime type after 1995? While there have been several 
studies on democratization and consolidation cross-nationally (Ingelhart 1997; Przeworski et al 2000; 
Ingelhart and Welzel 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, to name but a few recent ones), few have 
generated theoretical correlates which can account for regime variation within Africa, as illustrated 
by the main quantitative studies of democracy on the continent (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; 
Dunning 2004; Lindberg 2006). Although this might be due to the fact that some of the variables 
associated with democratization remain difficult to measure on the continent, many of these 
correlates might also be derived from theories that are not applicable to the general African context.   
 Of all the correlates found to be associated with democratization and the consolidation of 
democracy, those derived from modernization theory are probably most commonly accepted as 
conventional wisdom in cross-national analyses.11  To roughly summarize, modernization describes a 
process of social and economic changes that are borne out of industrialization. These changes 
include increased occupational specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels and rapid 
                                                        
11
 I do not intend to argue that modernization’s theoretical implications have not been debated. I refer to the variables 
associated with the theory as conventional wisdom because they are regularly controlled for in most cross-national 
quantitative analyses on variations in democracy for reasons along the same line that modernization would propose. 
32 
 
economic growth. Combined, these transformations are likely to produce a relatively more educated 
and economically important middle class that values a more democratic culture. This class will hold 
new political and economic leverage over the political system.  Thus, according to modernization, 
democratization is likely to occur when an empowered middle class with sufficient economic and 
political leverage is present to demand and succeed in gaining such changes from a regime. 
Democracies, therefore, are likely to have high levels of income, education and will possess an 
economically important capital class (Lipset 1959; 1960; Inglehart and Welzel 2009; Inglehart and 
Baker 2000; Inglehart 1997).   
One might expect that a democracy created at the behest of a politically powerful and 
relatively educated middle class would be most likely to produce leadership who are responsive to 
the basic social service demands of its citizenry. Assumingly, given their level of education, this 
segment of the population would be better informed about the need for services. Additionally, the 
political leverage wielded by this segment could be used to pressure for increased coverage in social 
services. Africa’s democracies, however, differ insignificantly from their authoritarian counterparts 
on many of the correlates that modernization theorists would propose democracy to have (income, 
education and the presence of an economically important capital class). 
Although some of Africa’s richest countries, like Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, are 
democracies, their democratic trajectories hardly follow the modernization narrative as the former 
two were already democratic before getting rich, and the latter had one of the continent’s most 
repressive regimes while being possibly its richest country until 1994.  Additionally, some of Africa’s 
most democratic countries (Benin, Cape Verde, or Mali) are also among the poorest in the world.  
To some extent, the lack of correlation between income and democracy in Africa derives from the 
nature of the continent’s economies.  While the effects of income on democracy are supposed to be 
mediated by the development of industrialization and the rise of a middle or entrepreneurial class, 
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African national incomes and episodes of growth are more often the result of extractive economic 
activities and variations in commodity prices.12 Unlike manufacturing, extractive industries are 
typically capital-intensive expatriate-dominated enclaves. Such wealth concentration is less likely to 
grow a potentially politically powerful middle class and more likely to embolden authoritarian 
regimes (Ross 2001). 
While modernization’s theoretical implications suggest that higher incomes will correlate 
with democratization and sustained democracy, arguably, its key causal mechanism lies in the idea 
that economic development will produce a bourgeois class which will have economic leverage over 
an authoritarian regime to demand democratic concessions. A more direct measure of the strength 
or size of a capital class might be the share of GDP accounted for by manufacturing, because as 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) have suggested, elites who have invested in manufacturing capital 
are loath to see it destroyed and thus more likely to compromise about democracy.  Yet, in Africa, 
the correlation between the share of GDP accounted for by manufacturing between 1985 and 2008 
and the average freedom house civil liberties score over the same period is a statistically insignificant 
r=0.08.13  To a large extent, this lack of relation is due to the very limited range of manufacturing 
(and of other economic indicators) in Africa.  The puzzle with democratic theory in Africa is to 
explain variations in democracy while there are few variations in its usual correlates.     
This problem also applies to education which, according to modernization, is expected to 
lead to the acquisition of tolerant and democratic values (Lerner 1958; Inkeles and Smith 1974). The 
correlation between the log of literacy and civil liberties over the same period as above is not either 
statistically significant (r=0.09), in part due to the limited range of variation in literacy in Africa. 
                                                        
12
 While Przeworski et al (2000) have challenged modernization by showing that democratic transitions can happen at 
any level of income, in line with modernization’s predictions for democratic consolidation, they find that consolidation 
does not take place in countries with incomes below $6,000 per capita (PPP).  This income level, however, is well above 
the average for African democracies 
13
 Value added in manufacturing as % of GDP from World Development Indicators (accessed 29 January 2010). 
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Hence democratic Mali has a literacy rate of 26 percent, while that of neighboring authoritarian 
Niger is 29 percent.14 Thus, in large part, Africa’s democracies lack the correlates that a 
modernization theorist would usually associate with political liberalization. That Africa’s newest 
democracies evolved without these elements might give some insight to why they have failed to 
return governments responsive to the social service demands of its citizenry.  
 Resource curse arguments fair slightly better in predicting regime variation on the continent.  
Under this theory, resources are thought to limit the likelihood of democratization because 
governments can use their rents to finance extensive networks of patronage and/or provide social 
services to garner support and/or fund internal security efforts used for repression (Ross 2001). 
Success stories of democratic consolidation on the continent seem indeed to be more likely among 
resource poor countries. Benin, Mali, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles, all countries that 
democratized during the early 1990s and have consolidated as democracies, are relatively resource 
poor (Sao Tome’s first oil production licenses were sold in 2004 and production has yet to begin).  
Conversely, resource rich countries like Angola, the Republic of Congo, Gabon or Sudan have 
remained steadfastly authoritarian over the years.  Studies have confirmed the presence of a 
“resource curse” in Africa with more mineral-rich countries less likely to democratize (Jensen and 
Wantchekon 2004; Omgba 2009).15 Additionally, the resource curse theory may help to explain the 
lack of differentiation in social service coverage between democracies and non-democracies on the 
continent. In this light, the extension of broad based social services by a resource rich government 
would likely be seen as a payoff of the population to dispel democratic demands. Theoretically, we 
                                                        
14
 Data from the World Development Indicators (accessed March 12, 2010). Both are for the most recent date available, 
which was 2006 for Mali and 2005 for Niger. 
15
 While not looking at the impact of natural resources on regime type, Omgba (2009) does find that the presence of oil 
reserves made authoritarian leaders on the continent more resilient, as evidenced by its positive effect on their tenure in 
power. 
35 
 
might expect that some resource-rich non-democracies would have similar levels (or higher levels) of 
service coverage to some new democracies.     
 Resource wealth still falls short, however, of explaining the entire regime distribution picture 
in Africa.  For one, Botswana—one of Africa’s democratic stars—is a deeply mineral economy.  In 
addition, the absence of mineral resources is in no way systematically associated with democracy, as 
witnessed by the performance of countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya or Zimbabwe.  Moreover,  
resource-curse types of explanation do not account for hybrid consolidation, which occurs as much 
among resource-rich as resource-poor countries. Thus, the resource curse theory makes a more 
ambivalent contribution to our understanding of regime distribution and social service coverage in 
Africa.   
 The social configuration of countries is one of the non-economic variables most often 
associated with democratic performance.  Particularly, more culturally homogeneous countries are 
expected to have an easier time democratizing and staying democratic than their more 
heterogeneous counterparts.  The more homogeneous, the more similar the population’s policy 
preferences and the lesser acute the demands for patronage and redistribution (Easterly and Levine 
1997).  However, as Daniel Posner’s work has shown (2004; 2007), the salience of ethnicity in Africa 
is more likely to be a function of the rules of the political system than the other way around.  In 
Zambia, the switch from single- to multi-party politics reduced the effective degree of ethnic 
heterogeneity in the country.  It is thus often unhelpful to think of ethnic distribution as hard-wired 
and causally related to political outcomes.  Moreover, Habyarimana and others’ recent work suggests 
that ethnicity is more likely to function as a facilitator of collective action within groups rather than 
as a factor of polarization across them (2007).  These findings, as well as the absence of any ethnic 
effects among existing quantitative studies of democracy in Africa, suggest that looking for ethnic 
causes of democratic performance is a largely blind alley. 
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There is, however, a possibility that African countries vary in terms of their civic culture in 
ways that correlate with their democratic performance (Almond and Verba 1963).  This argument 
suggests that some societies have a greater disposition towards democracy than others because they 
share values that are favorable to compromise, communication, consensus and diversity.  Putnam 
(1992) offered a more recent incarnation of this theory in which levels of social capital—social trust, 
horizontal social relations, associate life—correlate with democracy.  Yet, civic-culture types of 
argument are difficult to formalize or verify.  The little work that has been done on social capital in 
Africa has actually found that there was less of it in democratic Botswana than in more authoritarian 
Uganda (Widner and Mundt 1998).  And arguments that have equated trust with ethnic homogeneity 
have not fared better in Africa (Knack and Keefer 1997).  In general, the lack of culture data 
aggregated at country levels across the continent precludes further empirical investigations. 
 Yet, one can identify plausible variations within Africa of a factor that might be associated 
with a broad interpretation of civic culture.  Although political cultures have significant indigenous 
elements, it is also true that African countries tend to maintain certain characteristics of the 
countries that colonized them.  For example, former French colonies tend to have more centralized 
authority than their former British counterparts.  This could partly be a function of whether or not 
colonial powers resorted to indirect rule.  In a study of the effects of different colonial legacies on 
the rule of law in Africa, Sandra Joireman (2004) found that common law countries fared somewhat 
better.  I find no effect, however, of differentiating countries by their colonial origins.  Former 
French colonies as a group do not have visibly different scores from the rest of the continent on the 
Freedom House index.  British colonies do slightly better but not significantly so.  Former 
Portuguese colonies do significantly better and former Belgian ones significantly worse, but neither 
had very distinctive colonial systems and their limited number gives excessive leverage to a few 
observations. 
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 In summary, the variables conventionally associated with democratic theory have little 
explanatory power in Africa.  Additionally, they shed little light on why democratization did not 
correlate with increases in social service coverage. Recently, however, Staffan Lindberg (2006; 2009) 
has offered evidence that associates democratic performance in Africa to the organization of 
elections.  The very practice of elections helps to spread democratic values in society and contribute 
to improvements in civil liberties, Lindberg proposes (2006; 2009).  This argument finds antecedents 
among theories that democratic change is more likely to occur in nations where past regimes held 
regular elections, even more so if they allowed some degree of competition among parties, however 
superficial such allowances were.  Bratton and van de Walle (1997:141) argued that regimes that held 
regular elections, even if it was a single party state, institutionalized a tradition of mass participation, 
wherein elites and the masses became socialized to accept participatory political roles.  They found 
that such a history was positively associated with the presence of political protests which preceded 
many of the democratic transitions in Africa during the early 1990s.  Bates (2008:163) finds that “the 
longer a country has been subject to a no- or single party system, the less likely it is to change to a 
multiparty system,” a trend he terms “historisis.”16  
While these theories were largely targeted at explaining the proclivity of a country to undergo 
a democratic transition, Lindberg’s work has extended this logic to inform our expectations about 
democratic consolidation and current variations in democratic levels across the continent.  
According to him, variations in democracy in Africa can be traced to a self-reinforcing democratic 
power of holding consecutive multi-party elections. The practice of elections, he argues, promotes 
the creation of a virtuous lock-in mechanism through the spread of democratic values.  Elections 
democratize a polity from the ground up, through several byproducts like the education of voters, 
training of domestic election officials, civil society organizations becoming more active, and added 
                                                        
16
 For a similar argument applied to Latin America, see Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2008). 
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media criticism, all of which contribute to a general increase in the likelihood that citizens will 
demand more civil liberties (2006:122-123).   
While Lindberg does not directly address what effect electoral democratization might have 
on social services coverage, his theory might help explain why newer democracies perform worse 
than older democracies in this respect. Imaginably, the democratic byproducts that evolve and 
mature over several election cycles, like a more critical media, active civil society organizations, and 
more educated voters, could invigorate calls for responsiveness through social services. By this 
reasoning, newer democracies may just not have had enough time and opportunity to develop these 
grass roots institutions which are important to holding elected leaders accountable.      
However, Lindberg’s theory also suffers from its applicability to capture Africa’s current 
regime distribution, which, as mentioned earlier, contains a large proportion of regimes which have 
continued to hold elections but have consolidated at a hybrid level. If the practice of elections 
inevitably leads to further political liberalization, then consolidation, for countries that regularly hold 
elections, at any level outside of fully democratic is hard to explain.  Hybrid countries should be on 
their way to democracy rather than in equilibrium.  Possibly, hybrid countries undergo recurrent 
cycles of elections and breakdown, but the narrow standard deviation of their freedom house scores 
index does not support that view.   
Additionally, alternative measurements do not fully support his own findings and open the 
door for a more ambiguous interpretation of the effects of elections.  Lindberg’s (2006) measure of 
elections counts either the total number of presidential or the total number of legislative elections a 
country has had since its last “breakdown” (coup or civil war), whichever is most.17  It is, however, 
somewhat unclear why legislative elections in a presidential system (and vice-versa) or in a country 
with more presidential elections (and vice versa) would not have democratizing effects.  Second, 
                                                        
17
 I inferred his method from information in the book and email exchanges with him. 
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while there certainly can be valid reasons to reset the elections count after a breakdown, one 
wonders whether this might introduce some sort of bias in the data, in the sense that it makes the 
measure of elections somewhat endogenous to democratic developments.  In other words, starting 
the count at 0 after a breakdown makes the number of elections a function of whether democracy 
encountered a setback. Whenever it does, it is deemed that elections never took place, and thus their 
effects on the current level of democracy is discounted to 0.  But why would the democratizing 
effects of past elections, particularly their progressive transformation of civil society, be lost if a 
handful of soldiers decide to overthrow the president?  
In the statistical models present later, I retest Lindberg’s findings with an alternative count of 
the number of elections, which does not reset the election count after each break down, as well as 
many of the other variables mentioned to be commonly associated with democratization. I compare 
these models with another, derived from a theory of African democratization that focuses less on 
the domestic sources of regime change and more on the important impacts that external factors 
have had on politics in the continent. This theory is discussed next.  
 
Theoretical Argument 
In this section, I offer a theory of African democratization that is able to account for the 
different initial transitions and the subsequent multiple levels of consolidation after 1990.  Since I 
am ultimately interested in understanding why new democracies have failed to distinguish 
themselves from their authoritarian counterparts with respect to increasing social service coverage, I 
pay most attention here to the groups of countries that experienced some level of democratization, 
namely the “strong democratizers” and “hybrid regimes” of Table 1.  The “consistent democrats” 
do not present a similar puzzle; there, democracy has been associated with social service delivery 
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levels. Therefore, their path to democracy presents less of a puzzle, for my purposes. Additionally 
they did not engage in any substantive democratic change during the 1990s. 
Extraversion Portfolios 
One challenge to understanding the distribution of regime type in Africa lies in reconciling 
the similarity of politics across the continent with the extent of regime variation.  Most African 
countries share features of neo-patrimonialism and personal rule, that is, the instrumentalization of 
state power and its resources for private and political purposes (Jackson and Rosberg 1984; Bratton 
and van de Walle 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Pitcher et al. 2009).  Most of them also engage in 
foreign relations based on seeking the patronage of rich countries, offering diplomatic allegiance and 
strategic benefits in exchange for resources, political support and non-interference in domestic 
affairs (Jackson 1990; Clapham 1996).  More specifically, as Jean-François Bayart (1993; 2000) has 
identified and articulated, most African governments have historically gained, consolidated or 
maintained their power and resources by following policies of “extraversion.”  According to this 
hypothesis, African ruling elites employ their dependent relationship with the external world to 
appropriate resources and authority in order to establish or reinforce their power over domestic 
competitors.  In the course of history, such strategies of extraversion have included the domestic 
instrumentalization by some elites of slavery, colonization, development aid, commodity exports, 
structural adjustment programs, and more. In Frederick Cooper’s (2002:157) words, African 
governements are “gatekeepers,” sitting “astride an interface between a territory and the rest of the 
world, collecting and distributing resources that [derive] from the gate itself.” Thus, through the 
extraversion paradigm, African elites consolidate their power at home by relying and extracting 
resources from dependent relationships with actors external to the continent.  
I argue that variation in regime type across the continent does not reflect meaningful 
differences in the degree to which regimes are neopatrimonial or rely on strategies of extraversion. 
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Instead, I suggest that differences in regime type are in part a function of differences in the 
extraversion portfolios each regime has access too.  A country’s extraversion portfolio is made up 
of the specific linkages with the international system that a regime can exploit to extract abroad the 
resources it needs for domestic domination.  Regimes vary, importantly, in terms of the make-up 
and diversification of their extraversion portfolios. Both the composition of one’s extraversion 
portfolio and the extent to which the portfolio is diversified translates into different degrees of 
independence a regime will have from interference of the outside powers that it is reliant upon.  
As governments rely on externally drawn resources to secure their own power at home, they 
potentially risk opening themselves to external influence on domestic governance. Certain 
extraversion linkages give foreign powers leverage to influence how the government operates at 
home, while others can act as a buffer against foreign pressure. For example, the rulers of a country 
like Benin have few avenues for appropriating international resources for their benefit.  Like most 
African regimes, they can capitalize on their country’s underdevelopment to invite aid flows.  
However, the Beninese regime has little else to offer in terms of attracting additional revenue or 
foreign support. Thus, the makeup and undiversified nature of Benin’s extraversion portfolio leaves 
the regime’s control of domestic power largely at the mercy of its donors.  
In contrast, the Chadian government, for example, does not only instrumentalize its 
underdevelopment for attracting foreign aid, but also maintains close diplomatic ties with its former 
colonizer, France, for whose armed forces it provides a permanent base on its territory. It 
additionally holds geo-strategic importance in the context of the Darfur conflict in Sudan, a linkage 
which became particularly important when the country started to host UN troops. In each of these 
cases, international actors are at the mercy of the Chadian government’s cooperation; arrangements 
like these afford the Chadian government bargaining chips if domestic political demands are asked 
of them by the international community.  Finally, Chad is an oil exporter. Consistent with the 
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resource curse argument, the extraversion paradigm would argue that a regime will potentially use 
the sale of a natural resource on the international market to extract necessary rents to fund its own 
efforts to remain in power.  In Chad’s case, at different times and in different circumstances, it can 
rely on one or the other (or several) of these extraversion assets.  The specific balance of its 
portfolio gives the Chadian government considerable flexibility and relative autonomy from the 
specific political demands of donors, such as democratization.    
 
Vulnerable Extraversion Portfolios and Initial Democratization  
The diversification of a country’s extraversion portfolios became particularly important at 
the end of the Cold War, when several countries lost their Soviet patron, and the United States and 
some European countries departed from their support of allies in the region and began making 
demands for democratization (Carothers 2006).  Depending on the relative importance of Cold War 
geo-strategic factors in their extraversion portfolios, regimes became more or less vulnerable to 
these demands.  Hence, African countries experienced the shock of 1989 differentially.  Those with 
little to exchange for material and political resources became increasingly vulnerable to donor 
demands to democratize.  They tended to be the countries closest to fiscal bankruptcy and debt 
default, most associated with the Soviet Union, and least endowed with natural resources.  
Donors pulled at various linkages to prompt steps towards democratization, including 
“sticks” like aid withdrawal, refusing military support (to regimes that received it in the past)  and 
sanctions, and “carrots” like promising to forgive debts, increase foreign aid flows, directly pay civil 
servants and pay for the elections themselves.  The “carrots” transformed democratization from 
simply a step towards regime change to another linkage by which a regime could attract foreign 
support through. However, because democratization as a strategy of extraversion has the potential 
to threaten rather than to reinforce the power of incumbent elites, it takes particularly dire 
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circumstances for incumbents to embark on such a high-risk strategy.  Democratization was thus 
adopted mainly by regimes whose undiversified portfolios were particularly vulnerable because they 
had grown dependent on international aid and patronage over other sources of domestic authority 
and wealth (Levitsky and Way 2005).   
Allegiance to a disappearing or changing patron might well have been the most important of 
these factors.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European communist regimes 
dealt a severe blow to the single-party African regimes which were Soviet clients and relied on 
similar ideologies for their domestic domination.  The financial resources from the West also 
acquired greater importance and came with new, explicitly democratic conditions.  For the 13 
African Soviet clients identified by Thad Dunning (2004), I found that the average time from the fall 
of the Berlin wall in November 1989 to the adoption of multi-party politics was 14 months.  For 
other African countries, it was 33 months (with some like Eritrea still counting), a difference 
statistically significant at the 5% level.18 
The number of former Soviet clients is indeed particularly high among the strongest 
democratizers.  The Beninese regime had adopted Marxism-Leninism in the 1970s.  It abandoned it 
in December 1989, the same month that France agreed to pay some of its civil service arrears in 
exchange for political reforms.19  Although most of its aid came from Western donors, Cape Verde 
too had been a client of the Soviet Union, from which it received technical assistance.  Mali also had 
extensive and long-standing ties to the communist bloc.  The Mozambican government, engaged in 
civil war since 1975, was dependent on the Soviet Union for military equipment and oil.  It too 
dropped Marxism-Leninism in 1989 and announced the adoption of a multi-party system in July 
1990.  In Sao Tome and Principe, Manuel Pinto da Costa had allied his regime to Angola and the 
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 Based on a two-sample t-test with unequal variances. 
19
 All case materials in this section are derived from Africa Contemporary Record, volumes XXII to XXV, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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Eastern Bloc, although a rapprochement with the west had begun in 1987.  The Seychelles’ 
President France Albert René had public affinities for North Korea, where he went on four official 
visits, and was a protégé of the Soviets.   
The post-1989 shift affected countries on both sides of the Cold War.  Malawi, for example, 
was a staunch anti-communist western client whose regime had been sympathetic to white rule in 
Rhodesia and South Africa.  Yet, President Kamazu Banda’s stock with the west considerably 
diminished with the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the apartheid regime in 1991, and 
donors turned on him, suspending all non-humanitarian aid in 1992 for human rights abuses.  That 
same year, Banda agreed to a referendum on a multi-party system, which he lost, as he did the May 
1994 elections. 
In contrast to being a Soviet client, French patronage did not require costly adjustments.  
For sure, especially after the La Baule Franco-African summit of June 1990, France demanded some 
political changes of its African clients, but France itself did not disappear and its African policy 
continued to be based on considerations other than just democracy promotion.  Being also a client 
of France, which subsidized its day-to-day operations including most of its civil-service payroll, the 
Malian government was initially able to reject demands for multi-party politics.  Yet, when the 
French government formally declared its expectations of democracy among aid recipients, the 
government was further weakened.  Lacking the tools of accommodation, Moussa Traoré responded 
with violence.  About 100 demonstrators were killed in two days before the army took over in 
March 1991.   Although the new head of state, Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) initially hoped to 
stay in power, he was warned by donors and he relented after a week. Other French clients, 
particularly those well-endowed in natural resources like Cameroon or Gabon, or those with a more 
strategic location like Chad or Djibouti, faced significantly less pressure from Paris to democratize or 
were better able to resist it. 
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Vulnerability to the democratic demands of Western donors was thus not uniformly 
distributed across African countries, with the consequence that the regime trajectories they 
experienced immediately after the Cold War differed substantially.  Others have pointed this logic 
out, at least as a partial explanation, before (Dunning 2004, Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Joseph 
1997, 1998).  In the next two sections, I look at consolidation and focus on the two most 
paradoxical categories of countries:  those that democratized between 1989 and 1995 and have 
stayed democratic since, and the large group of hybrid regimes. 
Vulnerable Extraversion Portfolios and Democratic Consolidation 
That the regimes which democratized in the early 1990s have remained democratic derives in 
large part from the continued vulnerability of their extraversion portfolio and from the capacity of 
their rulers to benefit from democratization.  These regimes remained structurally vulnerable after 
1995 and continued to be sensitive to donor demands, however deflated these became.  For 
example, in Benin, President Soglo faced constitutional crises, mutinies, the consequences of the 
1994 CFA Franc devaluation, and ongoing strikes and student protests.  In Mali (which also faced 
the CFA devaluation), the Tuareg rebellion continued throughout the Konaré and ATT 
presidencies, keeping the regime fragile and dependent on outside military support (including from 
the US).  Debt servicing also remained contingent on continued donor assistance.  In Mozambique, 
donor conditionality might have increased rather than easing up after the initial transition.  Because 
the country democratized as part of its peace process, donors were possibly initially less demanding 
and became more conditional in matters of governance after the initial elections, which might have 
contributed to keeping FRELIMO committed to the reforms.  Sao Tome has been called an 
“unviable state” due to its reliance on external sources of financial support; by 1997 the government 
depended on external sources for 97.3 percent of its public investment programs and in 1995, net 
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official development assistance amounted to almost twice GDP (Frynas et al. 2003:52). In addition, 
the regime faced strikes and a coup attempt in 1995. 
But it is not enough to demonstrate that regimes are vulnerable to explain their democratic 
performance in an extraversion framework.  They must also be able to instrumentalize democracy to 
their own benefit, for the success of an extraversion strategy is measured by the capacity of 
incumbents to stay in power.  While consolidating formal democratic gains seems particularly risky 
for elites interested in remaining in power, ruling elites in most of the strongest democratizers were 
in fact able to either stay in or rapidly return to power under the new democratic dispensations.  
Indeed, “at the end of 2002, the single party in power before 1989 remained there in 15 of the 
region’s multiparty political systems” (van de Walle 2003: 300).  In other words, being able to 
navigate the formal trappings of democracy afforded them both international support, as they were 
playing by the new rules, as well as the personal political and economic rewards that come with 
holding significant positions of domestic power.  
Thus, among the strongest democratizers, I find several cases of elites maneuvering their 
way back into positions of power even after they were removed from office during the initial 
transition period.  Mathieu Kérékou was re-elected president of Benin in 1996 and again in 2001.20  
The ruling party from 1975 to 1990 returned to power in Cape Verde in 2001 when it won legislative 
elections and its candidate, Pedro Pires, became president.  In Mali, ATT who had hoped to seize 
power by force in 1991 but had then to relinquish it under significant donor and social pressure, was 
back at the helm through elections in 2002 and was re-elected in 2007. 
In many cases, democracy became a viable strategy for ruling elites to remain in power and, 
in some cases, afforded them even more job security.  In Mozambique, FRELIMO won the 
                                                        
20
 There are other facets to Kérékou’s propensity for instrumental extraversion.  In addition to his successive 
commitments to Marxism-Leninism and to democracy, he also converted to Islam in 1980 (following the rise in oil 
prices of 1979) before becoming a born-again Christian in the 1990s. 
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elections and never lost power (or the war).  Not only did democratization help bring an end to the 
war, but it also reinforced FRELIMO’s territorial control and its power over its domestic opponent 
RENAMO (see Cahen 2005), while unleashing very significant aid flows in this resource-poor 
economy, in which more than 50% of the budget is funded by donors.  If anything, FRELIMO 
reinforced its monopoly of power in the democratic era, particularly after the replacement of 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano by Armando Guebuza in 2004, who has presided over a return of party 
precedence over the state (New York Times, 28 October 2009). 
In Sao Tome, the former ruling party was again the dominant party in parliament by 1994 
and its leader was prime minister. And although Sao Tome has seen frequent changes in 
parliamentary majorities since 1991, politics has stayed confined to a handful of elites (Frynas 2003: 
73-74). In general, the candidates of the major political parties are personally connected, making 
party turnover less threatening to the small class of elites’ access to state resources (Frynas 2003).  
Politics in Cape Verde similarly has alternated but has been confined to a small group of elites.  In 
fact, Pedro Pires, the current president, was also Prime Minister from 1975 to 1991. In such 
environments, consolidating democracy is hardly a risky strategy from the perspective of the elites. 
Finally, in The Seychelles, René never lost the presidency and managed to increase the number of 
terms he was eligible for.  He finally stepped down in 2004. 
Democracy also provides ruling elites with material benefits.  Although democratic African 
countries tend to be less corrupt than other countries, they are far from corruption-free and do not 
necessarily show progress over time in this respect.  In Sao Tome, for example, according to Africa 
Contemporary Record, “corruption and patrimonial politics remained the stock in trade of all political 
leaders [after the transition] and the only means open to them to win elections” because of a 
“culture of corruption so deeply implanted in the political system” (XXV B267).  In Benin, Nassirou 
Arifari writes of the continued “extortion” of authorities (2006).  As illustrated by Table 2, 
48 
 
corruption has remained relatively high in most democratic countries (worsening in Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique and the Seychelles), which supports an inference that elites continue to appropriate 
resources and thus find an instrumental interest in maintaining democracy (unfortunately no data on 
corruption is available for all these countries prior to 1998). 
 
Table 2.  Corruption among African democratizers 
       1996*  2008 
 
   Benin    -0.7  -0.4 
   Cape Verde                -0.3          0.8 
   Malawi    -0.5  -0.6 
   Mali    -0.3  -0.5 
   Mozambique   -0.4  -0.6 
   Sao Tome   -0.4  -0.4 
   Seychelles    0.5   0.2 
   Average   -0.3  -0.2 
   All-Africa average  -0.6  -0.6 
Source:  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi  
(positive numbers indicate less corruption, range of values is about -2.5 to 2.5; 
measure is normalized).  
*1996 or first year available. 
 
 
 The expectation of political and material benefits from democratization is by no means 
merely confined to African leadership.  Wright (2009) finds that democracy-conditional foreign aid 
is most likely to become the impetus for liberalization in settings where the authoritarian regime’s 
tenure will be least threatened by democratization. These regimes, he notes, find it in their interest to 
democratize to gain access to foreign finance, while they maintain job security.21  Therefore, the 
consolidation of strong democratizers might be partly explained by their elites’ continued 
instrumentalization of democracy for both political and material benefits.  The high level of 
                                                        
21 Not all of these calculations were precise, however. In some cases, regime’s miscalculated whether or not they could 
weather the initial elections and maintain control over the democratic transition. For example, in Cape Verde, Pedro 
Pires, the prime minister prior to the adoption of multiparty elections, admitted quite honestly that the PAICV leaders 
had embraced the idea of democratic transition in part because they were convinced that they could not lose multiparty 
elections. They however did lose to an opposition party that had formed only eight months prior to the elections (Meyns 
2002). 
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vulnerability of their portfolio maintains democratic compliance as the only available extraversion 
strategy.  The high rate of incumbency success inherent in the clientelistic nature of African electoral 
democracies (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Posner and Young 2007; van de Walle 2003) limits the risks 
of this strategy. 
 
Making Sense of Hybrid Consolidations 
The logic of hybrid consolidation is not all that different.  One distinction might be that 
hybrids remain over time less vulnerable to donor conditionality.  They have more access to 
alternative sources of revenue, are generally less dependent on foreign aid and as a group are 
comprised of fewer Soviet clients.  In addition, donors care relatively less about democracy in hybrid 
regimes, in part because these countries tend to have resources or strategic advantages that matter 
more to them. Hence, donor preferences are themselves a function of country conditions.  Finally, it 
might be intrinsically harder for donors to monitor conditionality at mid-levels of democracy, 
facilitating hybrid consolidation. 
To begin with, hybrids are less vulnerable to donor demands than their democratic 
counterparts.  First, fewer of them were initially Soviet clients and thus fewer of them had to 
scramble to find new patrons (Table 3).  In contrast, more of them are in the French sphere of 
influence.  French patronage after the initial transition has not been excessively sensitive to 
democratic conditions, which gives these regimes some room of maneuver.  The ratio of aid to 
export revenue, a novel measure of the relative importance of aid cash flows to which I return at 
greater length in the empirical section, is considerably smaller for hybrids than it is for democratizers 
(a phenomenon also observed during the initial transition).  Finally, none of the strong 
democratizers are significant oil producers whereas 29% of the hybrids are, providing the latter with 
some alternative source of revenues. 
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Table 3:  Comparing selected indicators of vulnerability after the initial transition, Democratic and 
Hybrid Regimes 
 
Group Soviet 
Clients 
French Clients Oil Producers Aid-to-Exports ratio** 
 (% of regimes within group) (average % of indicator within group) 
Democratizers 71 29 0 2.75 
Hybrids 41 59 29 0.76 
* Average from 1995-2007, World Development Indicators. 
** 1996-2008 
 
 
Access to revenue from the export of natural resources no doubt represents one of the most 
significant linkages in a portfolio which can afford regimes the ability to avoid pressure to 
democratize. Of the 17 hybrids, eight (Angola, Cameroon, the CAR, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Gabon, Niger and Zambia) are large primary commodity producers.  As in the initial transition 
period, these countries benefit from alternative sources of income aside from aid, which shield them 
from conditionality, irrespective of the direct negative effects that resource abundance per se might 
have on democracy (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Omgba 2009; Ross 2001).  Moreover, these 
regimes also have greater leverage in playing patrons against each other, as they keep patrons 
competing to gain access to their natural resources.  In this respect, the argument that China’s return 
to commodity-rich African countries has lessened the leverage of western donors in terms of 
governance has already been well debated (Tull 2006; Taylor 2009; Brautigam 2009).   
Diversification does not only provide alternative sources of income for a regime.  It also 
allows hybrid regimes to take advantage of the multiple interests that donors hold in their country.  
Put differently, regimes exploit those elements that are of interest to outsiders and that can buffer 
them from more substantial democratic reforms.  As much as they can, they shape their portfolios 
so as to maximize their domestic freedom.  
Donors might indeed be intrinsically less committed to democracy in countries on which 
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they depend for resources and with which they have established routines and privileges (Uvin 1993: 
69; Hook 1998).  Both the United States and the European Union, for example, failed to implement 
strict conditions on their aid to Nigeria during the return to military rule in 1993 because of their oil 
interests in the country (Crawford 1997:91).  Such lack of internal consistency might particularly 
affect France which has a multifaceted involvement in African countries (Nelson and Eglinton 
1992:82).  For example, the democratization pressure exercised by France on Benin and Mali 
contrasted with their more lenient attitudes towards Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon.  One is also 
tempted to see a link between the announcement by President Sarkozy in Niamey of significant new 
French investments in Niger’s uranium sector in March of 2009 and President Mamadou Tandja’s 
subsequent authoritarian drift (which led to his overthrow in February 2010). 
Donor countries are also increasingly torn between their desire for democracy and their 
interest in political stability, including containment of alleged terrorist threats.  The “war on terror” 
can also become the object of extraversion.  In this respect, the rise of the anti-terrorist agenda after 
2001 has offered some African ruling elites (particularly those of the Sahel region and of countries 
with large Muslim populations) a new venue for extraversion that has reduced the appeal and 
necessity of democratization.  Cédric Jourde (2007:481) finds that Mauritanian and Guinean state 
elites actively “enacted a series of performances such as the arrests of alleged ‘Islamists,’ ‘warlords,’ 
and other transnational ‘subversive threats,’ thereby framing their domestic and foreign policies in 
ways that can resonate with hegemonic international discourses, seeking to obtain either more 
support from Western states or to lower their democratization pressure (or both).” 
Similarly, the geopolitical importance of some hybrid regimes might be a source of leverage.  
Since the death of Côte d’Ivoire’s President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, Blaise Compaoré of 
Burkina Faso has been the new power broker of West Africa, an important relay of French foreign 
policy.  France has also systematically courted the Angolan regime over the last decade, and Angola 
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has been involved in both Congolese conflicts in support of France’s clients.  Ethiopia barely 
received a slap on the wrist following the large-scale violence in the wake of its botched 2005 
elections, in part because it is the US’ main ally in the Horn of Africa against Islamic insurgent 
movements.  The same argument also applies to quite a few of the stagnant authoritarian regimes.  
Western donors generally ignore Uganda’s de facto one-party system because of the country’s 
economic growth, success with fighting HIV and its government’s support in the “War on Terror.” 
In addition to the mixed motives of donors, there might be an intrinsic difference in how 
they value democracy as a function of the degree of a regime’s democracy.  In other words, with 
democracy promotion an important dimension of foreign aid agendas since the early 1990s (it 
accounts for an annual $2.5bn in aid in the United States alone22), donors might have too much at 
stake to contemplate failure among the strong democratizers.  They are unwilling to see reversion in 
these countries, and ready to invest additional efforts to avoid it.  In contrast, they have less at stake 
among hybrid regimes.  They are satisfied for these countries to meet a minimum threshold of 
democracy, but it is not worth the effort to push for more, especially in view of the difficulties to 
make conditionality successful (Brown 2005: 184-188). 
Hence, hybrid regimes face little pressure to further democratize.  They get away with some 
trappings of democracy, while the incumbents remain safely in control of the political process.  Yet, 
they are not at liberty to completely revert to authoritarianism either.  Serious setbacks, like large-
scale political violence against opponents or military coups, carry sanctions.  For example, the 
United States suspended all but humanitarian aid after the Rajoelina takeover in Madagascar in 
March of 2009.  Similarly, France and the European Union applied an arms embargo after the 
Camara regime in Guinea killed some 150 opponents in a Conakry stadium in September 2009.  In 
contrast, the Democratic Republic of Congo did not face any significant consequences from the 
                                                        
22
 Carothers (2009). 
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abductions and killings of human rights activists and journalists in 2008 and 2009, and the US hardly 
complained about the scrambling of Voice of America by the Ethiopian government in 2010, both of 
which registered too low on the conditionality scale. 
The compatibility of hybridity with democratic extraversion is thus partly a matter of 
salience.  Holding multiparty elections can be easily observed and creates a presumption of relative 
democracy.  In between elections, it takes very significant backsliding to trigger aid sanctions (Brown 
2005:184).  Actual aid withdrawal is unlikely to happen unless regimes display dramatic and 
recognizable undemocratic behavior, such as a coup or civil conflict (Boulding and Hyde 2008).  As 
a result, hybridity has stable characteristics. 
Hybrids are countries that can capitalize on the inherent weaknesses of political 
conditionality.  They might have more resources or be more important geo-strategically, and they 
may benefit from the ambiguity of donors’ goals and ambitions towards them.  Consequently, they 
were able to limit the degree of their original democratization and to stabilize at such level (or, for a 
few, to backslide from initially larger gains).  Yet, they cannot afford or find few benefits in returning 
entirely to authoritarianism.  For these countries, partial reform is an equilibrium.   
 
Empirical Evidence 
In this section, I use OLS regression analysis to test the explanatory power of the 
extraversion argument compared to alternative possible explanations of African regime trajectories.  
I begin with a comparison between a model of transition based on domestic predictors and one 
based on measures that capture a country’s vulnerability to foreign pressure.  I then combine both 
models into one analysis. I then do the same for consolidation.  I find that, in both cases, variables 
that operationalize the extraversion theory provide much greater explanatory power.  
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Transitions 
I present the results in Table 4.23  The dependent variable to capture the extent of early 
transition toward democracy is the change in freedom house scores from 1989 and 1995.24  All 
models include a control variable for the freedom house score in 1989.  This is a convergence term, 
which captures the fact that initially more democratic countries have less room for subsequent 
progress.  The first model includes all variables that approximate possible domestic determinants of 
democratization. Specifically, in the first model, I find no statistically significant effect of the most 
common predictors of democratization, namely GDP per capita in 1989, literacy,25 ethnic 
fractionalization (Easterly and Levine 1997), domestic protests (Bratton and van de Walle 1997), 
colonial legacy (Joireman 2004), or past experience with a multiparty system (which Bates 2008 
refers to as “historisis”).26 I did, however, find support for Lindberg’s assertion that the practice of 
elections will be positively correlated with democratization.  It should be mentioned, though, that I 
did not use Lindberg’s (2006) own measure of elections, which counts the total number of elections 
a country has had since its last “breakdown” (coup or civil war), because I was concerned that 
resetting the elections count after a breakdown might make the measure somewhat endogenous to 
democratic developments.  Instead, I used a cumulative measure of elections that does not reset the 
                                                        
23
 For data sources and measurements, see Appendix I. 
24
 For all analyses (transition and consolidation) I tested whether the results were robust to using just civil liberties scores 
and just political rights scores. In general, the results were robust. In all cases, extraversion type variables provide the 
majority of explanatory power and domestic variables, as a group, are found to not significantly improve the explanatory 
power of the models.  
25
 GDP per capita and literacy are meant to operationalize the effects of a modernization-type democratic movement; 
wherein industrialization is theorized to promotes economic wealth and correlates with democratic demands. GDP per 
capita was measured in 1989 to control for whether variations in wealth at the beginning of the wave can account for 
variations in the extent to which a transition occurred. An average literacy score of the available data for each country 
over the 1990-2007 was used because of the severe missingness of literacy data and under the assumption and 
observation that literacy data does not vary dramatically over this period of time.  
26 Bates (2008:163) finds that “the longer a country has been subject to a no- or single party system, the less likely it is to 
change to a multiparty system.”  For a similar argument applied to Latin America, see Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 
(2008)  
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count to 0 after breakdown.27 Altogether, the first model is significant only at the 10% error level (as 
indicated by the F test), and a large proportion of its R-squared comes from the convergence term 
alone.     
 
Table 4:  Extraversion, Vulnerability and the Initial Democratic Transition 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Robust 
SE 
Coef. Robust 
SE 
Coef. Robust 
SE 
Freedom House score in 1989 -1.49*** 0.43 -0.52** 0.24 -1.09* 0.61 
GDP per capita in 1989, ln 0.13 0.29   0.39 0.39 
Average Literacy rate, 1990-2007 -0.75 0.69   -0.38 0.78 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.56 0.95   0.16 1.22 
Protests -0.03 0.03   0.00 0.04 
Legacy 0.27 0.32   0.02 0.40 
Historisis -0.04 0.04   0.03 0.04 
Elections 0.64** 0.31   0.75* 0.42 
Soviet   1.36*** 0.46 1.54** 0.70 
French   0.75* 0.42 -0.12 0.70 
Aid as a % of exports, 1989-95   0.08 0.06 0.11** 0.05 
Oil Rents, 1989   -1.18** 0.54 -1.62* 0.89 
SAL to 1989   -0.15 0.11 -0.06 0.15 
Conflict 1989-95   -0.86** 0.39 -0.31 0.55 
Constant 6.39** 2.75 2.29** 0.88 0.06 4.07 
Observations 43  46  42  
R-squared 0.30  0.46  0.60  
F test 1.87  7.40  6.74  
Prob >F 0.10  0.00  0.00  
OLS; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
 
 
In contrast, the second model, which estimates the effects of extraversion and vulnerability, 
has good predictive power and several significant variables.  It shows that having been a Soviet or 
French client significantly promoted democratic transition when these patrons disappeared or 
relented.  I test whether access to foreign aid has an effect on this early transition period with the 
use of foreign aid as a ratio of export revenue on reform.  Most studies that have looked at the 
impact of aid dependence on democratization have measured it per capita or as a percentage of GNI 
                                                        
27
 In an unreported model I used a measure that I think approximates Lindberg’s (2006) measure of the number of 
elections. In that model, elections is also significantly and positively associated with democracy.  
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(and most have not found any significant effect).  This is a poor proxy for the role of aid in 
extraversion strategies, however.  From the point of view of incumbent elites, one of aid’s main 
benefits is access to cash.  The extent to which such access matters to a regime is a function of what 
other sources of cash it can rely on.  Measuring aid as a percentage of GNI does not capture this 
measure of necessity.  Two countries can have identical aid ratios to GNI.  Yet, one country’s GNI 
might rely largely on exports and thus provide ample cash, while another might depend more on 
subsistence farming and thus present governments with fewer avenues for access to foreign 
exchange.  Aid would be more important in the extraversion portfolio of the latter country.  This 
measure, averaged over 1989-1995 period, captures the relative importance of aid cash during the 
period in question for the country.  It draws sharp distinctions.  
In addition to these three measures of extraversion, I include three factors that might reduce 
a country’s vulnerability.  Access to oil rents at the beginning of the transition (1989) is found, as 
expected, to negatively impact democratization during this period and is interpreted to imply that 
this lack of vulnerability at the onset of the transition buffered the regime from future democratic 
demands.  I also reasoned that countries that had access to IMF structural-adjustment financing 
prior to 1989 (which did not include governance conditionality then, much less democratic ones) 
might have been in lesser dire straits than others and more immune to the democratic demands of 
Western bilateral donors.  However, while the coefficient is in the right direct, it is not significant 
and thus, this idea was not supported by the results. Finally, I find a negative effect of conflict on 
democratization.  No doubt this is at least in part a direct effect:  countries in the throes of war are 
less likely to democratize. But it also, paradoxically, mitigates the democratic vulnerability of a 
country towards donors:  countries that experience conflict are under less pressure to democratize 
from donors.  Altogether, the second model is significant at the 0% error level and accounts for 
almost 50% of the variance.   
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Finally in the third model, I test a combination of all variables. In this model, the elections 
effect remains; elections are found to be positively associated with the extent to which a regime 
liberalized during the early 1990s. Additionally, conflict and being a former French colony is no 
longer significant in the combined model. However, this model illustrates that extraversion type 
variables still tell the majority of the story. For instance, being a Soviet client and having less access 
to oil rents is still robustly associated with more democratization during this time period. Also, with 
the inclusion of domestic variables, a country’s dependence on foreign aid is also found to be 
significantly and positively influential on the extent to which regime liberalizes. In addition, I ran F-
tests on each group of variables (domestic and extraversion) after the combined model was analyzed. 
These tests determine whether the inclusion of a group of variables significantly improves the 
variance explained of regression analyses that would otherwise exclude them. I found that the group 
of domestic variables do not significantly improve the variance explained, while the group of 
extraversion variables do. These tests serve as an additional way to confirm that extraversion type 
variables provide most of the explanatory power in the pre-1995 transition period in Africa.  
Consolidations 
Extraversion also proves to be an essential driver of regime consolidation.  In Table 5, I 
again put side by side a model based on domestic explanations of regime consolidation (measured 
this time by average Freedom House score for 1996-2009), one based on extraversion, and a 
combined model. Because I use the extent of the initial transition as a predictor of subsequent 
consolidation, I exclude countries that were already democratic prior to 1989.  I also omit Namibia 
and South Africa, which had more radical regime changes that make their transitions not 
comparable. 
In all three models, I control for the effects of initial change (1989-1995).  As discussed in 
the first section, the initial change in civil liberties is a strong predictor of subsequent levels of 
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democracy.  Aside from that and from “historisis” (the number of years spent as a single party 
before the transition has a negative effect on the subsequent level of democracy), however, none of 
the common domestic factors is significant, including the elections effect found in the previous 
analyses. 28  
In contrast, the second model supports the hypothesis that continued vulnerability of 
extraversion portfolios largely contributes to regime consolidation.  The relative parsimony of this 
model derives from several factors.  First, I found no effect of being a former French colony or 
Soviet client, and did not include them in the model (which had no effect on the other variables).  
This is not surprising:  as the decade wore on, French enthusiasm for democratization waned and 
former Soviet clients aligned with new donors. I did not either include the measure of structural 
adjustment loans that we had in table 5.  I actually found a significantly positive effect on democracy 
of the number of structural adjustment loans (SALs) between 1995 and 2008.  Including this variable 
had no effect on the sign, magnitude and significance of the aid as % of export variable, but it 
slightly reduced the significance of the conflict and oil variables.  Its positive sign, compared to its 
negative effect in the transition regression (Table 4), is not either necessarily surprising, as SAL’s 
impact on regime type became more ambiguous throughout the 1990s.  In some countries, SALs’ 
conditionality took on more political dimensions (in fact, many of these loans became public-sector 
adjustment and poverty-reduction strategy programs) and the multilateral agencies worked more 
synchronously with bilateral donors.  
 
 
 
                                                        
28
 When my measure of elections is substituted with a measure of elections that I think Lindberg (2006) used in this 
model, the number of elections is significantly and positively associated with regime consolidation in the 1996-2009 
period. However, because of the issues discussed above with how the variable is originally operationalized (reset for a 
democratic ‘set-back’) and how this might be endogenous to the dependent variable, I chose to not report that model.  
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Table 5:  Extraversion, Vulnerability and Regime Consolidation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Robust 
SE 
Coef. Robust 
SE 
Coef. Robust 
SE 
Freedom House Score Change 1989-95 0.50*** 0.10 0.41*** 0.08 0.45*** 0.07 
GDP per capita in 1995, ln 0.10 0.20   0.19 0.16 
GDP growth average 1995-08 -0.02 0.04     
Average Literacy rate, 1990-07 -0.41 0.46   -0.08 0.44 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.34 0.55   1.15* 0.61 
Legacy -0.08 0.22   -0.23 0.24 
Historisis -0.06*** 0.02   -0.04** 0.02 
Elections -0.04 0.08   0.01 0.07 
Aid as a % of exports, 1996-08   0.17*** 0.06 0.17** 0.07 
Oil Rents, 1995-06   -0.86** 0.39 -1.04** 0.41 
Conflict 1995-08   -0.86* 0.27 -0.40 0.36 
Constant 5.49*** 1.69 3.25*** 0.26 2.67 2.12 
Observations 40  41  40  
R-squared 0.50  0.62  0.66  
F test 5.29  17.30  10.87  
Prob >F 0.00  0.00  0.00  
OLS; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
 
 
  The analysis focuses therefore on the three remaining variables.  The notion of vulnerability 
of extraversion portfolios is largely borne out by the behavior of aid in % of export, which has a 
very significant positive association with levels of democracy, highlighting democracy’s role as a cash 
earner for governments deprived of others sources of foreign exchange.  Even after the initial 
transition, strong democratizers remain about four times more dependent on foreign aid cash than 
their hybrid and authoritarian counterparts.  Looking then at what mitigating circumstances might 
reduce the vulnerability of countries and the necessity of democracy for their regimes, I observe that 
rents from oil exports have a significant and negative association with democracy.  Oil exporters are 
on average over 1.5 points below other African countries in terms of their freedom house scores. 
Finally, the existence of conflict is once again associated with less democracy.  As before, such a 
finding only partly relates to the extraversion argument, for countries at war make for poor 
democratic venues in general.  
 I was, however, unsuccessful in my attempts to capture some of the non-financial specific 
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conditions that might reduce the vulnerability of hybrid consolidators.  For example, I found no 
effect of a dummy variable measuring whether a country was a strategic ally of France (Angola, 
Chad, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal) or of the US (Angola, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya), or benefited from some other circumstances that might reduce 
donor pressure (Rwanda, Uganda), including a perceived role in the “fight against terror” (Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger).  I believe, however, that such absence of significant effect largely derived from 
the lack of nuance of these dichotomous measurements and the problem of multiple overlapping 
variables with few observations. 
 The combined model, despite a few changes, provides a confirmation of much of the 
previous two.  Extraversion type variables still provide most of the story. Although conflict is not 
longer associated with consolidation, oil and aid dependence prove to be robust indicators of 
consolidation. With regard to domestic variables, while historisis is found to be positively associated 
with consolidation, so is ethnic fractionalization. This is surprising and counterintuitive to the theory 
that ethnic fractionalization squelches collective action, which is needed for democracies 
consolidate.   Once again F-tests were performed to examine the importance of each group of 
variables to the variance explained. As with the transition model, I find that the group of domestic 
variables to do not significantly improve the explanatory power of the consolidation analyses, while 
the group of extraversion models do to the 0% error level.  
 
Conclusion 
Variations in initial transitions to democracy and in subsequent consolidations at different 
levels of democracy can be largely accounted for by variations in the degree of vulnerability of the 
extraversion portfolios of African regimes.  Regime consolidation at the level of democracy reached 
at the end of the transition period typically results from an absence of major changes in extraversion 
61 
 
portfolios.  This is not to say, however, that such changes cannot take place and that consolidation 
might not give way to new transitions—towards more or less democracy—in any given state.  On 
the contrary, one should expect portfolios to evolve in the long run as different endowments acquire 
or lose value.  The end of the Cold War provided a rapid and dramatic example of such a shift (with 
socialism suddenly losing extraversion currency), but slower adaptations are more likely.  Recent 
developments suggest that portfolio diversification might be on its way for several countries, for 
which democracy would then represent relatively lesser value.  These developments include 
increased Chinese patronage for several regimes (although this effect might not be clearly 
differentiated from the mineral rent as it mostly concerns resource-rich countries); the discovery 
(Ghana, Uganda) or start in production (Sao Tome) of oil; and new strategic importance in the 
context of the US “war on terror” (e.g., Kenya, Mali, or Mauritania).   
If African democracy is more a function of access to external resources than it is of domestic 
factors, one might wonder how genuine it is.  When democratic reforms are taken primarily for a 
foreign, rather than a domestic audience, does it decrease the many other dividends we expect to 
come from democratization?  Are citizens able to use democratic institutions adopted under these 
“exogenous” circumstances to hold their leadership accountable for providing social services?  In 
the next chapter I return to addressing the puzzle that democratic change has not been associated 
with positive change in social service coverage. I develop an argument that focuses on the likely 
negative implications that foreign sourced democratic change has on institutionalizing responsive 
leadership. Put differently, I argue that it is the exogeneity of Africa’s democratic wave that can 
explain why Africa’s newest democracies are failing to provide higher levels of social services.   
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Chapter Three: Exogenous Political Change and Government Responsiveness 
 
This dissertation focuses on examining why the 1990s democratization wave in Africa has 
not been associated with increases in social service coverage.  In the previous chapter I argue that 
Africa’s post-Cold War democratization wave was largely a product of the extraverted nature of 
African politics and a changed international environment wherein foreign pressure to adopt 
democratic institutions became dominant. In this light, steps to democratize can be both seen as a 
strategy of extraversion and a consequence of it. Regimes were not only under immense pressure to 
adopt democratic institutions to maintain ties or obtain new linkages with foreign patrons, they were 
equally faced with a new set of incentives to democratize. Thus, much of Africa’s 1990s democratic 
wave can be attributed to changes in exogenous, or foreign, circumstances, rather than from 
pressures generated from a domestic democratic movement. As illustrated in chapter 1, even though 
the majority of authoritarian regimes on the continent adopted democratic institutions, like 
multiparty elections, these reforms have not been associated with a rise in responsive leadership, as 
is indicated by the state of social services coverage on the continent. In this chapter I develop an 
argument that contends that it is the exogenous nature of political liberalization which can help to 
explain why democratization has become disassociated with social service coverage on the continent. 
I argue that instead of institutionalizing an electoral incentive to provide social services, leadership of 
exogenous democracies become principally accountable to the foreign actors whom  political change 
was meant to appease.   However, while foreign actors can, to some degree, monitor whether 
African leaders hold multiparty elections, they are less able and, in some respects, unwilling to 
effectively demand and monitor that regimes adopt political reforms that are necessary to 
institutionalize a responsive democracy and to supervise their habitual behavior in terms of service 
delivery. Additionally, exogenously pressured democratic reforms are likely to result in an imbalance 
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between the ruling party and domestic opposition. In such settings, domestic opposition parties are 
usually under-prepared to effectively act as a democratic watchdog and the ruling party is able to 
maintain and/or create a political monopoly wherein the democratic playing field is tilted. These 
outcomes ultimately threaten any electoral incentive a ruling party might have to produce higher 
levels of social services.  
To test the merits of the broader claims of this argument, I develop a measure of exogenous 
political change and examine its impact on social services in Africa through quantitative analyses. In 
using this measure in standard econometric models of the relationship between political change and 
changes in social services, I illustrate that exogenous political change has dampened the impact 
that democratic progress has had on social service delivery on the continent. Further, I 
illustrate that once these models account for the exogeneity of political change, democratization in 
Africa is associated with positive changes in quality of life. These findings directly address the 
empirical puzzle uncovered in chapter one of this dissertation. 
 
Exogenous Democratic Change and Responsive Leadership 
That democracies vary, or that such variation likely produces important policy differences 
across countries is not a novel idea. Little, however, has been written on the lasting impacts of 
different paths that countries take to democratize. This chapter focuses on the likely lasting impact 
that different transitions have on policy outcomes. Specifically, democratic reforms are 
conceptualized to exist along a continuum based on the importance of various pressures and 
incentives that were present to persuade undemocratic regimes to adopt them. Pressures or 
incentives to reform are conceptually categorized as either domestically rooted, or externally driven. 
Thus, at the end of the continuum would be those regimes that adopted reforms primarily due to 
circumstances that were external to the country, which I will call exogenously derived 
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democratization. These regimes may have had internal demands for democratic reforms as well, but 
the principal impetus behind the concessions was due to foreign pressure or external circumstances. 
At the opposite end would be those where domestic pressures, or endogenous pressures, were most 
important to the decision to reform.  Reforms that were taken due the importance of an equal 
mixture of both would make up the middle point of this continuum. Thus, conceptually, this 
continuum does not capture the mere presence of one type of pressure or another, but their relative 
importance to the regime’s decision to ultimately adopt reforms.  
Regardless of what mixture of exogenous and endogenous factors contributed to a decision 
to adopt multipartyism, if a given government holds competitive elections, should we still expect 
that leadership will be incentivized to meet the social service needs of their constituents because of 
their fear of being voted out of office? (Deacon 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2004; Meltzer and Richard 1981). I argue that instead of 
institutionalizing an electoral incentive to provide social services, leadership of exogenously derived 
democracies are unlikely to adopt policies which institutionalize a more responsive political system. 
This problem is a result of two different spheres of possible influence on a government, the 
domestic and international. Exogenous democratization inherently shifts accountability of the 
government from the domestic to international sphere. In the domestic sphere, incumbent 
leadership are largely unchecked as they do not face strong opposition to a continuation of the old 
way of doing things, and will thus have ample leeway to protect a status quo which has thus far 
benefitted them. However, internationally, the foreign actors for which political change was meant 
to appease are equally unlikely and/or unable to use their economic and other leverages to 
effectively cause ruling elites to adopt “responsive” policies. While donors ensure a change towards 
democracy occurs, it is unlikely to be one that increases a government’s level of responsiveness to its 
people.  Thus, exogenous democracy in Africa ends up introducing a wedge between the formal 
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characteristics of a regime and its practical dimensions, its manifestations in the daily lives of its 
citizens. 
Donors’ Role in Establishing a Responsive Government 
In Africa’s more exogenously derived democracies, foreign aid donors were the main 
audience for which democratic reforms were taken. While changes made in this setting may have not 
had strong domestic roots, donors still hoped that newly elected governments would be accountable 
to the demands and needs of the domestic public (Crawford 2001: 78).  However, increasing a 
government’s responsiveness involves ensuring that several complex policy and social changes take 
place, which require the attention of change seekers far beyond the first multiparty election. When 
donors are the primary actors for which steps toward democracy are taken, the degree of 
responsiveness the ensuing democracy will have depends primarily on the ability and will of donors 
to compel recipient governments to become committed to policy changes associated with 
responsiveness. Donors have a set of instruments available to them to try to shape a recipient 
government’s incentives to make domestic change (Crawford 2001:44; Carothers 1999: 6). They can 
either sanction or reward behavior, as is often done through withholding or increasing foreign aid 
and other assistance.  They can also directly fund actions that they feel will strengthen democracy in 
a given country; such assistance is the most common tool used to promote democracy (Carothers 
1999:6). Below, I argue that donors are unlikely to use these tools effectively to ensure that changes 
which are associated with increases in responsiveness take place. It is doubtful that donors will use 
sanctions on a new democracy, or otherwise, for the specific goal of increasing responsiveness.  
Additionally, rewarding governments for, or directly funding policies, aimed at institutionalizing a 
more responsive democracy often does not overcome a lack of domestic will to change the status 
quo or pre-existing socio-economic realities which inhibit the establishment of increased 
responsiveness. 
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 Arguably, punishing an economically dependent recipient country by withdrawing aid or 
other needed assistance is a donor’s most powerful tool. While a donor could sanction a government 
if it did not take measures that would theoretically institutionalize a higher level of responsiveness, as 
mentioned in chapter two, aid sanctioning is usually reserved for times where easily recognizable and 
egregious signs of democratic backsliding occur, like in the case of a coup or civil conflict (Boulding 
and Hyde 2008). Sanctioning is probably reserved as a reaction to dramatic events for several 
reasons. For example, donors may want to avoid the sheer expense and disruption that accompanies 
canceling development projects, for example,  which usually require long term planning, and 
consistency to have a lasting impact (Brown 2005:84). Additionally, as Easterly (2002) has made 
apparent, the aid bureaucracies that are delegated with evaluating aid programs and making many 
decisions about the allocation of aid, have strong incentives to not to reduce its flow, or recommend 
a reduction to other decision makers, because cutbacks can cause fluctuations in their own operating 
budgets.  
However, there are additional reasons, specific to the task of trying to induce more 
responsiveness that decrease the likelihood that aid withdrawal be used for this purpose. For 
example, because “responsive” policy changes are likely to be complex undertakings, measuring 
whether a policy change has increased responsiveness is difficult to do (Uvin 1993: 70; Hook 1998: 
173). Thus, donors may have a difficult time establishing a benchmark with which they might be 
satisfied or dissatisfied in order to take action (Brown 2005). This problem of operationalizing 
responsiveness success is illustrated with the case of decentralization. A decentralizing government is 
supposed to open more effective channels for citizens to voice their policy demands (Tommasi and 
Winshelbaum 2007), incentivize local policy makers to respond to local needs and aid in rectifying a 
general problem of inequalities in the distribution of state resources (Faguet 2004; Besley and Coate 
2003: 2628; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005).  However, decentralization alone does not guarantee 
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responsiveness, and in some cases it can result in concentrating power in the hands of local elites 
(Edwards 1994: 69). herefore, where measures to decentralize are taken, donors have to be able and 
willing to monitor the development of a democratic, or responsive, character of local government, 
as well (Crawford 2001: 84). Such monitoring not only requires an incredible commitment from a 
given interested donor, but judging whether progress has been made on this front will likely be 
complicated by a host of other qualitative measurement and contextual factors.  The complexity of 
evaluating whether a given policy, like decentralization, induces responsiveness makes conditioning 
aid on this goal highly unlikely.  
The example of decentralization highlights other factors that undermine the willingness of 
donors to demand that governments adopt policies which increase responsiveness. Donors might 
avoid promoting institution altering policies, like decentralization, with too much force because such 
pressure could raise controversial issues of the sovereignty of the recipient government to determine 
the structure and nature of its own political system (Crawford 2001: 84). Additionally, promoting 
decentralization, or any responsiveness-associated policy, may conflict with other policy goals a 
donor may have an already, or more, vested interest in. Particularly in the case of decentralization, a 
donor may be reluctant to push for shifting roles and responsibilities of the central and local 
governments if there is also an effort being made to persuade the government to follow some sort 
of “state-shrinking” economic reform agenda (Crawford 2001: 84). As Stephen Brown observed, 
especially among multilateral donors, economic concerns like this often trumped democratic ones 
(2005: 186). Operating within competing donor agendas, recipient governments can use a 
combination of reforms to lessen the attention on any one in particular. If recipient governments 
take steps to meet the desired economic reforms and make somewhat minimal democratic 
concessions, donors are more likely to soften political conditionalities on aid, without the promise of 
more substantive political change. This scenario occurred in the cases of Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda, 
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Kenya, and Zambia, among others (Brown 2005: 185). Among competing agendas democratization 
is not often the first priority of donors, much less the degree of responsiveness or quality of the 
democracy that is being promoted.  
 Beyond sanctioning, donors can also directly fund reform or reward countries for reforming 
towards more responsive governance. However, in their own right, these “positive” tools are 
unlikely to be effective to provoke governments to make responsive change, especially when such 
change threatens the power of those in office. Donors and IFIs are often confronted with a lack of 
political will among power holders in the recipient government to becoming committed to the 
reforms they promote (Carothers 1999: 183). This is many times the case when donors try to assist 
in strengthening legislatures. Stronger legislatures are commonly hypothesized to increase 
government accountability to its citizens and among government branches (Crawford 2001: 84; 
Barkan et al. 2004), and such accountability should induce a higher degree of government 
responsiveness (Crawford 2001: 84). Donors and IFIs have promoted stronger legislatures through a 
number of measures, from paying for office equipment and training seminars to helping to establish 
legislative offices and strengthening committees (Stapenhurst 2008: 61). However, while 
governments find it easy to ask members to attend a training session or allow a new bureaucratic 
office to open, real change is not usually adopted because power holders are not willing genuinely 
accept measures that would check their own authorities (Carothers 1999: 88).  
 Finally, donors, regardless of the tools they use to promote change, may be unable to 
overcome pre-existing social and economic realities which hinder the establishment of a responsive 
government. This point is made through the example of civil society promotion. Democracies are 
likely to be more responsive when domestic civil society is able to channel citizen interests and 
demands to government and when civil society takes on a role of an autonomous democratic 
watchdog, which is able to provide a counterweight to state power (Crawford 2001: 21).While 
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donors can monitor and sanction the degree to which a government allows civil society to flourish, 
their attempts in funding the emergence of civil society to act as a check on state power is 
complicated by the resulting financial dependence of these organizations on donors. Donors try to 
encourage the growth of civil society through directly funding the operations of an astounding 
number of local NGOs in Africa, however, in most cases, local NGOs in Africa are too poor to 
operate without the finance from donor agencies (Diamond 1997: 28). Financially dependent NGOs 
are unable to evolve organically and independently, because they find that they have to adjust their 
political and social agendas to suit those of their benefactors (Makumbe 1998: 314). In this manner, 
“local” NGOs become somewhat of an extension of their foreign donors. This is worrisome for the 
establishment of a responsive democracy for at least two reasons. First, civil society, or at least the 
portion of “civil society” that consists of the operation of local NGOs, is domestically unsustainable 
and would fold if a donor loses interest in funding it. Second, dependence on foreign sources of 
finance likely decreases an organization’s proclivity to act as an effective critic of the government. 
Donors are often reluctant to offer funding to organizations that make overt political demands of 
the government because of a worry that their own presence in the country would be expelled in 
retaliation (Makumbe 1998: 315). Thus, when dependent on foreign finance, local organizations 
might shy away from efforts at holding elected officials accountable and avoid taking a strong stance 
to ensure responsiveness.29  
It is also unlikely that donors will be able to change some of the fundamental socio-
economic structures in Africa that inhibit the natural growth of a more organic and larger class of 
civil society. Africa’s democratization took many scholars by surprise simply because it lacked an 
                                                        
29
 Another point to consider here is that donors often fund service delivery NGOs, which provide social services. In 
other words, these organizations replace the role of the state. This may also be detrimental to establishing a democracy 
which is responsive to citizens social service needs because citizens may stop expecting the government to provide these 
services, and, thus, not weigh in a politician’s performance on providing services when they vote. This, too, decreases the 
likelihood that politicians will be incentivized to provide services. 
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emerging middle or capitalist class whose domestic financial and political leverage was independently 
derived of the state (Joseph 1997: 363). As discussed in chapter 2, modernization theorists 
understood a middle class to be pre-requisite of internally driven democratization. Instead, as Peter 
Uvin observes, politics in Africa is usually contained to “a very small percentage of the population; 
the large, ‘silent majority’ – farmers, urban poor- are totally excluded from that” (1993: 73). With 
few resources, the poor in Africa focus their energy on navigating survival, not political development. 
These realities are likely to remain untouched by the presence of donor supported democratization 
efforts.  
Domestic Political Environment in Exogenously Derived Democracies 
In countries where exogenous circumstances are most important to the decision to adopt 
democratic reforms, domestic movements or opposition to the ruling party are weak and effectively 
non-existent, by definition. Thus, domestically, decisions to take steps towards democracy are almost 
isolated to the purview of the ruling party and/or incumbent.  As one observer noted of the case of 
Guinea-Bissau, where multipartyism was adopted without a significant domestic movement and 
largely to court Western donors after the regime lost its connection to the Soviet Union at the end 
of the Cold War (Ferreira 2004), “accepting multi-partyism independently of any popular pressure at 
least means that the process is protected from the disturbances and unrest inherent in any change 
dictated by the street” (ARB 1990: 9685).  The extent to which a regime can control the terms of 
political liberalization benefits their ability to institutionalize “rules of the game” which will most 
serve their own interests.  And, because of a lack of organized domestic opposition, exogenous 
democratizers take transitional steps within an environment which is ripe for them to control. 
Some regimes, like Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and Tanzania, used their domestic control of 
the timing of the first election to edge out the possibility that an opposition to their continued rule 
to could effectively mobilize (Hughes 1996; Jeffries and Thomas 1993: 33; Sandbrook 2000:27). In 
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each case regimes held elections very quickly after it became clear to the ruling elites that the 
government lost or might lose needed foreign aid if they did not hold elections and in the case of 
Equatorial Guinea, specifically, the regime held the first election six months sooner than had been 
previously announced (Hughes 1996: 442).  Many other tactics were employed by regimes to tilt the 
electoral playing field in their favor. For example, regimes denied opposition parties’ access to 
publicly owned mass media and the freedom to hold rallies, co-opted opposition leaders, used state 
resources to subsidize their own campaign, deployed militias to intimidate opponents, channeled 
state resources as patronage towards supportive constituencies, gerrymandering districts to their 
favor, among other things (Sandbrook 2000; Joseph 1997; Jourde 2007; Schedler 2002:44). In Ghana, 
the incumbent, facing a weak and fractionalized opposition, was able to walk away from negotiations, 
with the opposition, with the power to effectively dictate electoral rules and even arrangements of 
the international supervision over the election (Jeffries and Thomas 1993: 333). While these tactics 
certainly threatened the freeness and fairness of a first election, they also generally flew under the 
radar of what the international community could or were willing to monitor and sanction (Levitsky 
and Way 2006: 382).  
In exogenously derived democratic transitions, the cracks in donors’ political conditionalities 
and the lack of a powerful domestic source of pressure at home gave incumbent governments loose 
parameters within which to operate. This position of control for the incumbent government over 
the transition in the domestic sphere has an important implication: the incumbent government is in 
a position to protect much of the status quo, from which they previously benefitted. Thus, in this 
setting, changes that are adopted during a transition to multipartyism are likely to be done carefully 
so as to protect the ruling class’s access to power.  For example, in Equatorial Guinea, where donor 
pressure resulted in the introduction of a new constitution which legalized opposition parties, the 
government also codified within that constitution an automatic immunity for the president from any 
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prosecution, as well as age (over 40), residency (last five years in the country), income (deposit of 3 
million CFA), legal (no criminal record) and nationality restrictions on those who ran for president 
(Hughes 1996: 445). This was extremely restrictive to the main opposition leaders to the regime, 
whom had either spent considerable time in exile or had been arrested for political activities in the 
past (Hughes 1996:445). 
A similar move was made in the Gambia, where a military coup, led by Yahya Jammeh, 
overthrew a long established democratic system in July of 1994 (Wiseman 1998: 65). In October of 
that year, Jammeh announced that he would stay in power without elections for another four years 
(Wiseman 1998: 66). However, international donors used their considerable leverage over the regime 
to speed up the process by sanctioning aid flows and in response, only two months later, Jammeh 
announced an shortened 2 year transition period (Saine 2002: 168). However during the transitional 
process, donors did little regarding the regime’s attempts to tilt the playing field in its favor. Jammeh 
was able to push through a new constitution which effectively banned any pre-coup parties from 
competing (Schedler 2002: 42).30  
In addition to making changes carefully, incumbent leadership will likely not make any 
change which is not demanded of them by the international community. Donors are unlikely and 
somewhat unable to use their leverage to overcome a problem of a lack of genuine political will to 
reform. If prior to the transition, the executive branch held an inordinate amount of power, as was 
the case in many of Africa’s personal regimes, the executive branch is likely to remain dominant. 
Cameroon, the Gambia, Mauritania and Togo can all serve as examples of this sentiment. In each 
country governments were under extraordinary international pressure to adopt multiparty elections, 
and due to a lack of organized domestic opposition, the elites within these governments largely 
                                                        
30
 While the constitution was also approved overwhelmingly by the public in a referendum, the government made the 
document public only four days prior to the vote, which did not allow Gambians enough time to really understand the 
content of what they were voting for outside of the fact that the new constitution allowed for some sort of multiparty 
democracy (Adejumobi 2000). 
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controlled the scope of the transition towards multipartyism (Gros 1995; Saine 2002; Pazzanita 1999; 
Nwajiaku 1994). In the new electoral setting, the office of the president remained dominant without 
any effective mechanisms to check his power institutionalized (van de Walle 2002: 68). Likewise, if 
state resources were commonly channeled to patronage networks in the old regime, it is also unlikely 
that in a new regime the government would adopt reforms which will institutionalize their usage to 
fund broad based social services. That certain institutions post transition are likely going to resemble 
institutions of the past is not in any way unique to the experience of only exogenously derived 
transitions. However, the point I want to emphasize here is that this is especially likely in exogenous 
democracies, where leadership face few if any organized checks to their power domestically. Thus, 
democracy, in this setting, will likely resemble much of the old order, with a few cosmetic changes to 
reflect the acceptance of new formal rules.  
Additionally, a tilted balance of power in favor of the existing ruling party in the domestic 
sphere, is likely to settle into somewhat of an equilibrium.  By manipulating the political field at 
home to retain political dominance, and still fulfilling some democratic demands that came from 
abroad, incumbents and their ruling parties maintain an upper hand in the initial elections against 
opposition groups, and winning initial elections further benefits them in subsequent elections, as 
these parties keep their access to state resources and control of state apparatuses. If we accept that 
most transitions to multi-partyism which occurred during the post Cold War era in Africa were 
heavily influenced by exogenous pressure and circumstances, we can find evidence of the legacy of 
this control in the fact that “at the end of 2002, the single party in power before 1989 remained 
there in 15 of the region’s multiparty political systems” (van de Walle 2003: 300). Additionally, from 
1990 to 2005, in 25 of 46 African countries, the majority party in the legislature won more than 2/3 
of the vote and in 21 of those countries they won 75 percent (Manning 2005: 709; Nohlen et al. 
1999). The dangers of continued one party dominance, with respect to the institutionalization of a 
74 
 
responsive democracy, are obvious; when ruling parties enjoy an effective monopoly of power they 
will have less incentive to undertake real change which will result in a more responsive redistribution 
of resources towards constituent needs because they will not perceive their seat in power as being 
credibly threatened by an opposition. 
A final point to make here concerns some possible implications exogenous democratization 
might have on the domestic party system development. At the same time that an exogenous 
democratization creates a foundation wherein the incumbent has extraordinary control over the 
ensuing political field, it also likely impacts party formation in a way that further discourages gains in 
responsive governance. As Carrie Manning has observed, party systems in many African countries 
are not built on the same foundation that party systems in advanced industrial democracies were 
(2005).  The rise of party systems in most of Europe, for example, is usually explained as being a 
response to socio-economic development generated from the Industrial Revolution (Huntington 
1968). Having been born out of economic change, parties functioned as an organizational tool to 
channel the political activity of groups with different economic interests (Huntington 1968). 
However, in the context of Africa’s most recent wave of democratization parties really arose once 
their organization was legal. Thus, as Manning articulates, the party systems that arose in many 
African countries were not born out of a bottom-up popular organic process, but “out of elites’ 
urgent need for electoral vehicles which would allow them to compete in the newly devised rules of 
the political game” (2005: 715). Partly as a result of the sense of urgency by which elites organized 
political parties, parties proliferated in number.   For example in Mali, 47 parties initially registered 
for elections, while in Zaire there were 200 (Bienin and Herbst 1996: 28).  Additionally, elites found 
it much easier to mobilize party followers along pre-existing cleavages, like ethnicity, rather than 
along ideological differences (Manning 2005). Thus, instead of reflecting a range of policy options, 
many of Africa’s party systems are often described of being void of ideology, giving potential voters 
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no real policy options, and more reflective of regional or ethnic differences within countries (Bienin 
and Herbst 1996: 28;  Manning 2005; van de Walle 2003: 298).  
While the above scholars did not make these observations about party development 
specifically or exclusively in countries that I would refer to as “exogenous democracies”, I argue that 
it is reasonable to assume that these characteristics hold most strongly in an exogenously derived 
democratic setting. Where a domestic opposition is weak or non-existent prior to a regime’s 
concession of a multiparty system, most oppositional mobilization will occur as a response to the 
legalization of political parties and the announcement of multiparty elections. To the extent that a 
lack of ideological differentiation and the dominance of ethnicity in Africa’s party systems are due to 
the post-hoc nature of party system development that Manning (2005) describes, one would also 
expect these characteristics would be particularly pronounced in exogenous democracies. The 
implications of a party system growing in such a rash environment for institutionalizing 
responsiveness are grave. When political parties do not represent clearly defined alternative policy 
options, voters cannot use their vote to voice their demand for policies which are more responsive 
to their needs.  
Thus far I have argued that exogenously pressured democratic reforms are unlikely to 
institutionalize responsive governments. In these countries, instead of reforming political norms and 
institutions to become responsive to the social service needs of their citizenry, leadership is more 
likely to make only the democratic changes that are demanded of them from exogenous actors. Put 
differently, reforms taken under these circumstances largely impacts the formal institutions of 
selecting leadership, but does not reduce the distance between the public and elected politicians, 
which is needed to achieve gains in responsiveness. Exogenous actors, like international donors, are 
usually ineffective and/or unwilling to use their leverage over the transitioning regime to force 
changes needed to increase accountability and responsiveness. Domestically, ruling parties generally 
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hold all the cards; they are likely to enjoy a political playing field tilted in their favor and be in a 
prime position to maintain many elements of a status quo they previously benefitted from. Thus, 
through exogenously derived transitions, unresponsive authoritarian regimes will likely transform 
into unresponsive electoral democracies. I test this argument in cross-national analyses below, 
however, next, I offer a rough measurement of the exogeneity of a transition. 
 
Measuring the Exogeneity of Political Change 
Quantifying the level of influence various pressures have on any decision is problematic. As 
outsiders, what can seem to be most influential may not be.  Because any outside observer lacks 
information on all the pressures and signals a specific decision-maker might have been exposed to, it 
is problematic to measure the degree of exogeneity of political decisions. As a proxy, one can rely on 
the information available about the time leading up to such a decision and on assumptions about 
different factors surrounding it.   
As a first step to approximating the influence exogenous circumstances had on decisions to 
politically liberalize one might rely on the explicit statements available about pressure exerted for 
democratization. Some of the most detailed accounts of African politics can be found in the Africa 
Contemporary Record and the Africa Research Bulletin. The first provides summaries, and to some extent, 
analyses, of important events that occurred within a two year time span and the second gives reports 
of important events on a monthly basis. A review of the events reported in these publications in 
each country reveals evidence of international actors playing an important role in influencing each 
decision to adopt multiparty elections in the post Cold War era.  
For example, in at least 15 cases, the country’s main donor or financial institution directly 
tied its foreign assistance to the regime’s commitment to democratic reforms by threatening to cut 
off access to foreign aid and/or actually doing so. In six cases, financial incentives were given or 
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promised for democratization from the donors. For example, along with promising to pay for the 
elections, the French cooperation minister ensured that the “elections would restore links with the 
international financial community” (ARB 1993: 11030-11031) to the Central African Republic. With 
regard to at least four regimes’ decisions (Kenya, Mauritania, Lesotho, and Central African Republic) 
the reports mentioned some sort of “behind the scenes” talks between the country’s leadership and 
donors, where the announcement of multiparty elections shortly followed. Another four cases of 
adopting multiparty elections were reported to be influenced by the leadership’s attempt to appeal to 
Western donors, because they lost their patron, the Soviet Union, or access to other financing. 
Foreign influence was clear in 6 other cases, where, because the country had undergone a civil 
conflict, the UN set up the negotiations for, financed, and closely monitored the first multiparty 
elections. In six other cases the lack of foreign military involvement to help the regime during bouts 
of domestic instability was linked to the fact that it had not made significant democratic reforms.  
In addition to these examples of specifically targeted donor pressure, there were also several 
exogenous events that, albeit were indiscriminate of which regimes they targeted, contributed to 
creating an environment of external pressure that influenced the decisions of many leaders. The fall 
of the Soviet Union, as has been discussed many times previously, was an external event that made 
its close allies second guess their domestic institutions. Additionally, main donors, like the US, 
France and Britain, made public statements about linking foreign aid to democratization on the 
continent in early 1990 (Crawford 2001: 4).  While exogenous events like these did not necessarily 
target a regime in particular, they still had the effect of shaping regime incentives towards 
democratic reform. For example, in Tanzania’s case, the leadership did not receive any direct threat 
of aid withdrawal (Vener 2000: 150). Instead, the decision to adopt multipartyism was heavily 
influenced by a belief among Tanzanian leadership that donors would revoke aid if they did not 
institutionalize multipartyism. This perception was largely formed in response to a series of general 
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statements made by all of Tanzania’s major donors that future of their development assistance policy 
would include democratic conditionalities (Vener 2000).  
However, relying solely on this information to generate a measure of the influence of the 
importance of external pressure to democratize is problematic. Whether a regime was targeted with 
several different types of pressure tactics (i.e. foreign aid sanctioning, military withdrawal, loss of an 
important patron) is not necessarily a function of the importance of exogenous influence; and thus 
bars the validity of creating an additive measure or factor of these various donor tactics. In several 
cases, the longer a regime held out from reforming, the more tactics donors tried to use to pressure 
democratization. In those cases, the severity or number of the tactics used is more of a function of 
how long a regime avoided reform. Additionally, there were also the problems of inconsistency in 
reporting across cases.  Smaller countries like Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe receive much 
less detailed reporting about all events.  
Because there is evidence of foreign pressure in each of the post Cold War transitions, one 
might then turn to gauging the extent to which domestic pressure was important. If domestic 
pressure was present, one might assume that there was at least a mixture of both endogenous and 
exogenous pressures. However, the presence of domestic opposition to the ruling party or 
democratic movement does not necessarily mean that the decision to adopt democratic reforms was 
less exogenously based.31 Indeed, any measure of exogeneity of political change would have to be 
based on assumptions that underline the relative importance of either type of pressure, and not its 
mere existence.  
To approximate the relative importance of various pressures in constructing an “exogeneity 
of political change” measure I focus on specific signals and rely on several assumptions. First, I use 
whether or not a multiparty election has been held as a signal of the country transitioning to 
                                                        
31
 In some cases popular pressure for democracy only started mounting only after clear signals from international 
donors were made.  
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democracy. Second, I break up the sample of countries on the continent into those regimes that 
were impacted by external events that occurred during the post-Cold War period, and those that 
were not. As chapter two discussed, the incentives for regimes on the continent shifted quite 
dramatically post-Cold War. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an unprecedented 
period wherein most of Africa’s important donors began to demand that regimes adopt democratic 
reforms and reward some of those that did. As stated earlier, reports during that time illustrate that 
these related external events likely impacted the decision to adopt multiparty politics in all countries 
that did so after the end of the Cold War. While these external events impacted the domestic politics 
of most countries on the continent, there were a handful of countries that have remained the same 
regime type they were prior the end of the Cold War. These regimes either had a record of holding 
consistent and regular multiparty elections prior to this unique period of foreign pressure or never 
held a multiparty election, even though, in some cases, they faced international pressure to do so. 
Thus countries that receive a zero on the exogeneity scale include those countries that did not show 
signs of capitulating to foreign pressures to hold multiparty elections, and those that were multiparty 
democracies prior to the end of the Cold War.  I list these countries below by regime type: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The democracies on the list started their record of holding multiparty elections far before the 
end of the Cold War and have continued to hold them without any significant evidence of 
Countries given a 0 on the Exogeneity Scale 
Democracies Autocracies 
Botswana Eritrea 
Mauritius Somalia 
Senegal Swaziland 
 Uganda 
 Democratic Republic of Congo 
 Angola 
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international pressure to do so. Mauritius and Botswana have had regular multiparty elections since 
independence, 1968 and 1966 respectively. Senegal switched from a one party socialist state to a 
multiparty system in 1978 largely to defuse domestic social, economic and political crisis (Fatton 
1986: 72).  For various reasons, the list of autocratic governments successfully avoided international 
pressure to adopt multiparty elections. For example, Eritrea only gained nationhood in 1993 and its 
subsequent conflict with Ethiopia buffered it against any significant external pressure to hold 
elections.  Somalia has not had a functional government since 1991 and was autocratic prior to that. 
Swaziland outlawed oppositional parties in 1973. And, while the Democratic Republic of Congo had 
multiparty elections post Cold War, it did so in 2006, which is outside of the time frame I focus on.  
I limit my focus up to 2005 when categorizing countries because I am ultimately interested in 
examining the impact that exogenous democratization had on the change in social service delivery, 
during 1990 to 2005.  
Finally, the cases of Angola and Uganda deserve some explanation. While Uganda’s election 
in 2001 allowed other political candidates to compete, they were not allowed to do so under a 
recognized party affiliation. This case is somewhat ambiguous because political parties were banned 
from Uganda, but competition was allowed. For the reported models in table one I use the threshold 
for making significant political change as holding multiparty elections and thus have Uganda coded 
as a zero under the exogeneity of its political change. I do, however, summarize the results of several 
analyses wherein I examine if alternative coding in ambiguous cases produce different results; this is 
discussed further below.  
Angola actually held multiparty elections in 1992, after a seventeen yearlong civil war. The 
elections were the product of an internationally brokered peace accord, which according to my rules 
of categorization (explained later), would give Angola a 2 on this scale. However, the multiparty 
system collapsed back into civil war only three months after the elections were held, and it would 
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thus have little expected influence on social service delivery for the next 13 years. The country did 
not hold another set of multiparty elections until 2008, well after the period I focus on (1990 to 
2005). This is similarly the case for Burundi, where civil war erupted after only four months of 
holding multiparty elections, however they held another election in 2005, within the time frame I 
focus on (this case is discussed later). While other countries experienced civil war and other 
interruptions in the holding of successive multiparty elections, like coups d’état, only in the case of 
Angola was another election not organized within the time frame of focus. Thus Angola’s 
experience with electoral democracy across these 15 years seems to fit more in line with that of the 
other countries I categorize as staunchly authoritarian. Again in this case, I examine the effect of 
alternative coding below.  
Finding evidence that all regimes were exposed to some sort of foreign pressure to 
democratically reform post Cold War informs the next assumption I make of the rest of the sample 
(i.e. the countries which held a first multiparty election during the 1990 to 2005 period): the decision 
to hold multiparty elections was at least partly rooted in exogenous circumstances.  However, I 
divide the sample further by focusing on the outcome of the first, post Cold War, multiparty 
election. I assume that when the opposition party was able to unseat the ruling party in the first 
election that the domestic democratic movement held a significant amount of strength and power in 
pressuring that this change occurred. In other words, in these cases, I assume endogenous pressures 
were also significantly influential. Thus, countries that held multiparty elections post Cold War and 
the opposition was voted into power were given a 1, or a middle position on the 0 to 2 exogeneity 
scale.  I list these countries below with the year of their first, post-Cold War, multiparty election:  
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In this category I assume that by itself, international pressure did not lead to democratization 
for these countries. Instead, democratization arose when the political conditionalities attached to 
foreign aid converged and interacted with domestic demands for political liberalization. For several 
of these countries, like in Benin, Central African Republic, Congo, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Zambia, 
domestic democracy movements were born out of civil unrest targeted towards economic austerity 
measures, but swiftly turned towards demanding democracy (Gazibo 2005; ACR 1990/1992: B188; 
Clark 1994: 49; Shettima 1993; Rakner 1992). In Central African Republic, Congo and Zambia, 
among other places, domestic trade unions held significant leverage in pressuring incumbent 
governments to adopt democratic reforms (ACR 1990/1992: B188; Clark 1994: 49; Rakner 1992). In 
fact, in Zambia’s case, the trade unions were one of the few organizations to have any autonomy 
from the almost all encompassing one-party state; it is this autonomy that gave citizens an alternative 
outlet to effectively organize their opposition to the regime (Rakner 1992). However these domestic 
groups gained important legitimacy, which translated into leverage in negotiations with the 
incumbent regime once their cause was supported by the international community. In Zambia’s case, 
while the domestic element of its multiparty transition is often emphasized, it is also observed that 
Countries given a 1 on the Exogeneity Scale 
                                      Election Year 
Benin 1991 
Cape Verde 1991 
Central African Republic 1992 
Congo 1992 
Madagascar 1992 
Malawi 1994 
Mali 1992 
Niger 1993 
Nigeria 1999 
Sao Tome and Principe 1991 
South Africa 1994 
Zambia 1991 
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the opposition to the regime only gained momentum and influence once it was supported by the 
international donor community (Rakner 2003: 21).  
In several ways, donors and domestic democratic movements worked in conjunction for 
political reform. In some cases, donor pressure to politically reform intensified in reaction to large 
street demonstrations and/or when the regime would use repressive measures to attempt to silence 
the protest movement. This was the case in Malawi where donors suspended all foreign aid and 
conditioned future aid to whether political reforms would be taken after the Banda regime violently 
cracked down on an opposition rally which resulted in the deaths of 38 protestors (Brown 2004: 
709). Similarly, in Madagascar, after the president Ratsiraka’s body guard killed 100 and wounded 
many more peaceful democracy protestors, the French government suspended all military aid, 
advised the president to resign and offered him asylum in France (ASS 2004: 632).  
The two sources of pressure worked in combination in other ways as well. In some cases the 
domestic democracy movements tried desperately to gain support from the international community 
so as to compel donors to use their leverage over the regime to push for reform. For example, in 
Malawi’s case, some opponents to the Banda regime that were based in neighboring countries found 
it easier to lobby Western governments to withhold aid from the regime than to infiltrate the 
country and work internally for political change (ACR 1990-1992: b582).   Additionally, donors 
became the pocketbook behind many transitions. For example, in several of these countries donors 
directly funded the efforts of domestic opposition groups (Sandbrook 1996). In Mali’s case, 
opposition groups began received funding from France-Liberté, which was headed by Danielle 
Mitterrand, the wife of the French president (ACR 1990-1992: b82). Donors also played a role in 
providing the needed financial resources and electoral technology to stage the first multiparty 
national elections, as was the case in several countries on the list above (Sandbrook 1996: 69). 
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The last group of countries includes those where I assume regimes held a multiparty election 
primarily due to changes in exogenous circumstances. These countries are given a 2 on the 
exogeneity scale because the regime in power held multiparty elections (regardless of the freeness or 
fairness of the election) during the 1990 to 2005 period but the ruling party was able to stay in 
power after the first election. I use the outcome of the first multiparty election as an indicator of 
the strength that domestic democracy groups had in influencing the impetus of the transition. While 
domestic pressure may have been present, if the opposition was not strong enough to unseat the 
ruling party at the first election, I assume that the domestic opposition was too weak to persuade the 
ruling party to concede the democratic reforms it ultimately did.  
Additionally, countries are given a 2 on the exogeneity scale when they held their first 
multiparty election after a UN brokered peace deal, as these cases represent strong examples 
wherein the international community oversaw the democratic institutional building process (Paris 
1997; Englebert and Tull 2008). Ethiopia and Comoros were also given a 2 because the unique 
circumstances that brought them to hold their first ever multiparty elections.  Ethiopia’s transition to 
multipartyism was similar to that of other countries who had adopted democratic institutions post 
conflict, but there the transition was largely overseen by only one major donor, the United States 
(Joseph 1998: 8; Engedayehu 1993: 30).32  Comoros’s path to multipartyism was very different, 
however. After the President of Comoros, Ahmed Abdallah, was murdered in a coup in November 
of 1989, armed mercenaries under the control of Bob Denard attempted to gain control of the 
islands. In response, France sent a military force, which ultimately stopped Denard’s attempts 
                                                        
32 Ethiopia’s first ever multiparty election has held after a rebel movement, EPRDF, was victorious in taking over the 
country through a civil conflict . However, the rebel movement’s victory was assisted by the U.S. government’s approval 
of its military advances, which came with the condition that the movement promised to establish a democratic 
government, once in power (Joseph 1998:8). Once victorious, the United States worked in conjunction with the EPRDF 
by brokering the peace talks and aiding the new EPRDF government in setting up the democratic institutions it had 
expected of them (Engedayehu 1993: 30). 
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(Nyang’oro 1996: 113). A strong French presence continued on the islands to oversee the 
installation of an acting president and the organization of the country’s first multiparty elections. In 
fact, when riots from groups opposed to the then acting President, Mohamed Djohar, caused the 
closure of one of the polling stations during the first round of voting, French security forces stepped 
in to guarantee peace on the islands for a rerun of the poll (ACR 1990-1992: B276).  I star the 
countries on the list that had their first election after a civil conflict or after a foreign power 
intervened militarily, like in the case of Comoros.  
Zimbabwe and Gambia are also given a two on this scale, even though they both had 
multiparty elections prior to the end of the Cold War. Zimbabwe’s case is interesting because it 
gained independence much later than the majority of African countries, in 1980 (the same year it 
held its first multiparty election). However donor influence was felt at independence, which came at 
the end of a civil war, wherein the international community successfully mediated talks between the 
warring parties (Gregory 1980). The mediation produced Zimbabwe’s first constitution and, among 
other things, the constitution constrained the government from legislating for a one-party state 
system for its first decade (Sachikonye 1990: 98). In addition, once the decade long constraint on the 
constitution ran out, the ruling Mugabe regime started to campaign heavily for a change to the 
constitution to turn Zimbabwe into a one-party state (ACR 1990-1992: B719). However, the ruling 
party ruled out the possibility of legislating a one-party state; this decision was largely influenced by 
the need for the regime to secure foreign financing and the support of international donors (ACR 
1990-1992: 719). Formally institutionalizing one-party rule was unnecessary to keep the country in 
the ruling party’s control; ZANU-PF was officially re-elected in every poll during the 1990 to 2005 
period. Thus the root of Zimbabwe’s multipartyism is very similar to that of countries on this list 
where elections were produced after a post-civil war internationally brokered peace talk, and the 
exogenous influence on the continuation of multipartyism for Zimbabwe, as well as the ability of 
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ZANU-PF to retain power despite elections, mirrors that of the rest of the countries who are given 
a 2 on this scale. 
The Gambia too started its record of holding multiparty elections prior to the end of the 
Cold War, in 1965. However, as discussed previously, the country experienced a coup in 1994, 
which unseated Dawda Jawara, who, despite competing in multiparty elections, had been in power 
for 29 consecutive years. The coup installed Yahya Jammeh and after much international pressure, 
Jammeh held multiparty elections in 1996. Prior to the elections, Jammeh changed the constitution 
to give himself the electoral advantage, among others, of barring the previously deposed president 
from running as his competitor (Adejumobi 2000: 67). Jammeh won the 1996 election as well as the 
following two elections held in 2001 and 2006. The possible ambiguity of the Gambia’s case comes 
from the fact that for four years (1990 to 1994) of the period of focus (1990 to 2005), the Gambia 
would have been considered a 0 on the exogeneity scale because of its history of holding multiparty 
elections, while for nine of the years (1996 to 2006) it would be considered a 2, because of the 
international pressure that Jammeh was under to transition to multipartyism and his subsequent 
ability to control the transition to produce his election in 1996. Ultimately because the Gambia’s 
second experience with multipartyism lasted a majority of the time I focus on (nine of the fifteen 
years between 1990 and 2005), and this experience mirrored that of several other transitions that are 
considered a 2, I list the Gambia as a 2 on this scale.  
Burundi’s inclusion on this list also deserves further discussion. Similarly to Angola, in 
Burundi’s case its first multiparty elections in 1993 were shortly followed by civil war. As in the case 
of Angola, I chose to not use this election because the multiparty system lasted for such a short 
period of time and was not followed closely by another multiparty election.33 Instead, I judge 
                                                        
33 However, if counted, although the 1993 election resulted in a change in power, it would be difficult to code it as a 1, 
because the election was brought about primarily due to external pressure (Reyntjens 1993) and there was a large 
presence of international observers  which may have guaranteed the freeness and fairness of the election (Kaiser 1999: 
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Burundi based on its most recent election which occurred right at the end of the 1990 to 2005 
period that I focus on. I test alterative coding for Burundi below and summarize their impact on the 
results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the majority of the un-stared cases, the ruling parties were able to remain in power by 
controlling the speed and scope of democratic reforms. These regimes both exacerbated and 
exploited weaknesses in their opposition. In several of these countries the opposition was not 
allowed to effectively mobilize due to government intimidation and repression. In Zimbabwe, the 
government closed the Universities and briefly detained without trial student leaders of a protest 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
35). In other words, an oppositional win can also be partially attributed to the fact that exogenous actors somewhat 
constrained the ruling party. 
34 Like in Uganda, the Sudanese held elections in 1996 where opposition parties were banned, but other political 
competitors were allowed to run for office. As explained in the case of Uganda, for this measure, the threshold I use for 
marking significant political change is holding multiparty elections, so I list the year of Sudan’s first multiparty election as 
2000. However, the alternative, it occurring in 1996, would not change Sudan’s coding on the exogeneity scale, because, 
as it was in 2000, the ruling party was re-elected in 1996.  
35
 It occurred to me that countries that had multiparty elections so late into the period of focus (1990-2005) would likely 
not have a democracy effect due to the short period of time since the multiparty election occurred. To that end, I 
created a dummy variable for those countries that had elections from 2000 to 2005 and included it in unreported models. 
I found that there were no substantive changes in the results with that inclusion. Additionally, in reported models there 
is a measure for the age of the democracy which should control for this effect. 
Countries given a 2 on the Exogeneity Scale  
                           Election Year                      Election Year 
Zimbabwe 1980 Guinea-Bissau 1994 
Cote d’Ivoire 1990 Tanzania 1995 
Burkina Faso 1991 Chad 1996 
Cameroon 1992 The Gambia 1996 
Ghana 1992 Sudan 200034 
Mauritania 1992   
Kenya 1992 Namibia* 1989 
Djibouti 1993 Comoros* 1990 
Equatorial Guinea 1993 Mozambique* 1994 
Gabon 1993 Ethiopia* 1995 
Guinea 1993 Sierra Leone* 1996 
Togo 1993 Liberia* 1997 
Seychelles 1993 Rwanda* 2003 
  Burundi* 200535 
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movement and in Cameroon the police killed at least 6 protesters during an opposition rally (Bratton 
and van de Walle 1992: 423-424). In Equatorial Guinea’s case, violently repressing calls for 
democracy was not only reserved for domestic sources of pressure; in early 1993, the ambassadors 
of Spain the US and EU received death threats from the regime due to their insistence on 
democracy (ACR 1992/1994). Additionally, the Equatorial Guinean regime also used more formal 
means to marginalize the opposition and the effects of a transition towards mulitpartyism. While the 
government adopted multipartyism through a new constitution in November 1991, in January of 
1992, it also passed a law that barred the majority of Equatorial Guinean adults from legally joining 
an opposition party. The government outlawed people holding dual nationality from joining political 
parties; the country was under Spanish control until 1968, so anyone over the age of 24 at the time 
would have held dual nationality according to the new law (ARB: 1992: 1040b). 
Regimes also used several tactics to divide oppositional movements and benefitted from the 
weakness of this fractionalization (Baker 1998: 122).  In Kenya, for example, the Moi regime 
weakened the domestic democracy coalition by invoking ethnically divisive conflict through 
sponsoring armed units to attack specific ethnic communities (Roessler 2005: 215). The Moi regime 
was able to guard itself from any additional international backlash for these human rights abuses by 
distancing itself as the cause of the violence through portraying the clashes as a result of tribalism 
and ethnicity (Roessler 2005: 215). While manipulation of the playing field often secured a re-
election for many of the ruling parties, in several countries on this list the ruling party held 
multiparty elections to later steal victory.  In fact, Biya of Cameroon, Bongo of Gabon, Compaore 
of Burkina Faso, Conte of Guiena, Eyadema of Togo, Gouled of Djibouti, Moi of Kenya, Nguema 
of Equatorial Guinea, Rawlings of Ghana and Taya of Mauritania all succeeded in elections that 
were suspected of severe ‘irregularities’ (Baker 1998:124).  
At the same time that regimes were able to manipulate and repress the opposition in their 
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efforts to call for reform, they faced substantial pressures from their donors to hold multiparty 
elections. Thus, for this category, I expect that multiparty elections were largely organized by ruling 
parties for the superficial purpose of appeasing the donor community, but done so carefully that 
they avoided introducing meaningful competition. It is my view that ruling parties sought to 
transform elections from an institution which made them vulnerable to competitors, to an event 
which would hopefully gain them international legitimacy, renewed financial links to donors, 
decrease external pressures for meaningful reform, and secure their dominance in power during this 
new “democratic” era. In fact, most political parties in this group maintained power throughout the 
1990-2005 period of focus. For Djibouti, Cameroon, Gabon, Seychelles and Tanzania the surviving 
ruling party during this period was the same party in power since independence; as of 2005, the 
average number of years these parties had been in office was 38.  
However, in a handful of these countries, opposition parties have since won in subsequent 
multiparty elections (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Kenya for example). As mentioned earlier, 
this measure focuses on the outcome of the first election. This is particularly important for these 
cases. One of the hypotheses underlining my argument of the dampening effects of exogenous 
transitions on subsequent responsiveness is that exogenous transitions are more likely to result in 
institutions which allow for a ruling party to tilt the electoral playing field in its favor. Even when an 
opposition party does finally win in a subsequent election, theoretically, the new ruling party would 
equally benefit from these institutions for their own tenure in power. Such advantages work to 
reduce the chances of having fair competition and the incentive for politicians to capture votes by 
becoming more responsive to the needs of citizens. By only examining the outcome of the first 
election, I hope to approximate on the effects of the exogeneity of the transition and not 
subsequent political events. 
Altogether, this scale makes no judgment on the extent of democratic reforms undertaken or 
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the freeness or fairness of the first multiparty election. Togo, Mauritania, and Equatorial Guinea are 
certainly just a few cases that are given a 2 on this scale where one can easily argue that no 
substantive democratization actually took place. As mentioned earlier, one could also argue that in 
each of these cases the first “multiparty election” was stolen by the ruling party and other parties 
were not able to truly compete. When a regime calls for multiparty elections for the first time, but is 
able to repress all other parties or even outright steal the election, it begs the question: why are they 
holding them at all? Given the context of heightened international favor with multiparty democracy 
and the general dependence most of these regimes have on international patronage, it is likely, I 
argue, that the catalyst of elections in these settings was exogenous. While this scale does not 
approximate the extent of liberalization that has occurred in the country, the hypotheses I have put 
forth in this chapter posit that change in social service coverage is in some contexts a function of the 
extent to which a country democratized. Thus, as is explained below, I use this measure of 
exogeneity in analyses only when interacted with a measure of the extent of democratization, to test 
the merits of my arguments.  
Two implicit assumptions that I made in constructing the measure should also be 
acknowledged. First, I assume that when an opposition candidate is elected in the first multiparty 
election, it signifies some degree of domestic oppositional strength. However, the decision to hold a 
multiparty election might be primarily exogenously pressured, but because of regime weakness (not 
oppositional strength), the ruling party could lose at the poles. This is a possible weakness in the 
measure and particularly relevant in the cases of Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde, where the 
opposition or domestic democratic movement was largely negligible. In both cases sectors of the 
elites organized opposition parties shortly before the elections were held. This organization may 
have been equally exogenously influenced, as it appears that they attempted to capitalize on the fact 
that the former ruling party would capitulate to foreign pressures to hold elections. This as well as 
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other idiosyncrasies of the politics on these islands compelled me to run the same analyses that I 
report below with an additional control for these countries. In general, those unreported models 
return very similar results with regard to the impact of exogenously pressured democracy. The 
second assumption made is that when incumbents are re-elected, the domestic democratic 
movement is assumed to be weak, and thus, the democratization is judged to be primarily driven by 
exogenous influences. However, it is conceivably possible that an incumbent government was re-
elected into office by a majority of the people due to its popularity, and that the domestic 
democratic movement was powerful enough to persuade the government to hold elections. Thus the 
impetus could be domestically driven, while the result would have been that the regime remained in 
power. However, I am not aware of any cases in Africa that would fit this scenario. 
These two possible weaknesses in the construction of the exogeneity scale speak to the 
ability of the measure to parse out meaningful differences between countries that should be 
considered completely exogenous and somewhat endogenous, (2 and 1 on the scale, respectively).  
Put differently, through the rubric generated based on the assumptions stated, I may be falsely 
identifying some countries as completely exogenously derived or not identifying some as completely 
exogenously derived, when I should be. While the case categorization should be debated, some 
descriptive statistics can highlight whether there is a meaningful difference between a 1 and 2 on the 
scale. A first step might be to look at the mean percent of seats held by an opposition party after the 
first multiparty legislative election across the 1 and 2 exogeneity scale categories. On average, 
countries scoring a 2 on the exogeneity scale should also have a lower percentage of legislative seats 
held by an opposition party, because opposition parties are likely to be fractionalized and relatively 
weak to the ruling party. Indeed this is the case; on average the main opposition party in coded 
‘mixed sourced’ regimes captured 52.4% of the legislative seats in the first multiparty election, while 
in coded exogenous regimes, the main opposition party captured only 16% of the legislative seats. 
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This difference is significant at the 1% percent error level.  
Finally, while an effort was made to assign a score to each country, Lesotho was the only 
country not given a score on the above lists. This case was difficult to categorize because its election 
in 1993 proceeded after the rule of two military governments, the incumbent did not run in the 
election, and the election was followed by a coup, wherein the international community pressured 
the old regime and the coup leader to compromise into a power sharing agreement. As discussed in 
more detail below, there is arguably good reason to code Lesotho’s case as a one or a two on this 
scale. While both are used in separate analyses which I report in table two, Lesotho remains the only 
missing case in table one. I turn next to discuss the estimation strategy of analyses which utilize this 
scale of exogeneity. 
 
Analyses of Exogenous Democratization and the Quality of Life 
 To approximate what impact exogenous democratization has had on social service 
provisions and the quality of life in Africa, I run a series of cross-sectional OLS regressions with 
robust standard errors. The dependent variable in each case is the change in each quality of life 
indicator that was examined in chapter 1 from 1990 (or the closest year to 1990 that data was 
available) to 2005. Specifically, this includes the change in infant mortality, life expectancy, 
undernourishment, primary enrollment (net) and secondary enrollment rates (gross). This data 
comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.   
The central hypotheses I am interested in testing are conditional. I expect that 
democratization should have a positive effect on the change in social services delivery when it is not 
exogenously derived, and no effect on the change in social services when democratization is more 
exogenous. To test these conditional hypotheses I include an interaction term between the variables 
where a moderating relationship is expected, in this case those are the extent of democratization and 
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the previously discussed exogeneity scale. I use the change in Freedom House scores from 1990 to 
2005, for a measure of democratization.36  The inclusion of this interaction variable allows me to 
examine what effect the change of democracy has had on the previously mentioned social service 
outcomes at various levels of exogeneity. I also control for whether a country was given a 0 on the 
exogeneity scale but were and have remained authoritarian, as I expect that these countries would 
not have the same regime based political incentive to improve social service delivery as democracies 
would. 
 In addition to approximating the effect of exogenous democratization, other plausibly 
important variables that would either help or hinder a government in the task of providing social 
services are controlled for. Specifically, the average GDP per capita, controlling for purchasing 
power parity, over 1990 to 2005 (in 2005 constant international dollars) is included to control for a 
nation’s wealth or economic ability to provide services to its population.  The average of GDP per 
capita over the entire period is used because using any single year might capture a particularly high 
or low point in the economy. I use a logged transformation of this data. I also control for the 
average rate of urbanization over the 1990-2005 period to account for the fact that an urbanized 
population might facilitate a government’s job in delivering services. In urbanized countries a higher 
percentage of the population will be within one specific area where infrastructure is likely to be more 
developed than in the rural areas, where populations are more spread out and sometimes out of easy 
reach from paved roads. The average population of a country from 1990 to 2005 is also used as a 
control. Governments in more populous countries, it is assumed, have a more difficult and 
expensive task at providing services. Data for all three of these variables are all from the World 
                                                        
36
 I used the average between the civil liberties and political rights scores. Also, the original Freedom House scores were 
changed to be more intuitive. Originally, they are coded so that the largest score (7) is the smallest level of freedom or 
democracy. I subtracted these scores by 8 to obtain a more intuitive scale where large numbers reflect a more free 
democracy. Therefore, the change in Freedom House scores are now intuitive so that positive change reflects a move 
away from undemocratic rule towards democratic rule. 
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Bank’s World Development indicators.37 Whether the country experienced a civil conflict in from 1985 to 
2005 which resulted in at least 1,000 deaths, is included to account for the fact that civil conflicts are 
likely to have a negative effect on political stability, government capacity and infrastructure; all of 
which are likely to decrease a government’s ability of providing social services. Data for this variable 
is from the PRIO civil conflict data.  All of the above mentioned control variables were used in the 
analyses in chapter one and besides the inclusion of a control for whether or not the country 
experienced conflict, the rest of the variables were also used in Lake and Baum’s (2001) analyses of 
social service provisions.38  
Additionally, the age of democracy is also included in the analyses to account for Keefer’s 
(2007) hypothesis that younger democracies perform worse than older democracies in providing 
social services. Younger democracies, it is argued, are more likely to suffer from a “low credibility” 
political environment, wherein political competitors are unable to “make credible promises to 
citizens about broad public policies” (Keefer 2007:805) due to the shorter period of time that 
politicians would have had to establish themselves as credible actors. In such an environment, the 
political incentives to provide public goods or campaign based on the provision of public goods are 
weak because most voters do not think of the promises of the incumbent or challenger as being 
credible, and instead politicians are incentivized to provide targeted goods to feed into established 
clientelist networks to secure political support is strong (Keefer 2007:806). To capture this concept, 
an attempt was made to mold Keefer’s (2007) methodology of calculating the age of a country’s 
democracy to the context of this research question. Keefer (2007) analyzed the age effect on a cross-
section of dependent variables at one time frame; I examine its effect across a change in social 
                                                        
37
 Any missing observations for GDP per capita, ppp, were imputed using data from the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Database. 
38
 In Lake and Baum’s (2001) study these variables were used in different forms. Instead of looking at the impact of 
democratization, they were analyzing the impact of the level of democracy. For this reason, they used similar variables 
but not as averages over the entire period, like I needed to do. 
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service delivery. Ultimately, this measure was created by taking the number of consecutive years a 
country was either considered free or partly free on the Freedom House scale as of 2005.39  
 The above mentioned control variables have a plausible impact on the ability of all 
governments to provide high levels of social services. However, I also include a measure of ethnic 
fractionalization and a proxy for neopatrimonialism, which are two variables that have been 
hypothesized to impact the relationship between regime type and social services in the African 
context, specifically. Ethnic fractionalization is controlled for to account for argument that Africans 
are likely use their vote to reward a co-ethnic rather than to reward or punish a candidate for his/her 
performance on social service delivery; voting motivations of this nature reduce the incentive of 
politicians to provide broad based social services to secure future votes (van de Walle 2003: 313; 
Keefer and Khemani 2005). Unfortunately, there is not a cross national measure with sufficient 
country coverage of the extent to which different populations vote along ethnic lines for the time 
period I focus on. Alesina et al.’s (2003) ethnic fractionalization measure is used as a possible proxy 
of this concept.40  Along these lines, one would expect that greater ethnic fractionalization will 
decrease the changes in social services delivery.  
As discussed in chapter one, citizens that live within a neopatrimonial political system may 
be more culturally passive with regard to the demands they make on the state, and instead view their 
own access to state resources as a function of their ability to draw upon personal ties (Bratton 1992: 
93; van de Walle 2003). Such a political culture will likely decrease the proclivity for citizens to 
demand broad reaching social services and punish politicians at the polls for not providing such 
services. As there is no direct measure of the extent to which a country’s political system is 
neopatrimonial, a common proxy for this concept, a measure of perceived corruption, is controlled 
                                                        
39
 The age of the democracy variable and the exogeneity scale are correlated at -0.22.  
40
 I did not use Posner’s (2004) measure of Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups because of the missing observations in 
that data.  
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for in the models instead. Specifically, I use an average of a country’s score on the World Governance 
Indicator’s measure of the control of corruption over the 1996 to 2005 time period.41 This measure 
was not calculated before 1996. Other corruption measures that do have data for years before 1996 
were not used because they are missing data for many countries within my sample. I expect that 
countries with greater control over their corruption will have higher increases in social services over 
the 1990 to 2005 time period.  
Finally, I also include the level of the respective social service/quality of life indicator in 
1990 to capture any convergence trends. Summary statistics of each variable for these analyses 
appears in appendix II.  
 For every dependent variable I display two models. The first is a rough replication of similar 
models in the literature wherein democracy levels are usually found to be associated with social 
service levels. In the second model I include the exogeneity of the transition, interactive term, a 
dichotomous variable for whether the country was coded as a zero on the exogeneity scale, but was 
an authoritarian, and the age of the democracy. Table 1 displays the results of these tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
41
 I average this score over the years that are available within this time frame.  
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Table 1: The Effect of Exogenous Democratization on the Change in Social Service Delivery 
 Infant Mortality Life Expectancy Undernourish  Primary Enrollment Secondary Enrollment  
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Infant Mortality, 1990 -0.33*** -0.30**        
 (0.11) (0.11)        
Life Expectancy, 1990   -0.54** -0.42**      
   (0.22) (0.19)      
Undernourish, 1992     -0.57*** -0.61***     
     (0.15) (0.13)     
Primary Enrollment, 1991       -0.58*** -0.63***   
       (0.12) (0.13)   
Secondary Enrollment, 1990         -0.43** -0.38* 
         (0.18) (0.20) 
Democ. Change, 1990 to 2005 0.01 -7.20** 0.59 3.23* -1.18 -9.12** 0.65 5.05* 0.88 8.39* 
 (1.16) (3.43) (0.69) (1.70) (1.37) (3.80) (1.12) (2.69) (1.86) (4.06) 
GDP per capita, ln 7.11* 8.55* -1.74 -1.76 -5.38* -3.92 -1.67 0.38 6.78 7.25 
 (4.02) (4.67) (1.78) (1.94) (3.00) (3.42) (3.93) (4.50) (6.18) (6.50) 
Urbanization -0.31* -0.37* 0.11* 0.08 0.00 -0.08 -0.21 -0.33* 0.12 0.04 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) 
Civil Conflict -0.84 -1.08 0.40 0.93 -2.18 -1.15 -17.65*** -16.58*** -3.07 -2.92 
 (4.84) (5.28) (2.38) (2.16) (3.41) (3.83) (4.19) (5.03) (4.27) (4.31) 
Population  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 15.41 23.11* -1.47 -4.93 -18.31** -15.60 2.85 0.39 -7.87 -12.38 
 (12.74) (12.53) (6.14) (5.21) (8.87) (9.34) (8.21) (7.75) (6.54) (9.14) 
Control of Corruption -16.44*** -14.03** 2.67 3.34 -8.79 -12.54** 5.77* 4.23 9.10 10.16 
 (4.22) (5.33) (2.08) (2.61) (5.68) (5.48) (2.95) (4.36) (5.61) (6.47) 
Exog.   -1.50  1.99  -11.43***  4.28  5.02 
  (3.19)  (2.13)  (3.58)  (4.30)  (5.68) 
Exog. * Democ. Change  3.95*  -1.57+  4.82**  -2.91+  -4.99* 
  (2.18)  (1.04)  (2.11)  (2.01)  (2.53) 
Authoritarian  -8.11  -2.91  -22.91**  -4.66  -0.75 
  (9.19)  (5.31)  (8.67)  (11.11)  (12.73) 
Age of Democracy  -0.11  -0.16  -0.11  0.30  0.01 
  (0.29)  (0.20)  (0.29)  (0.31)  (0.50) 
Observations 46 44 46 44 42 41 39 37 34 33 
R-squared 0.45 0.52 0.34 0.46 0.41 0.64 0.72 0.76 0.50 0.61 
F test 4.28 3.95 2.36 3.42 4.46 4.01 13.87 8.11 3.86 4.62 
Prob >F 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Constants removed;  *** p<0.01(two-tailed) , ** p<0.05 (two-tailed), * p<0.1 (two-tailed), + p<0.1 (one tailed) 
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The first models for each dependent variable, which estimate the effect of democratization 
on the change in these various social service outcomes, without accounting for the exogeneity of the 
transition towards democracy, confirm the findings I review in chapter 1; when controlling for only 
“conventional” variables, democratization is not positively and significantly related to the change in 
social services in Africa. This chapter has outlined an argument to suggest that democratization’s 
null effect in these models is due to the fact that conventional models do not account for the 
dampening effect that exogenously derived democratization has on leadership’s incentives to 
provide broad reaching social services. The results in table one provides support for this notion. 
Once exogenous democratization is controlled for (in the second models), democratic change 
becomes positively and significantly related to the change in social services across all models. This 
signifies that a conventional model of the effect of democratization on social services in Africa fails 
to capture the positive effect of democratization because it omits controlling for the type of political 
change the country went through.  
The nature of my core hypothesis is that democratization’s effect is conditional upon the 
extent to which the transition was exogenously derived. As such, I expect that the interaction term 
between democratic change and exogeneity will have a significant p value, to indicate that 
democracy’s effect is in fact conditional on the exogeneity of the transition. Consistent with this 
expectation, across all models, the interaction term between exogenous political change and 
democratic change is significant, albeit in some cases only at the 0.10 error level in a one-tailed test.42  
However, it is not enough to establish the significance of this relationship to support the core 
hypotheses that are proposed. Democratization, it has been argued, should be associated with 
positive changes in social services when the transition is less exogenously derived and not associated 
                                                        
42 For each analysis where the interaction between change in democracy and the exogeneity scale is included, I test for 
whether the inclusion of the interaction is significant with an f-test. For all models the prob  > F is below 0.20, and for 
Infant Mortality, Undernourishment and Secondary Enrollment it is below 0.10. 
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with increases in social services when democratic reforms were taken primarily for exogenous 
audiences. To establish whether the effects of the interaction term are in the expected direction, I 
calculate the slope of democratic change at different levels of exogeneity. Figure 1 graphically 
displays those results.  
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Figure 1: The Slope of Democracy at Various levels of Exogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p<0.01(two-tailed) , ** p<0.05 (two-tailed), * p<0.10 (two-tailed), + p<0.10 (one-tailed) 
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The above figure illustrates the effect of change in democracy on the change in social service 
outcomes, at different levels of exogeneity. Consistent with my hypothesis, in each model, I find that 
at a zero level of exogeneity (most endogenous), a change in democracy has a positive and 
significant impact on the change in social services. Specifically, endogenously derived democracy 
positively impacts changes in primary and secondary enrollment rates, as well as life expectancy. 
And, as expected, endogenously derived democracy is associated with decreases in the percentage of 
people that are undernourished and a country’s infant mortality rates. These trends lend support to 
the argument that when democratization is endogenously derived it will have the intended effects 
that conventional models assume it to have: it increases the incentives of leadership to provide 
higher levels of social services. It was also expected, however, that when democracy is exogenously 
derived, leadership will be less likely to be incentivized to provide higher levels of social services. 
The results are again consistent with this expectation. Specifically, across all models, the effect of 
democratization decreases dramatically when a country is coded as a one, as compared to when 
countries are coded as a zero on the exogeneity scale. Further, I find that in every model, the change 
of democracy ceases to have a significant effect on the change in social services at the most 
exogenous level of political change. Finally, the inclusion of the variables related to capturing 
exogenous democratization improves model fit, for every dependent variable; as one can see by 
comparing the r-squared in each model one to their respective model two. Thus, the results reported 
in table one and figure one support the hypotheses put forward in this chapter; democratization is 
positively related to changes in the quality of life where domestic pressure was essential to reach 
democratic reforms, less so when that domestic pressure was also combined with significant 
international pressure and should not be associated with social service delivery performance when 
exogenous pressures were most important to democratic reforms.   
 Aside from the effects related to the inclusion of exogenous democracy, only the 
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convergence terms, which are, as expected, negatively and significantly related to change in the 
quality of life indicators, have consistently significant effects across all indicators.  
Robustness Checks with Alternative Coding of Ambiguous Cases 
Especially given the fact the dependent variables capture a variety of social service and 
quality of life indicators, the consistency of the findings presented in table 1 and figure 1 are 
particularly striking. I will now examine whether this consistency is vulnerable to recoding the 
exogeneity score of ambiguous cases. As a reminder, the cases that I thought were somewhat 
ambiguous and are thus recoded in the below analyses are Angola, Uganda, Burundi and Lesotho. In 
previous analyses I code Angola as a zero because it seemed to echo more closely the experience of 
other staunchly authoritarian regimes. Although Angola held multiparty elections in 1992, civil war 
broke out only three months later and multiparty elections were not again held until 2008. Thus, for 
Angola multipartyism did not take root with any degree of regularity and instead the country was 
embroiled in civil war for the vast majority of the time period that I focus on. I reasoned that 
multipartyism could not have much of an effect because its lifespan existed for only a few months. 
If we were to count the 1992 election, however, Angola would switch its coding from a zero to a 
two on the exogeneity scale because the election occurred after an internationally brokered peace 
accord.  
Uganda’s case is similar to that of Sudan; both countries held elections where politicians 
were allowed to compete for office but opposition political parties were banned. In the analyses 
reported in table 1 I did not count these elections as each country’s first multiparty election because 
I used the threshold of allowing multiple parties to compete in coding each country’s “transition.” 
However, one could argue that elections that allow competition but not recognized parties are still a 
first step towards democratization. If the elections where opposition parties were banned are 
counted as each country’s transition election, Sudan’s coding would not change; it was a two on the 
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scale in the previous analyses and would remain so because both elections occurred within the 
timeframe I focus on and both resulted in the ruling party staying in office. However, Uganda’s 
coding would change from a zero to a two. Uganda was coded a zero on the exogeneity scale 
because its first election wherein multiple parties were recognized occurred after the time period I 
focus on, in 2006, so it was coded as if it did not have an election at all. However its first 
competitive election occurred in 2001, and the ruling party was re-elected through that election.  
Burundi’s case is somewhat similar to that of Angola; its first multiparty election, in 1993, 
was shortly followed by civil war. As in the case of Angola, I chose to not recognize this election as 
the transition election in the analyses above because the multiparty system lasted for such a short 
period of time and was not followed closely by another multiparty election. Additionally, others have 
written about the importance of international pressure and international observers in the 1993 
election (Reyntjens 1993; Ndikumana 1998: 36; Uvin 1999: 261), which further supported it being 
considered exogenously derived.  However, the 1993 election resulted in a change of power, so I 
retest this case by recoding Burundi from a two to a one on the exogeneity scale.  
Finally, Lesotho was the only country that was not given a score on the exogeneity scale, and 
is thus a missing observation in the analyses reported on table one. This case was particularly 
difficult to categorize because its election in 1993 proceeded after the rule of two military 
governments, the incumbent did not run in the election, and the election was shortly followed by a 
coup, wherein the international community pressured the old regime and the coup leader to 
compromise into a power sharing agreement. On the one hand, Lesotho’s election in 1993 should 
be considered as a one on the exogeneity scale because it did result in a sort of change in power. 
While the ruling military coup leader was not competing, the military leader which led the previous 
coup was, and was overwhelmingly rejected at the polls (Southall 1994). However, the events leading 
up to the 1993 election and post-election seem to make a stronger case for the exogeneity of 
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Lesotho’s democracy. Prior to the election, donors targeted the military junta with significant aid 
withdrawal and the closure of aid programs (Matlosa 1999:25). Additionally, a little more than a year 
after the 1993 election was held, King Letsie III staged a coup and in response Lesotho’s major 
donors suspended all aid to the country (Matlosa 1999:27). Due to this pressure, the King was 
forced to negotiate at internationally brokered negotiations and settled on a pseudo-power sharing 
deal with the old ruling party (Matlosa 1999: 27). In many ways, Lesotho’s continuation of 
mulitpartyism seems to be a function of the international community’s leverage over the regime. The 
events surrounding Lesotho’s 1993 election made it difficult to choose one categorization over 
another for Lesotho. I rerun the regressions with this case as coded a one and a two below.  
  In testing the effects of coding cases with different scores for exogeneity, I re-ran the 
“second models” of table one for every case of alternative coding. I found support for the 
hypotheses discussed for three indicators. First, I found that when exogenous democratization (the 
interaction term) is included, the change in democracy is significantly and positively related to the 
change in social services. This indicated that the “conventional” models (model ones of table one) 
failed to capture the positive impact of democratization on social services because they omitted a 
variable which approximated the type of transition the country went through. Second, evidence that 
there is the expected moderating relationship between exogenous change and democratization is 
expressed through a significant p value of the interaction coefficient. Third, I found support for the 
hypotheses that when democracy is endogenously derived it will positively impact social services and 
when it is exogenously derived it will not be associated with changes in social services through 
estimating the slope of democratic change at various levels of exogeneity, as was displayed 
graphically in figure one. Specifically, I found that the slope of democratic change at a zero level of 
exogeneity is significant and positive, less so at a one on the scale of exogeneity and not at all at a 
zero level of exogeneity. Thus, in table two, I summarize these three types of results, which are most 
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important to testing my hypotheses for each case of alternative coding.  
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Table 2: Summary of Results from Alternative Coding Analyses 
 
  Change in Infant 
Mortality 
Change in Life 
Expectancy 
Change in 
Undernourish  
Primary 
Enrollment 
Secondary 
Enrollment 
 
Angola 
2 for 
Exog  
Democ. Δ, 1990 to 2005 -6.45* (3.66) -3.00* (1.79) -10.38*** (4.02) 5.05*  (2.69) 8.39* (0.20) 
Exog. * Democ. Change 3.48+ (2.21) -1.46+ (2.14) 5.46** (2.19) -2.91+ (2.01) -4.99* (2.53) 
Slope of  Democ. at 0 Exog. -6.45* (3.66) 3.00* (1.79) -10.38*** (4.02) 5.05*  (2.69) 8.39* (0.20) 
Slope of  Democ. at 1 Exog. -2.97* (1.75) 1.54* (0.84) -4.93** (2.10) 2.13+ (1.35) 3.40+ (2.12) 
Slope of  Democ. at 2 Exog. 0.50 (1.57) 0.07 (0.69) 0.53 (1.50) -0.78 (2.11) -1.58 (2.32 
 
Uganda  
2 for 
Exog 
Democ. Δ, 1990 to 2005 -6.80* (3.46) 3.07* (1.68) -8.86** (3.80) 7.22** (3.02) 7.34* (4.12) 
Exog. * Democ. Change 3.82* (2.20) -1.46+ (1.04) 4.72** (2.12) -4.00* (2.12) -4.44* (2.60) 
Slope of  Democ. at 0 Exog. -6.80* (3.46) 3.07* (1.68) -8.86** (3.80) 7.22** (3.02) 7.34* (4.12) 
Slope of  Democ. at 1 Exog. -2.98* (1.59) 1.61** (0.77) -4.14** (1.98) 3.22** (1.52) 2.90+ (2.11) 
Slope of  Democ. at 2 Exog. 0.84 (1.66) 0.15 (0.71) 0.58 (1.55) -0.79 (2.11) -1.53 (2.32) 
 
Burundi  
1 for 
Exog 
Democ. Δ, 1990 to 2005 -5.84* (3.41) 2.87+ (1.72) -8.12** (3.76) 4.66+ (2.77) 8.84** (4.02) 
Exog. * Democ. Change 3.08+ (2.16) -1.33 (1.05) 4.17* (2.09) -2.62 (2.10) -5.32** (2.55) 
Slope of  Democ. at 0 Exog. -5.84* (3.41) 2.87+ (1.72) -8.12** (3.76) 4.66+ (2.77) 8.84** (4.02) 
Slope of  Democ. at 1 Exog. -2.75* (1.59) 1.54* (0.79) -3.95* (1.96) 2.04+ (1.34) 3.53*  (2.05) 
Slope of  Democ. at 2 Exog. 0.33 (1.67) 0.21 (0.70) 0.23 (1.51) -0.58 (2.17) -1.79 (2.31) 
 
Lesotho 
2 for 
Exog 
Democ. Δ, 1990 to 2005 -7.26** (3.37) 3.40** (1.63) -9.09** (3.79) 4.98* (2.69) 8.37** (4.01) 
Exog. * Democ. Change 4.09* (2.16) -1.80* (1.04) 4.60** (2.12) -2.82+ (1.95) -4.96* (2.49) 
Slope of  Democ. at 0 Exog. -7.26** (3.37) 3.40** (1.63) -9.09** (3.79) 4.98* (2.69) 8.37** (4.01) 
Slope of  Democ. at 1 Exog. -3.18** (1.54) 1.60** (0.74) -4.49** (1.95) 2.16+ (1.34) 3.41+ (2.10) 
Slope of  Democ. at 2 Exog. 0.91 1.65 -0.20 (0.77) 0.11 (1.48) -0.66 (1.99) -1.54 (2.26) 
 
Lesotho 
1 for 
Exog 
Democ. Δ, 1990 to 2005 -5.67* (3.27) 1.83 (2.07) -10.25*** (3.53) 5.04* (2.56) 7.81* (3.91) 
Exog. * Democ. Change 3.12+ (2.10) -0.78 (1.21) 5.38** (1.99) -2.91+ (1.93) -4.64* (2.41) 
Slope of  Democ. at 0 Exog. -5.67* (3.27) 1.83 (2.07) -10.25*** (3.53) 5.04* (2.56) 7.81* (3.91) 
Slope of  Democ. at 1 Exog. -2.55* (1.52) 1.05 (0.95) -4.87** (1.85) 2.13+ (1.31) 3.17+ (2.10) 
Slope of  Democ. at 2 Exog. 0.57 (1.65) 0.28 (0.70) 0.51 (1.54) -0.77 (2.09) -1.48 (2.28) 
Coefficient is on the left and robust standard error is on the right in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01(two-tailed) , ** p<0.05 (two-tailed), * p<0.10 (two-tailed), + p<0.10 (one-tailed)
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The results in table two are generally consistent with those of table one and figure one; 
however there are some cases where recoding impacts the consistency of support for the hypotheses 
across all dependent variables. Analyses where Angola is recoded to a 2, Uganda to a 2, and Lesotho 
to a 2 on the exogeneity scale all produce results consistent to that of table one and figure one. 
Specifically, the change in democracy is significantly and positively related to the change in social 
service outcomes when exogenous democratization is controlled for across all dependent variables. 
The interaction term between exogeneity and democratization is significant to at least the 0.10 error 
level on a one tailed test (and in the case of Uganda and Lesotho’s recoding the p value of this 
relationship is generally more significant than it was in the original analyses displayed in table two). 
Additionally, the slope of democracy is significantly and positively related to all social service 
outcomes when calculated at a zero level of exogeneity, the slope of democracy is estimated to be 
around half of its zero level of exogeneity value at a one level of exogeneity and it is insignificant at a 
two on the exogeneity scale.  
Additionally, the consistency of these results hold true for a majority of dependent variables 
in the other cases of alternative coding. When Lesotho is coded as a one, the results from the 
regression estimating the change in life expectancy is only set which does not support the 
hypotheses I discussed earlier. In this model, the change in democracy is not significantly related to 
change in social services once exogenous democratization is controlled for and the interaction term 
is not significant at all. In the analyses where Burundi is recoded as a one on the exogeneity scale, 
the significance of the change in democracy coefficient falls in the life expectancy and primary 
enrolment models from a two tailed 0.10 error level to a one tailed 0.10 error level. Additionally, in 
these models, the interaction between exogeneity and democratization is not significant. However, in 
both of these analyses, the slope of democracy, when estimated at a zero level and a middle point of 
exogeneity (a one), is still positively and significantly (to at least the 0.10 error level in a one tailed 
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test), related to the change in social services.  Thus, in each case of alternative coding, I still find that 
in a majority of analyses, the exogeneity of democratization can help to explain why democratic 
change is not “conventionally” associated with changes in social service delivery. Additionally, the 
reviewed analyses provide considerable support for the hypotheses that democratization is least 
likely to result in responsive governance when it is most exogenously derived, and should be 
associated with increases in the quality of life when it is rooted in endogenous sources.  
 
Conclusion 
The impacts of democratization on the quality of life in Africa should be understood within 
the context of the variations in its origins. When derived endogenously, democratization in Africa is 
associated with increases in the quality of life and standard of living. However, when the pressure to 
adopt democratic reforms comes primarily from foreign sources, those reforms, however substantial 
they may be in other respects, do little to bring Africans responsive governments. In this chapter I 
have argued that these trends can be understood in light of the likely implications of exogenously 
derived democratization. Specifically, in exogenously derived democracies, ruling elites are beholden 
mainly to the needs of donors. However, donors are, for many reasons, unlikely to use their leverage 
over regimes to return higher levels of responsiveness. Additionally, exogeneously derived 
democracies are likely to result in an imbalance in the political playing field at home, i.e. it is unlikely 
that an opposition party can act as an effective domestic check on the power of ruling elites. These 
two characteristics reduce the electoral incentive that supposedly ties democratic leaders to the needs 
of their constituents. 
In the next chapter I turn to a more detailed look at the mechanisms that underline the 
relationship between democracy and social service delivery. Specifically, I report the findings from 
in-country fieldwork in Zambia, a country where the transition to multipartyism was heavily 
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influenced by both domestic and international sources of pressure. I examine, on the ground, how 
citizens in Zambia demand social services and how politicians respond to these demands. Also, I 
trace the evolution of “responsive” policies in Zambia and find that while strides were initially made 
to institutionalize a level of local government responsiveness post-transition, later erosions in the 
democratic experiment undermined the effectiveness that these institutions ultimately ever had in 
increasing the quality of life for Zambians.  
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Chapter Four: Multiparty Politics and Social Service Delivery in a Hybrid Regime, Zambia 
 
While a move toward competitive-multiparty politics is often hypothesized to have a positive 
effect on social services, its impact in Africa has proven to be contextual. Chapter 3 demonstrated 
that when exogenously rooted, democratization will likely not have an impact on social service 
delivery. Chapter three’s analyses compare well with the larger literature on a theoretically positive 
link that democracy has with social service delivery as it too investigates this relationship cross-
nationally and systematically (Rudra and Haggard 2005, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Deacon 
2003, 2009; Brown 1999; Frey and Al-Roumi 1999; Shandra et al. 2004; Baum and Lake 2003; Lake 
and Baum 2001; Ross 2006). While cross-national analyses highlight whether or not relationships 
hypothesized hold, they do little to explore exactly why they hold, on the ground. Thus, we are still 
left with important questions, including: How do citizens of new democracies actually demand 
services? How do their politicians respond to these demands? How does the exogeneity of a 
transition impact an elected official’s incentives to act in a responsive nature?  In this chapter I 
investigate these questions by offering a case study of the nature and evolution of social service 
policy making and implementation in Zambia.  
As a case Zambia has a lot to offer. The country adopted multipartyism at the beginning of 
Africa’s democratic wave and did so due to both significant foreign and domestic pressure. While 
many of the arguments made in chapter three are presented in terms of the likely impacts on 
responsiveness of a fully exogenously led transition, Zambia’s case gives more insight into how 
exogenously influenced transitions may impact subsequent responsiveness when a relatively strong 
domestic movement is also present prior to the transition.43  Also, the larger quantitative literature 
has somewhat overlooked the impact that hybridity has had on social service responsiveness. Like 
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 Zambia is given a 1 on the exogeneity scale; which is a middle point between mostly endogenous and mostly 
exogenous.  
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most African countries, Zambia seems to have consolidated its democratic progress in a state of 
regime hybridity. While hybrid regimes hold elections that may work to incentivize politicians to act 
on behalf of citizens’ welfare, they also maintain elements of authoritarianism that may work to 
undermine responsiveness. Zambia is one case, which allows us to peer into the puzzle of how the 
democratic/authoritarian mixtures in these regimes impact responsiveness that the presence of 
multiparty elections is supposed to enhance. Finally, social service delivery and quality of life in 
Zambia has had a mixed record since the country introduced multiparty competitive elections. While 
some indicators measuring social service access and quality of life have changed positively, most 
have changed negatively since the country has introduced multiparty competitive elections in 1991, 
making Zambia a particularly interesting case to examine the political underpinnings of social service 
delivery.44   
I find that while there were important initial strides made by Zambia’s post-transition 
government to institutionalize a higher level of responsiveness in social services, later erosions in 
Zambia’s checks and balances undermined these gains. Zambia’s transition to multiparty politics led 
the country away from single-party rule into a state of evolving regime hybridity. Even as the 
government was holding regular multiparty elections, Zambia’s leadership was repressing opposition 
and consolidating the dominance of its executive branch, which has likely negatively impacted 
responsiveness in the country. Additionally, the introduction of multiparty competition failed to 
sweep away other barriers to achieving a responsive democracy, like systemic corruption, low 
capacity local government, and a disengaged public. Thus, despite two decades of holding regular 
multiparty elections, Zambians continue to be left without an effective channel to voice social 
                                                        
44 Life expectancy has decreased by 6 years, the percent of people that are undernourished in the country has decreased 
by 2% , the percent of people immunized for measles has decreased by 5%, and infant mortality has increased by 6 
percent, over the 1990 to 2005 period. In contrast, primary enrollment has increased by 14%, and the number of doctors 
per capita has increased by 17 over the same period (World Bank Development Indicators) 
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service needs to, locally elected leaders are largely incapable of responding to needs, and more 
capable policy makers lack the incentives to respond to demands in equitable ways. 
This chapter is the result of in-country fieldwork during the Summer of 2010, when I 
conducted a series of in-depth interviews with policy makers, social service bureaucrats, members of 
the NGO community, representatives of foreign donors, and scholars, about the demand and supply 
of social services in the country as well as how social service policy has evolved and interacted with 
Zambia’s political system.  Specifically, these interviews paid particular attention to tracing the 
process by which Zambians articulate their need for education and health services, how policy 
makers receive this information, and their subsequent reaction to these needs.   
Before describing changes in social service policy, I first provide a summary of the political 
dynamics in Zambia during and post its transition to multipartyism. This is to give the reader a basic 
foundation of the general political context of the period of social service delivery that I will be 
focusing on. The story of events that led up to the adoption of multiparty politics, and the later 
“hybridization” of political rule have been told more extensively elsewhere (see Rakner 2003; 
Bratton 1992, for examples). I then move on to describe how social service policy making and 
financing in Zambia has evolved in the post transition period. Here I also hypothesize about the 
political underpinnings of changes in social service policy as well as how these changes likely impact 
responsiveness in the country. Third, I discuss the state of other characteristics of Zambia’s political 
system, which not only seem to be barriers to achieving a responsive democracy, but have also not 
been significantly impacted by multipartyism. Finally, I conclude with a broader discussion of what 
role exogenous pressures may have had in influencing the state of responsiveness in Zambia’s 
democracy. 
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Becoming a Multiparty Hybrid 
“In fact, politics is the conduct of public affairs for private advantage” 
Fredrick Chiluba, Zambia’s second President45 
Zambia returned to multiparty competition in late 1991, after 17 years of single party rule. 
This was significant for Africa, as it was the first English speaking country to complete such a 
transition peacefully. The transition occurred over only a two-year period, with the first calls for 
multiparty democracy occurring in December 1989 and the first inauguration in December 1991 
(Bratton 1992). President Kenneth Kaunda, the country’s founding father, and his United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) were replaced by an opposition group called the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and its leader, Fredrick Chiluba, who became president with 76 
percent of the vote. However, in a similarly short period of time, the democratic nature of the 
Chiluba regime started to show signs of hybridization as it made several moves, which mirrored that 
of the rule of its old opponent.  
Replacing Single Party Rule with Multiparty Competition 
Domestic opposition to single party rule largely rose due to discontent over failed economic 
policies and their widespread impact on the standard of living in the country. During its first decade 
of independence, Zambia’s economy grew modestly, at about 2.3% annually (World Bank). 
However, its heavy dependence on copper (copper made up 90% of its exports and 40% of its GDP 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s) proved to be an exceptional liability in 1974 when world copper 
prices fell (Rakner 2003: 53). A lack of diversification coupled with other economic drains, such as a 
pervasively large and inefficient state sector led to a sharp decline in average income. Per capita 
                                                        
45
 (Graham 1994: 154) 
114 
 
income fell from $615 in 1974 to $238 in 1986 (WBDI)46 and government revenue fell by 30% 
between 1974 and 1984 (Larmer 2006: 297). 
In light of the severe economic decline, the Zambian government had little choice but to 
turn to the IMF and World Bank. The government set about on a series of prescribed stability 
measures and, later, structural adjustment programs between 1973 and 1990 (see Graham 1994: 150 
for a full chronological account of Zambia’s relationship with the IMF and World Bank during this 
period). Economic policy conditionalities on IMF and World Bank financing during the early and 
mid-1970s were largely weak and lacked enforcement mechanisms; it was not until 1978 when the 
IMF attached a strict package of policy conditionalities on a US $250 million dollar loan, which was, 
at the time, the largest IMF loan ever extended to an African country (Rakner 2003:54; Hawkins 
1991: 844). The conditionalities and reforms adopted failed to produce policies that would address 
underlying economic problems and the government returned several more times to the IFIs for 
more economic help. “From 1978 onwards, the relationship between the IMF and Zambia was 
characterized by steady increases in borrowing, matched by even more stringent conditions” (Rakner 
2003: 55).  
As the Zambian economy continued to decline, its government became more desperate for 
external financing. This situation left the IFIs with more leverage in demanding policy reforms. 
However, many of the reforms came at a high political price for the ruling regime, which influenced 
the government’s decision to abandon them at various stages of implementation. For example, 
reforms in 1985 called for the elimination of subsidies on maize and fertilizers, a decrease in price 
controls in the state sector, and significant reductions in public spending and the size of the civil 
service (Callaghy 1990: 292). “More than anything, the 1985 adjustment measures hurt the 
government’s political base, the urban population and large public bureaucracy within the UNIP and 
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 Data is from World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
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the state.” (Rakner 2003: 58). In reaction to announcement of the reforms, waves of organized 
strikes overtook the country, marking the greatest outbreak of unrest Zambia had seen since 
independence (Rakner 2003: 59). The government’s response was to abandon the reforms altogether 
in early 1987 (Lewis 1996: 106) and to follow its own, less politically risky, economic reform 
program (Martin 1993: 138). However, in 1989, the government recognized that its own plan was 
failing to produce results, and it returned again to the IMF in 1990 (Martin 1993: 138). 
At home, economic dissatisfaction in Zambia was increasingly being translated into demands 
for a new government and multiparty politics (Rakner 2003: 63). Trade unions, particularly copper 
miner unions, had a history of political influence even prior to independence; these unions, led by 
the Zambia Congress Trade Unions (ZCTU) played a vital role in the independence movement 
itself, in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Meebelo 1986). ZCTU continued to be the most powerful 
non-state association in Zambia throughout the post independence era and its membership 
comprised roughly 70% of Zambia’s total workforce in the formal sector (Rakner 2003: 51). While 
in the first decade of independence, the ruling party, UNIP, was able to appease the union forces, 
the economic decline in the mid-1970s acted as a catalyst for trade unions to develop their role as 
the unofficial opposition to the single party regime (Rakner 2003: 51). 
The deteriorating domestic environment was compounded by pressure from international 
donors. Rakner argues that the internal multiparty movement “only gathered momentum when the 
domestic opposition was supported by the international donor community” (2003: 21).47 
International donors were becoming more cohesive regarding the economic and political 
conditionalities of financial assistance (Rakner 2003: 22). As discussed in other parts of this 
dissertation, the end of the Cold War marked a new consensus in this respect; bilateral donors 
                                                        
47 Members of the international community has beed described to have a visible and ongoing presence during the 
negotiations between the domestic opposition and the Kaunda regime (Bjornlund, Bratton and Gibson 1992). One 
example includes former President, Jimmy Carter, pushing the Zambian government to make changes in the electoral 
system. (Bjornlund, Bratton and Gibson 1992). 
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started attaching democratic conditionalities to their aid. While Zambia did not receive overt threats 
of aid sanctioning by donors for its lack of political liberalization, arguably the international 
community at the time did not necessarily need to do so. The regime was already at a point where it 
was in desperate need of a financial lifeline. Even without being threatened with aid withdrawal, the 
ruling party and opposition were well aware that “the survival of any political regime in Zambia 
[was] dependent upon improving the country’s international financial relations” (Rakner 2003: 22).48 
At the time, improving its relationships with the international community, and with donors 
especially meant that the regime would be committed to liberalizing its political and economic 
systems. Thus, while there was definitely a domestically rooted opposition wherein genuine calls for 
a change in government and regime were heard, the international community reinforced such 
political change by giving any government in Zambia democratic parameters within which it must 
operate. 
Dissatisfaction over the regime’s handling of the economy culminated in 1990, a year that 
was particularly politically active and unstable. Explosive riots broke out after the government 
doubled the price of maize meal in June 1990, after it followed yet another set of IMF directed 
reforms (Bratton 1992: 85-86; Rakner 2003: 63). Instead of being exclusively focused at the 
economic reforms imposed, the riots and other civil disobedience took a largely political tone 
targeted at ousting Kaunda regime.  “Thus, from July 1990 onwards, a broad coalition of the trade 
unions, students, academics, the business community and parliamentary back-benchers started to 
organize an alternative political platform for the reintroduction of multiparty politics” (Rakner 2003: 
63). The trade union movement remained the organizational base of the burgeoning opposition. 
Under domestic and international pressure, the parliament changed the constitution to allow for 
multiple political parties in early December 1990, and the chairman of the trade union movement, 
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 The international community played a central role in the policy making process of the Chiluba regime. For example,  
the international donor community “was regarded as the final sanctioning body of economic policies” (Rakner 2003: 22). 
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Fredrick Chiluba, was elected to head the Movement of Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the main 
political party that would face the Kaunda regime at the polls (Rakner 2003: 64). The seriousness of 
discontent with the economy and governance was finally felt in October 1991 when Chiluba won 
the presidential elections and MMD won 125 seats out of 150 in the parliament (Rakner 2003: 64). 
The new regime received a tremendous influx of foreign aid for its commitment to political and 
economic liberalization (Rakner 2003: 181). 
Hybridization of the Zambian Democracy 
 Zambia’s largely free and fair first multiparty elections marked a period of hope for the 
country. However, the democratic nature of the government started to deteriorate shortly thereafter, 
as its foundations were marred with an underdeveloped party system, institutional legacies from the 
previous single party rule, and devoid of any powerful domestic democratic watchdog. To this end, 
the donor community played an important role in marking the boundaries of democratic behavior.  
Donors reacted to signs of dramatic backsliding with threats of, or actual, aid revoking, and 
rewarded democratic concessions. Under this environment the ruling party seemed to play a game; it 
did what was necessary to remain in power, however undemocratic that action might be, and once 
the threat of losing power had waned, it made democratic concessions to win back the good graces 
of the donors. 
The new ruling party, the MMD, was essentially a coalition of various groups, including 
professionals, intellectuals, and business people, as well as organized labor and many members of 
the former ruling party that defected when it was clear it might be unseated (Sandbrook 2000: 34). 
In large part, the glue uniting these groups under the MMD banner was their shared disillusionment 
with the economic decline and governance of UNIP. Soon after taking office, however, the diversity 
of interests that were contained in the MMD started to manifest itself in several different factional 
struggles (Sandbrook 2000: 34). Additionally, the MMD’s rise to ruling party status left an 
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oppositional void, until most recently. UNIP maintained its base in limited areas (like the Eastern 
province), but along with losing the election and many of its parliament seats, it had lost many 
prominent members to the MMD. Further down the road, UNIP would slowly dissolve, to be 
unseated by other opposition parties as the main opponent to the ruling party. With the dawn of 
multiparty competition, came the proliferation of several other smaller opposition parties, and over 
time disillusionment and defection with MMD rule has led to an increase in the creation of new 
parties by old MMD politicians (Rakner and Svasand 2004: 53). Most notably, for example is the 
Patriotic Front (PF), a party set up by Zambia’s current president, Michael Sata, who was a 
prominent MMD politician that defected when the presidential nomination in 2001 was given to a 
different MMD member.49  
At the beginning of its rule, the MMD was given a relaxed institutional setting. By many 
accounts, a lack of adequate checks on the MMD’s power and, therefore, their ability to make 
political moves which echoed that of the UNIP government, can be attributed to the control that 
UNIP had in navigating the transition.  “UNIP managed to control the transition in that only minor 
modifications to the existing constitution preceded the election in October 1991. Although Kaunda 
and UNIP lost the election, the incoming MMD government inherited a range of repressive powers 
from the former one-party state” (Sandbrook 2000: 26). For example, Kaunda maintained a “state of 
emergency” throughout his rule, a topic that was not only opposed by the MMD during the 1991 
campaign, but adopted by Chiluba in 1993 (for a much shorter period of time) in response to threats 
of UNIP resurgence (Rakner 2003: 105). The MMD used and still uses state resources to help 
campaign on behalf of MMD candidates, another practice that the former ruling party engaged in 
(Rakner 2003: 106). As early as late 1993, the initial tolerance of various views within the Cabinet 
was largely gone (Nordlund 1996: 132). And although MMD campaigned based on promoting 
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 “Michael Sata: Zambia’s ‘King Cobra’ finally strikes,” BBC News, 23 September 2011, viewed on: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15034694   
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transparency and decreasing corruption, complaints of corruption within the government have 
become increasingly prominent (Rakner 2003: 107). 
The political events that preceded the second national election were most troubling for the 
status of the Zambian democracy. At the time, UNIP remained the largest opposition group to 
MMD, and Kaunda, the ex president was planning on competing in the upcoming election. In 
anticipation of this, the MMD government passed a constitutional amendment, which barred the ex 
president from competing. Under the pretense of nationalism, the MMD’s amendment required that 
the parents of a presidential candidate would have to be born in Zambia, and Kaunda’s parents were 
from Malawi (Kees van Donge 1998). This move sparked both domestic and donor opposition, and 
ultimately resulted in decreased aid from donors to pressure the regime (Kees van Donge 1998). 
Other issues surrounding the 1996 elections signaled that elements of the democratic experiment in 
Zambia had been abandoned. Voter registration was fraught with irregularities and delay, publicly 
owned media was used to the advantage of the MMD candidates, and the ruling party used 
government vehicles to campaign and relied on development funds and private goods to attract 
supporters in rural areas (Baylies and Szeftel 1997). Chiluba won the election in a landslide victory of 
73 percent of the vote and MMD captured 131 of 150 parliamentary seats (Rakner 2003: 110). 
It was also during the second election that the power of the executive also increased 
tremendously, with “the creation of a presidential discretionary fund outside parliament scrutiny; 
various special desks in the Presidential Office; and large supplementary payments to the 
Presidential Office” (Rakner  2003: 186). Also the president increasingly made unilateral policy 
decisions and expelled members of his party for dissent. The inordinate power of the executive 
would continue to be a defining characteristic of the Zambian government in future administrations 
(van de Walle 2002; Rakner 2003; VonDoepp 2005; Prempeh 2008). The “Big Man Syndrome” it 
seemed, would continue to plague the Zambian democratic experiment.   
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While the MMD retained power, the 1996 elections had tarnished Zambia’s reputation as 
being a functioning democracy. “Necessitated by the substantial cuts in donor support, the re-
elected MMD government began a process of regaining democratic credibility in early 1997” 
(Rakner 2003: 111). The main changes made were involved creating several semi-autonomous 
“institutions of restraint,” including an Electoral and Human Rights commissions and delinking the 
Anti Corruption Commission from the presidency. However, once again, these “democratic” 
reforms were heavily promoted by the international donor committee (Rakner 2003: 111). 
During Chiluba’s second term, the country experienced continued political oppression, in 
the form of raids, economic threats, tax harassment and outright violence on independent media, 
NGOs, and political opponents, including a situation where the police opened fire on Kenneth 
Kaunda at a political rally (Rakner 2003: 112). During the end of his second term Chiluba started to 
initiate a movement to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third term, a campaign that 
was met by unprecedented opposition both domestically and internationally (Venter 2003: 12). The 
blocking of the move was a promising sign for the durability of the rule of law and illustrated again 
the leverage that donor’s had in influencing Zambian politics. However, that the President 
campaigned for such a change also illustrates the unconsolidated nature of Zambia’s democracy. 
Having been blocked from running for a third term, Chiluba handpicked his successor,  Levy 
Mwanawasa,  and in the next national election, amidst allegations of massive vote-rigging and 
electoral fraud, the MMD candidate narrowly defeated an opposition party candidate (from UPND) 
by 33,997 votes (Venter 2003: 12). 
When Mwanawasa was returned to power for a second term in 2006, for the first time the 
fractionalized opposition obtained more seats in parliament then the ruling party (76 seats to various 
opposition parties to 74 seats of the MMD), which might be taken as a sign of increased 
endogenization of democracy in Zambia. Additionally, in general, Mwanawasa’s rule was viewed to 
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be an improvement in terms of authoritarianism and corruption from the Chiluba regime. However, 
his commitment to fight corruption waned towards the end of his time in office, and he illustrated 
some of the same repressive powers while in office. For example, in early 2004, he issued a 
deportation of a British citizen who had criticized the president in the news by comparing him to an 
elephant.50 Additionally, critics argued that he tried to manipulate a constitutional review (Larmer 
2009:128).  
Following Mwanawasa’s death in 2008, Rupiah Banda was elected into office, another MMD 
politician. Again, there were allegations of electoral fraud (Freedom House 2010). However, at this 
point, the oppositional climate started to show signs of shifting. Michael Sata, the PF’s candidate, 
only lost to Banda in the 2008 presidential campaign by 2 only percentage points.51 This was a 
promising sign that the destructive fractionalization, which characterized the past opposition parties, 
was coming to an end. During Banda’s time in office, complaints of corruption continued, and 
disillusionment with the MMD’s long rule continued to spread. In 2009 and 2010, foreign aid for the 
health sector was suspended following reports of corruption scandals in the ministry of health. Also, 
the Banda government took a number of aggressive and sometimes violent measures to repress the 
opposition and civil society (Freedom House 2010). 
The 2011 Presidential election marked another milestone for Zambia’s democracy; after 20 
years of MMD rule, Michael Sata, of PF, was elected into office. While this was clearly a case of 
party turnover, the Sata was a well-known and veteran Zambian politician. He rose to prominence in 
the ruling UNIP party under Kenneth Kaunda, but then defected to the MMD shortly before 
Chiluba won the presidency in 1991. He then broke away from the MMD party, after Mwanawasa 
was made the presidential candidate of the party in 2001. At this point, Sata set up his own political 
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 “Michael Sata: Zambia’s ‘King Cobra’ finally strikes,” BBC News, 23 September 2011, viewed on: 
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party, the Patriotic Front.52  Sata also contested three presidential elections before winning in 2011, 
under the PF banner, each time gaining a higher percentage of the votes.  
What the 2011 election means for Zambia’s democracy is up for interpretation. On the one 
hand, Sata’s victory marks the crystallization of a popular opposition party, and maybe some 
indication of an endogenization of democracy. Put differently, 20 years of practicing multiparty 
politics in Zambia may have, not only institutionalized the formal rules of democracy, but also made 
inroads in generating a domestic democratic movement, which would explain the 2011 presidential 
party turnover. However, on the other hand, several other features of this particular outcome 
indicate that it is unlikely that this victory of democratic institutions will change how politics works 
on the ground. First, the campaign leading up to the election was again characterized with MMD 
repression and their unfair use of state funds to campaign. This indicates that even up until this 
election, there lacked institutional checks on the ruling party’s abuse of power. There is also some 
speculation that Sata may have had to rely on foreign finance from Taiwanese firms to tip the 
financial balance more in his favor to win office. 53  This is a clear sign of the need to rely on 
exogenous actors to combat poorly institutionalized checks on the ruling party within the country. 
While it might be tempting to write off these issues as being features of the previous regime, there is 
equally reason to suspect that the weak institutional environment, which underscored both the use 
of state funds on behalf of the MMD and the reliance on foreign finance from PF, will persist with 
Sata in office.  
Additionally, while Sata clearly ran as an oppositional candidate, there was, arguably, not 
much that can distinguish his candidacy from Banda, besides the MMD label. Sata’s move away 
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from the MMD to form the PF is often framed as an opportunistic move to create a political party 
vehicle that would give him access to the presidency.54 The two parties, MMD and PF, are basically 
indistinguishable in terms of party platforms, and Sata’s candidacy was mainly based on making 
vague pledges to put more money in the pockets of voters.55  Rhetorically, the campaigns of both 
Banda and Sata focused on personal insults of the other, and relied less on distinguishing themselves 
in terms of their different policy platforms. 56 Sata’s election is seen as more of an expression of 
people’s disillusionment with 20 years of MMD rule, and less to do with the choice of new policies 
that Sata advocated for.57 Thus, while Sata’s election is a sign of an institutionalized electoral system, 
it speaks less to the ability of Zambia’s party system to offer voters meaningful differences between 
parties and from the past.  
Zambia’s particular breed of hybridity was born out of a domestic and internationally 
pressured transition, which resulted in a weakly institutionalized party system, dominant executive 
branch and other legacies from the era of single party rule, like pervasive corruption. These elements 
operated within the confines of a formal multiparty democracy, largely reinforced by international 
donors through pressures and threats of imposing political conditionalities on foreign aid, as 
domestic democracy proponents were relatively less powerful in the post transition period. While at 
various points the donor community exercised political conditionality over issues such as corruption 
and conditional reform, (Rakner 2003: 182) as others have pointed out elsewhere (Uvin 1993; Brown 
2005), donors are naturally limited in the extent to which they can demand political change through 
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revoking aid. Especially in Zambia, donors insisted on the implementation of both economic and 
political liberalization. Struggling with the question of which agenda was most important, bilateral 
donors were reluctant to use their economic leverage to punish the regime’s democratic pitfalls, and 
largely only responded with aid suspension when there were dramatic setbacks, as in 1996. This left 
elites with room to maneuver; as long as it showed commitments to the regularization of multiparty 
elections and economic liberalization, it could act undemocratically in other ways, still maintain 
donor support, and political power. More recently, Zambia’s formal electoral institutions have been 
tested, as signified with the 2011 presidential party turnover. While the election’s outcome calls for 
some optimism regarding the institutionalization of Zambia’s formal democracy, there are still 
several reasons to be skeptical of what this turnover may mean for inducing a more responsive 
democracy.  
 
Social Services and Political Change in Zambia 
Competitive multiparty systems are expected to provide a better quality of life and higher 
levels of social services because their leaders fear being voted out of office (Deacon 2003, 2009; 
Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2004). However, 
as argued in chapter 3, there are a number of reasons why the relationship between regime type and 
quality of life is not likely to always be entirely linear. The democracy-quality of life relationship 
implicitly assumes that citizens have an avenue to express policy needs, that they will do so, that they 
will use their vote to punish and reward policy makers based on their performance in providing 
social services (among other things), that elected leaders will have control over development policy, 
and that they will be incentivized to redistribute state resources in a manner which benefits the 
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general population.58 How has Zambia’s electoral democracy functioned with respect to these 
assumptions?  Has adopting multipartyism impacted social service delivery? And, finally, how has 
the erosion of democracy impacted social service delivery? 
The introduction of multiparty democracy led to a large formal institutional change in social 
service delivery, namely the adoption of the Local Government Act. Among other things, this Act 
aimed to institutionalize a more responsive government by delinking the ruling party from the 
government and establishing democratically elected local governments tasked with providing the 
vast majority of social services. However, Zambia’s reversion to authoritarianism, or hybridization, 
also had an impact on several aspects of social service policymaking, which undercut the 
responsiveness of Zambia’s system to citizens’ needs. Additionally, multiparty competition failed to 
change other features of political life in Zambia, like corruption and the absence of an actively 
involved citizenry, both of which continue to act as barriers to incentivizing politicians. In effect, 
Zambians are largely left without an avenue to voice their social service demands, and elected 
leaders, for a number of reasons, are not capable and/or lack a willingness to respond to the social 
service needs of their constituents with more effective coverage and higher quality services.  
Regime Change and Local Government 
Today, almost all social service provisions are tasked to local government in Zambia. Under 
single party rule, however, local government largely filled the role of providing the ruling party with 
an active presence in all districts and at the village level (Chikulo 2009:100). In fact, during this time, 
local and central government were so highly politicized that all administrative structures were 
essentially merged with the ruling party (Chikulo 2009: 100). Political office was accessible to only 
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high ranking and loyal ruling party members. With the transition to a multi-party democratic system 
came important legislation which would work to undermine much of how the former one-party 
system operated. The MMD campaigned on democratizing governance and separating party politics 
from government administration. On a wave of democratic rhetoric and an initial period of 
commitment to the democratic experiment, just 8 months after the constitution was changed to 
allow multiple parties to compete, parliament passed the Local Government Act (LGA) in August 1991. 
The LGA officially separated the ruling party from civil service and state apparatus and re-
introduced measures to democratize local government. Unlike before, with the passing of the LGA, 
every citizen who was registered to vote were then also given the opportunity to stand for election 
or vote for the candidate of his/her choice, irrespective of political affiliation (Chikulo 2009: 100-
101).  
The LGA also provided a formal structure to local government that was not necessarily as 
well defined prior to its passing. Accordingly, Zambia is divided into nine provinces, which are 
further divided into 72 districts, and further, still, divided into 1,456 wards. The LGA requires that 
every five years, local councilors are voted into office, one per ward.59  Each district was to have a 
District Council. Originally, in 1991, District Councils were made of all local councilors in the 
district, and in rural areas, two representatives which are appointed by all the traditional chiefs in the 
district (in 1992, the MPs of the district were also given a seat on the council). District Council 
meetings can be attended by anyone, and are one of the official avenues that Zambians have to 
voice policy needs. The District Council is formally tasked with implementing development policy, 
and coordinating the development efforts of various ministries within the district. Additionally, and 
especially important to the purposes of this chapter, the LGA also defined the role that local 
government would take in social service provisions. District Councils would be delegated with 
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providing almost all social services to their constituencies. Specifically, the Local Government Act of 
1991 outlines sixty-three functions of local councils. These functions can be categorized as general 
administration, advertisements, agriculture, community development, public amenities, education, 
public health, public order, and sanitation and drainage (Lolojih: 5).  
As mentioned in chapter 3, localizing or decentralizing social service provisions as the LGA 
seemingly did, is held up by many as responsiveness inducing policy.  Theoretically, delegating lower 
levels of government with social service policy gives citizens greater access to those whom make 
decisions about services, which allows more opportunity for citizens to articulate policy needs 
(Tommasi and Winshelbaum 2007), creates incentives for local policy makers to respond to local 
needs and aids in rectifying a general problem of inequalities in the distribution of state resources 
(Faguet 2004; Besley and Coate 2003: 2628; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005).60 In many ways, and in 
line with this logic, the LGA was read as a step toward the institutionalization of responsiveness 
within the new competitive multiparty order. The closest form of elected government to citizens, 
councilors and the district council, were officially responsible for local service provisions. District 
council meetings would be accessible to citizens as an outlet to express policy needs. Thus, local 
level politicians would, theoretically, have an electoral incentive to deliver on services and respond to 
expressed needs. And finally, citizens would have an opportunity to hold elected officials 
accountable at the polls.  
However, local government in Zambia failed to develop into a truly responsive body. When 
in power, UNIP held a monopoly on all matters of government and was deeply involved in 
implementing any development policy at the local level (Graham 1994: 151). With it removed from 
power, Zambia experienced an institutional vacuum and local level government never gained the 
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capacity needed to fulfill the tasks delegated to them under the new order. Instead, MMD leadership 
found it in their political interest to increase the central government’s control over development 
policy. Thus, its level of responsiveness in social services suffers from both the legacies of the 
former one-party state and Zambia’s reversion towards an executive-dominant governing system in 
the post transition era.  
Expanding a Central Influence in Local Level Social Services 
While the LGA seemingly institutionalized a level of local responsiveness in social service 
delivery, later amendments to local governance structures have undermined that effort.  It is through 
these additional changes that Zambia’s eroding democracy and increasingly dominant executive 
branch began to resonate within the country’s social service responsiveness. One of the first 
amendments to the LGA was in 1993, at which point District Development Coordination 
Committees (DDCC) were created. The DDCCs were to serve as “ technical advisory committees 
whose function would be to provide a forum for dialogue and co-ordination on development issues 
between the local authority, line departments, donors and NGOs in each district” (Mukwena 2001: 
16).61 In essence, the DDCCs were tasked with development policy planning at the district level, a 
job that was originally given to the District Councils, whom were now only in charge of providing 
services (Chikulo 2009: 104). More important to the issue of possibly displacing local responsiveness 
is the makeup of the DDCCs. A DDCC is comprised of the heads of central government 
departments at the district level and other development agencies represented in the district. Giving 
control of social service policy planning to this committee meant a break in the accountability chain; 
none of the locally elected officials would control social service policy planning at the local level, and 
instead the majority who would, were bureaucrats that represented central government departments. 
Citizens of local constituencies lost an electoral leverage over policy planning, and policy makers at 
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the district level no longer had an electoral incentive to respond to local needs. Additionally, because 
the central government departments (ministries) are held mostly accountable to the executive branch 
(this is elaborated upon further later), this policy change also served to realize an expanded the role 
of the executive branch into local social service policy planning. Theoretically, DDCC members 
would be more loyal to the needs of the central government when planning policy, to which they 
owed their employment.  
The creation of the District Administrator position is another example of the central 
government’s encroachment on local level development planning. This position was created in 1999, 
three years after the Chiluba led government undemocratically edged out Kaunda from running in 
the second election and well into a time of democratic erosion in the country. With the District 
Administrator position, the executive branch was able to assert its influence over district matters in a 
much more overt way then before, when it was somewhat prevented from doing so under the 
original LGA. The District Administrator was to be, and is, the executive head of the District 
Council, a member of the DDCC and is tasked with overseeing development plans within the 
district.  It is a civil service position that is appointed directly by the president and reports to the 
presidential office (Rakner 2003: 113). District Administrators were provided with vehicles and 
offices outside of formal local government structures and “were placed in control of the crucial 
Constituency Development Funds that provide much of the small-scale finance for government 
projects,” (Rakner 2003: 115). Due to this control, the position further undercut the capacity of local 
governments to control development policy autonomously, which worked to reduce local level 
responsiveness even more. Additionally, the position echoed a characteristic of the previous one-
party regime, as it was heavily politicized. Most District Administrators were recruited from “the 
party cadres of the ruling MMD” (Mukwena 2001: 13). Such recruitment trends worked to further 
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distort the incentives of development policy at the district level to reflect the political needs of the 
ruling party.   
Like the LGA, other legislation has been passed in Zambia to seemingly make more inroads 
towards more meaningful decentralization and responsiveness. For example, in 2002, the 
Decentralization Implementation Programme (DIP) was adopted to assist in more meaningful 
measures to decentralize and strengthen the capacity of the local government. However, not much 
meaningful progress has been made in its implementation. The slow pace of change towards more 
meaningful decentralization has been largely blamed on political disagreements over the final 
institutional arrangements that will be used in its implementation (PDM 2007). However, the lack of 
domestic political momentum to adopt more meaningful decentralized institutions may be a 
function of the exogenous nature of much of the pressures to decentralize, and the lack of domestic 
political will to implement decentralization policies.  
As discussed in chapter three, decentralization is one policy that donors have heavily 
promoted so as to induce responsiveness within recipient countries, among other things. Zambia is a 
good example of this; donors promoted decentralization and made it clear that decentralization 
efforts would be financially supported. For example, the UNDP provided immediate support to 
Zambia’s Decentralization Secretariate when it was established, and The World Bank, and several 
other bilateral donors have doled out support for decentralization efforts in the country (PDM 
2007). Thus, there is strong element of exogeneity when it comes to Zambia’s decentralization 
policy. As discussed in chapter 3, while ruling elites might be willing to adopt formal amendments to 
decentralize the government to appease eager donors and IFIs, actual implementation requires 
domestic political will. The stalled nature of the decentralization project in Zambia illustrates the 
lack of domestic political will to implement meaningful decentralization. Decentralization is 
designed to reduce the ability of the central government to coordinate and control development 
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efforts. Thus, incumbent leadership will likely not find the policy in their own interest without 
having strong domestic pressure to back decentralization efforts. Additionally, as discussed in 
chapter 3, donors are ill equipped to monitor or enforce suggested policy transformations, like 
decentralization. Thus, the exogeneity of decentralization efforts in Zambia may help to explain why 
domestic efforts to decentralize has been somewhat stalled.  
The original LGA and subsequent “responsiveness” related legislation envisioned a more 
responsive social service planning structure than what exists today. In essence the subsequent 
amendments to the LGA have hollowed out the capacity of local government to work 
autonomously from the center and took away citizens’ ability to more directly influence local level 
policy planning. Other policies, like decentralization, have stalled in their implementation and have 
remained ineffective at returning higher degrees of responsiveness. While the structure of 
development planning has certainly evolved in conjunction with the erosion of democracy in 
Zambia, social service financing has largely remained the same since the transition. As I discuss next, 
this continuity, unfortunately, also undermines local responsiveness.  
Keeping the Purse at the Center 
Zambia’s social service financing scheme also undermines local responsiveness and is 
vulnerable to being heavily politicized as it too gives a lot of leverage to the central government, and 
executive branch, specifically. For example, at the local government level social service financing is 
supposed to come from two sources: (1) local revenues raised by district councils through, for 
example, the collection on rents of government owned buildings, license fees, and market levies, 
(Tordoff and Young 1994) and (2) transfers from the central government.62 The latter is supposed to 
be the local government’s major source of finance. (Chikulo 2009: 103). “The transfers are firstly, 
the means by which the central government shares taxes with councils, and secondly, provide a 
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conduit through which various grants from sector ministries are disbursed to enable councils to 
undertake delegated functions on their behalf” (Chikulo 2009: 103).63 However, by requiring that 
local governments rely on the central government to fund the majority of projects or give general 
grants, local government become financially unable to respond to social service needs 
autonomously. This disrupts the accountability cycle which the LGA purported to institutionalize, as 
citizens are unable to hold locally elected officials accountable for a lack of funding due to essentially 
the central government’s planning.  
The problems that this lack of local autonomy over social service finance creates for 
institutionalizing responsiveness becomes more apparent when one moves further up the chain of 
development planning in Zambia. Once district-level planning is approved by District Councils, 
these plans are then passed on to the provincial level. At the provincial level sits a Provincial 
Minister, the political head of each province, and the Provincial Permanent Secretary, the head 
administrative officer. The Provincial Minister is a presidential political appointee while the 
Provincial Permanent Secretary is a civil servant. The provincial level also has a development 
committee, the Provincial Development Coordination Committee (PDCC) which is tasked with 
“coordinating the planning, implementation, and monitoring of developmental activities of the 
province” (CRS 2007:13). PDCC members include all provincial heads of government ministries and 
departments, donors with projects in the province, and representatives of NGOs (Mukwena 1999: 
11). The Provincial Permanent Secretary is the chairperson for the PDCC.  Thus, provincial level 
planning is led mostly by people who report to central government ministries, not to a local 
constituency. 
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Further still up the development planning chain, provincial development plans are then 
considered to be consultative tools to be incorporated into the National Development Plan. 
Ultimately a “steering committee of Permanent [Ministry] Secretaries, chaired by the Secretary to the 
Cabinet,” superintends the entire National Development planning process (FNDP 2006: 2). 
Zambia’s national development plan outlines the government’s development goals, strategies to 
achieve such goals and outlines a yearly itemized budget for five years as to how the government will 
fund such strategies. The Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP 2006) was drafted to cover 
2006-2010.64 The official structure, the process by which Zambia achieves a national development 
plan, seems to be “bottom-up” in terms of incorporated district level development plans into 
provincial plans and provincial level plans into the final national level plan. Indeed, the produced 
national development plan does seem to articulate how the nation will fairly tackle the needs of each 
province and district. However, in practice, the funding of the national development plan not only 
leaves room for the central government to control how and where social service funding is given in 
the country, but also incentivizes the politicization of social service funding.  
Several people I spoke with called the National Development Plan a “wish list,” which might 
be drafted more in line with what donors may hope the country to strive for, than what is actually 
realistic for the country to achieve. National development plans in Zambia are chronically 
underfunded. Underfunding results from overestimating projected revenues and/or a decline in 
resources available due to many reasons, including corruption. The various ministries (Ministry of 
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Development and Finance, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Health...etc.) that fund development and social service projects are routinely faced with this problem 
of underfunding planned budgets. This gap between what is planned and what is able to be funded 
necessitates “prioritization” within the planned budget. The largest potential for a politicization of 
social service funding lies within this “prioritization,” because what the ministries choose to finance, 
or prioritize, can be politically motivated by the ruling party’s needs, and still be rationalized as being 
a part of official development planning. Additionally, Permanent Secretaries of each ministry, whom 
essentially oversee the final National Development Plan, are appointed by the president of Zambia, 
and can be terminated and replaced at any point by the president of Zambia. Thus, they have an 
institutionalized incentive to “prioritize” the funding of social services and general development 
policy in geographic areas that are politically advantageous to the ruling party.  
This political incentive to appease the ruling party, or president, is exacerbated when the 
executive branch becomes more dominant. As discussed earlier, the government in Zambia started 
to show signs of hybridization as early as before the second multiparty election, as the president 
increasingly made unilateral policy decisions and expelled members of his own party for expressed 
dissent against his policies. With the executive branch increasing its dominance, an atmosphere was 
created that heightened the probability that development and related social service policies would be 
targeted towards the regions in the country that would likely please the political aspirations of the 
president and ruling party, and not necessarily towards those regions which expressed the most 
need. For example, some note that the MMD led government has systematically neglected the 
Eastern province in Zambia due to political favoritism, as the Eastern province was an UNIP 
stronghold post transition. As a result, the Eastern province exhibits comparatively much lower 
levels of education and access to health care than other provinces (Milimo 1991: chapter 2).  
 
135 
 
A Low Capacity Local Government  
Centrally controlled financing and an increasing sense of the center’s encroachment over 
development planning depleted the capacity of local government to act autonomously in response to 
social service needs in Zambia. Lacking funding, local government in Zambia fell bankrupt and low 
and unreliable funding attracted few qualified candidates to ultimately serve as distributor of local 
services. Instead, local officials usually have low levels of education, little motivation to do work 
toward achieving policy goals and are generally ignorant about what a councilor’s actually entails 
(Lolojih: 7). In fact, in the most recent wave (2008) of the Afrobarometer survey almost 55% of 
Zambians surveyed felt that their local councilor is unqualified in terms of how much they care 
about their community, 56% felt that their councilor did not have enough experience at managing 
public service programs, and a quarter of Zambians surveyed thought it was not likely that they 
could get their district councilors to listen to their concerns. Arguably, low and unreliable salaries 
somewhat incentivize the use of an official position to extract rents from citizens. Indeed, close to 
70% of Zambians surveyed thought that their local councilor was not honest in handling public 
funds, over 85% felt that local councilors used government revenue for private gain, and similarly 
only 8% of Zambians felt none of their local councilors were involved in corruption (Afrobarometer 
2008).  While these figures may be partly a function of social distrust, they may also be a reflection 
of the persistence of corruption among District Councilors. If so, we can that such graft further 
decreases the District Council’s capacity to respond to social service needs. As much as the MMD 
campaigned to root out corruption in Zambia before the transition (and every political party has 
campaigned on this ever since the transition), the adoption of a multiparty system has, by many 
accounts, not impacted the prevalence of corruption in the government.65. 
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The transition to multiparty competition did not translate into mechanisms whereby local 
government was emboldened enough to respond autonomously to social service demands. 
Unfortunately Zambia is like many African countries in that its local level government is plagued 
with low capacity to respond to needs (Smoke 2003). The persistence of a low capacity local 
government, however, should also be read as a political intention by the ruling party and central 
government. Empowering other levels of government to act more autonomously potentially detracts 
from the control that the central government can exert over the allocation of social service 
resources.  
Zambian Voters 
If elected leaders are to be held accountable to provide social services that their constituents 
demand, citizens should not only have an outlet to articulate policy demands, they should do so. As 
discussed earlier, Zambia’s government institutions do not provide an effective avenue for citizens 
to demand social service goods. While this incapacity can probably partially explain low levels of 
citizen involvement and demand articulation, there may be other factors at play. For example, 
Zambians might be less prone to voice policy demands due to cultural norms. The oppressing 
effects of colonialism and one-party rule could have impressed Zambian political culture with a 
sense of passivity; instead of interacting with the state through elected officials, Zambians may feel 
that the state is supposed to paternally take care of them, or that they do not yet have a role in 
actively engaging with government.  “Indeed one-party rule inculcates a patrimonial political culture 
in which people come to believe that their well-being depends on attaching themselves to the 
coattails of powerful political leaders” (Bratton 1992: 93). Such political culture reinforces loyalty, 
rather than opposition and dissent, and would not have been changed with the adoption of 
multiparty elections. As discussed earlier the international community and a domestic democratic 
movement both produced the change in government. However, the role the international 
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community played was large, and the domestic democratic movement in Zambia was largely 
confined to the urban areas (Lusaka and the Copperbelt). Thus, and especially elsewhere in the 
country, voters may not have felt empowered by the change in government. Indeed, 65% of 
Zambians surveyed agreed with the statement “people are like children; the government should take 
care of them like a parent,” and disagreed with “government is like an employee; the people should 
be the bosses who control government” (Afrobarometer 2008). Of course, cultural attitudes are also 
informed by political institutions. Because Zambians lack an avenue to effectively voice policy 
demands and hold policy makers accountable, much of the population might feel inappropriate with 
viewing their role as a Zambian citizen as one that can or should keep the government accountable.  
Politicians are more likely to feel credibly threatened to be voted out of office for their 
performance on social service policy if when voters vote, they do so, at least partially, based on 
social service policymaking. Like in most democracies, citizens base their votes on a number of 
issues in Zambia. However, like most African countries, and other developing countries, several 
characteristics of Zambia’s voting population, work against social-service based voting from 
occurring in Zambia. It is estimated that 30% of Zambians are functionally illiterate and that 68% of 
the country live at or below the poverty line (World Bank 2008). These demographics make voters 
vulnerable to believing misinformation about who can bring development projects and taking small 
gifts in return for their votes. Zambia’s high rates of poverty make the voting population more 
vulnerable to vote buying. Many local campaigns are won and lost based on the items the candidate 
is able to distribute to local populations, like milli meal, chitenge cloths, alcohol and other food. In 
fact, in the 2005-06 wave of the Afrobarometer, more than 90% of respondents in Zambia reported 
that politicians offer ‘gifts’ to voters during election campaigns “often” or “always” (Afrobarometer 
Network 2006). Gifts illustrate the permanence of neo-patrimonial politics amid the introduction to 
formal democratic institutions. Reforms, like decentralization, only deal with a portion of the state; 
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the way politics works is not really altered. Such campaigning, and responsive voting, again works to 
decrease the proclivity of citizens holding elected leaders accountable based on social service policy 
performance.  
Ethnic considerations also seem to be prominent in vote choices in Zambia. According to 
Dowd and Driessen (2008) who estimated the proclivity of people to vote along ethnic lines among 
the Afrobarometer survey respondents in the Afrobarometer surveyed countries, Zambia exhibits 
the second highest level of ethnic voting among this group. 36% of Zambians surveyed were 
estimated to vote along ethnic lines, which was higher than Kenya’s 35.8% and only less than 
Benin’s 41%.  To the extent that Zambians are voting based on ethnic considerations, and 
abandoning considerations of social service policy performance, elected officials will not be 
particularly fearful that they will be voted out of office for social service policy performance. 
Although, this is a factor that will be more prominent in national elections than local ones (due to 
the likely higher ethnically heterogeneous candidate pool at a national level, as compared to the likely 
homogeneity of candidates at a local level). 
The effects of poverty and low education, as well as the prominence of ethnic identity 
considerations in voting decisions are all factors which seem to be carryovers from the era of the 
one-party state in Zambia. In other words, they were not impacted by multiparty politics in a way 
which would decrease the likelihood that they would be barriers to incentivize politicians to provide 
services.  
Alternatives in the Party System 
 On a national scale, Zambia’s party system, since the transition to multiparty politics has 
evolved from being characterized by the presence of a dominant ruling party, Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy and a fractionalized and weak opposition to now being successfully 
challenged by the current President’s party, Patriotic Front. However, as mentioned previously, the 
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Patriotic Front and Michael Sata, as a candidate do not necessarily represent a change or an 
alternatively different choice from the MMD party platform or the actions of the MMD leadership. 
The policy platforms of both parties are vague and for all intents and purposes, indistinguishable; 
and Sata was a former MMD politician, who by some accounts did not defect to form the PF 
because of a clear ideological differences, but instead because his road to the presidency was blocked 
by MMD leadership.66 If Sata and the PF do not represent a real choice among alternatives for 
Zambians, this can bring about further apathy with the current democratic order in Zambia, for 
voters that are dissatisfied by the level of social service policies. 
 
Conclusion 
Conventional scholarship says that multiparty competition can incentivize leadership to 
provide higher levels of social services, as they become fearful of being voted out of office, for not 
doing so. However, several in the wave of regimes that adopted multiparty democracy in Africa 
during the early 1990s kept hold of authoritarian attributes indicative of previous regimes. Regime 
hybridity usually meant that while citizens could vote for a candidate among many from different 
parties, the playing field for parties to campaign and win votes was slanted, political repression was 
still a reality, and few functional checks and balances in the system were institutionalized. These 
regimes, by their very nature, undermine how we might think democracy should operate. When 
checks and balances are lost, incentive structures for leadership to be responsive to voters are 
skewed.  
This chapter has thus far attempted to frame the changes and status of social service 
responsiveness in Zambia within the context of regime change and political evolution in the country. 
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  “Michael Sata: the Victoria station sweeper turned Zambia presidential hopeful” the Telegraph. 21, September 2011, 
viewed on: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/ zambia/8777561/Michael-Sata-the-
Victoria-station-sweeper-turned-Zambia-presidential-hopeful.html 
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Despite regularly holding multiparty elections since 1991, Zambians continue to be left without an 
effective channel to voice social service needs to, locally elected leaders are largely incapable of 
responding to needs, and more capable policy makers lack the incentives to respond to demands in 
equitable ways. As Zambia backslid from a burgeoning democracy to a clear case of regime 
hybridity, responsiveness in social service provisions felt the negative impact of a centralizing state 
and a dominant executive branch. Additionally, multiparty competition did not correlate with the 
stamping out of systemic corruption or necessarily produce “democratic citizens,” both of which are 
barriers to achieving a “responsive democracy.”  
Why Zambia has seemingly reached an unresponsive-democracy equilibrium might be a 
function of democratization in the country. Both domestic and international pressures were 
important to the decision of the UNIP government to adopt multiparty elections in 1991. In chapter 
three, I argued that the presence of a domestic democratic movement can help encourage the 
growth of a more responsive democracy in the post transition period. However Zambia’s domestic 
opposition, post-transition took its seat as the new ruling party, and because internal opposing 
interests and political parties were not well developed, Zambia’s post transition period echoed that 
of what we expect from an exogenous transition.  While a one party dominant systems are certainly 
not exclusive to exogenously influenced democracies, as I have argued in chapter 3, it is likely to be 
characteristic of post transition politics in exogenously derived democracies. Indeed, once the MMD 
took office, an almost 20 year functional oppositional vacuum took hold in Zambia. Lacking a 
functional opposition in the first decade or so, to balance out the new ruling party and act as a 
democratic watchdog, certainly enabled the hybridization of the new regime.  
International actors, namely Western foreign aid donors, were practically the only actors left 
that had leverage over the new regime to control their authoritarian slants. Mainly through the threat 
of, or actual, revoking foreign aid, were Western donors able to reign in the increasingly 
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authoritarian Chiluba regime. However, one might imagine that international pressure to become 
more democratic produces a different democratic result from domestically induced reforms.  
Donors were essential to achieving the institutionalization of multiparty competition, but were 
unable to produce a system that linked citizens to politicians in meaningful ways to ultimately 
produce a responsive democracy. As argued in chapter three, through a donor’s perspective, whether 
a country holds regular multiparty elections is relatively easy to monitor (Uvin 1993), however 
conditioning foreign aid on the progress a country has in institutionalizing responsive social service 
delivery is much more difficult, especially when one considers the multiple agendas that donors wish 
countries to follow. And indeed, donors had multiple agendas in Zambia, namely political and 
economic liberalization. Thus, when economic reforms seemed to be followed, donors had a 
difficult time punishing political backsliding. Punishment was usually administered in cases of 
dramatic threats to democracy, like when the constitution was changed to prevent Kaunda from 
running against Chiluba in the second election. This produced a democratic boundary for the 
regime; as long as it stayed within certain confines, which in its basic sense included holding regular 
multiparty elections, the regime could maintain both its ability to manipulate the political system 
(including social service resource allocations), as needed, and maintain its international lifeline. 
Consequentially, the depth of Zambia’s democracy suffered. 
If exogenously influenced democratic leaders all operate within a foreign defined democratic 
boundary, without strong incentives to institutionalize responsiveness at home, one wonders if the 
citizens of exogenously derived democracies experience democracy differently than their 
endogenously derived democratic counterparts. Do citizens expect less from the democratic system, 
when it has not effectively resulted in real change in their own lives? Are citizens in exogenously 
derived democracies less likely to support the system itself, because of the way they have 
experienced it? In the next chapter, I address these questions by examining whether the exogeneity 
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of a transition impacts citizen’s satisfaction with democracy and their support for a democratic 
system. 
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Chapter Five: Exogenous Democratization and Bottom-up Democratic Consolidation 
 
Thus far this dissertation has focused on the impact of exogenous democratization on the 
quality of life in Africa. The previous chapter established that partly due to the exogeneity of 
democratization in many countries on the continent, few governments have made strides in 
responding to their citizen’s most basic needs by providing a higher quality of life. This finding 
provides insight into one dimension of an exogenously derived democracy’s depth: its ability to 
bond citizens with their government. However, the disconnected nature between citizens and 
elected leaders of unresponsive governments may have several other important implications beyond 
institutionalizing a reactive government to its citizenry’s material needs. These possible implications 
beg additional questions regarding the impact of exogenous democratization. Of specific interest, 
how might exogenously derived democratization impact the consolidation of democracy itself? Are 
these democracies in more danger of reversing back to authoritarianism, thus abandoning gains 
made in enhanced political rights?  
Democracies are generally thought to become “consolidated” once the vast majority of both 
the elites and general public consider democracy to be a better system of government then its 
alternatives (Diamond 1999: 65; Lipset 1981: 64; Linz 1978: 16-18; Dahl 1971: 129-131). As 
discussed in chapter 2, an extraversion framework inspires a particularly pessimistic view in terms of 
evaluating how committed elites in an exogenous democracy might be to the democratic experiment. 
Through this perspective, their attachment to democracy is dependent upon whether its practice 
continues to be rewarded by foreign patrons. If at some point, democracy proves to be less valuable 
for leaders to depend on in their extraversion portfolio, support at the elite level may wane.  With 
elite support dependent upon foreign influence, democratic consolidation in many of Africa’s new 
democracies may, at some point, rely more heavily upon the public’s commitment to defend the 
144 
 
democratic experiment. However, if the exogeneity of democratization negatively impacts citizens’ 
satisfaction with and/or support for democracy, further pessimism regarding the sustainability of 
democracy in many of Africa’s new democracies may be warranted, as the public will likely be less 
willing to fight for its survival.  
Given prevalent arguments of the determinants of democratic attitudes in Africa, what, if 
any, effects exogenous democratization may have on support for and satisfaction with democracy 
are unclear. On the one hand, citizens of exogenously derived transitions may be more likely to view 
democracy as an elite project that has little consequence on their lives, and will thus be less satisfied 
with the state of democracy in their country and have less invested in the system as a whole.  Also, 
by definition, exogenously derived democracies are likely to have weak or nonexistent domestic pro-
democracy movements. Thus, citizens in these settings will probably have had fewer opportunities 
to join or interact with democratic organizing and to be exposed to democracy promotion 
propaganda, which may have otherwise inspired the growth of a more bottom-up, passionate 
democratic culture. Conversely, others have argued that support for democracy in Africa is more 
intrinsic then instrumental; thus we might expect that citizens will have an attachment to democracy 
as a system which transcends their own experiences (Bratton & Mattes 2001a), however negatively 
affected they were by the exogeneity of the transition. Moreover, satisfaction with and support for 
democracy maybe positively influenced by increases political rights and civil liberties that, 
theoretically, both exogenous and endogenous democracies experience during a transition (Mattes & 
Bratton 2007)  
In this chapter, I examine the merits of these competing arguments using survey data from 
the Afrobarometer. I begin by reviewing the literature on the determinants of satisfaction and 
support for democracy, and pay particular attention to those arguments that can shed additional 
insight on to the possible impact of exogenous democratization. After, I discuss the data and 
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estimation strategy used, and then move on to discuss the results from several regression analyses. I 
find that the exogeneity of a transition is negatively associated with some measures of democracy 
attachment and satisfaction with democracy, however the estimated effect is relatively small.  
 
Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy and Exogenous Democratization 
While volumes have been written on the determinants of public satisfaction and support for 
democracy in general, less is known about how its drivers may be impacted by the African context 
(Bratton & Mattes 2001a; Mattes & Bratton 2007; Evans & Rose 2007; Chu et al. 2008; Fails 2009; 
Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2004). In general, “conventional” theories found to be important 
to explaining attitudes towards democracy in other settings have had mixed success in the African 
context. Below I review what has been found regarding public support and satisfaction with 
democracy in Africa and discuss how some findings may further inform expectations of the effect of 
exogenous democratization on democracy attitudes on the continent. 
While modernization theory is often leveraged to understand the transformation of political 
cultures cross-nationally (Inglehart 2005), its utility in explaining democratic attitudes in Africa has 
been somewhat mixed. Through a modernization lens, a more democratic-supportive culture 
emanates from economic transformation of industrialization. Those that stand to benefit from 
industrialization will be more prone to support democratization, as it is political means to check the 
power of a potentially economically hazardous authoritarian government, (Lipset 1959; Inglehart & 
Welzel 2009; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Inglehart 1997). The likely the beneficiaries of industrialization 
are often seen as those with a higher income, more education and those that live in an urban area. 
Additionally, as Evans and Rose (2007) note of Malawi, but will arguably apply to most countries in 
Africa, we may also expect that men will support democracy for similar “modernization” rationing, 
“given that women in Malawi continue to play traditional roles while men have greater spatial and 
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occupational mobility, it might be expected that males could benefit more from the modernizing 
influences of democracy and therefore be more supportive” (911).   
However, modernization related explanatory variables have received mixed support in 
analyses of democratic support and democratic satisfaction in Africa.  For example, in the case of 
education, while Bratton and Mattes (2001b) found that highly educated Afrobarometer respondents 
were more skeptical about democracy, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) and Evans and 
Rose (2007) found that education was positively linked to preferring democracy over alternatives.67 
Similarly, males and urban residents have been found to be more supportive of democracy than their 
female and rural counterparts in two of the three analyses that have investigated its role in Africa 
(Evans & Rose 2007; Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005); Mattes and Bratton (2007) found no 
such relationship.  Finally, a respondent’s income has found the least support in these analyses; the 
two studies that have investigated its role, Chu et al. (2008) and Mattes and Bratton (2007), have not 
found a significant relationship. This lack of consistent support for modernization theory’s 
explanatory power on support for democracy in the African context is not necessarily surprising. As 
discussed in chapter 2, modernization theory’s assumptions about the social and political impacts of 
economic growth are somewhat misplaced in Africa, where spurts of economic growth are less likely 
to produce an empowered middle class and, in some countries, likely to benefit expatriate-
dominated enclaves. Thus, those who enjoy social privilege in Africa may have less invested in 
regime type then what modernization theory would otherwise suppose.  
In contrast to modernization, variables that capture the likelihood of a person learning about 
democracy have been associated more consistently with greater support for democracy as a system 
in Africa. Specifically, those who have more access to information about democracy (the youth,68 
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 Evans and Rose (2007) were only examining Malawian respondents. 
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 Younger people are expected to have more access to information via the Internet on democracy, which will help them 
learn about democracy at home and abroad. 
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higher educated and those with access to multiple news sources), have some knowledge of who their 
leaders are, and have interest in political affairs have been found to be more supportive of 
democracy as a system (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005: 220; Evans & Rose 2007; Fails 2009; 
Mattes & Bratton 2007). However, these variables have a less clear impact on satisfaction with 
democracy (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005: 220; Mattes & Bratton 2007).  To explain this 
paradox, several have argued that when people politically learn they are more likely to be exposed to 
pro-democracy information and have the opportunity to critically assess the merits of democracy 
against its alternatives, and will thus be more supportive of democracy as a system (Nie, Junn & 
Stehlik-Barry 1996; Mattes & Bratton 2007:199). However, a greater awareness of national politics, 
which results from political learning or political information engagement, could impact satisfaction 
of democracy in varying ways. On the one hand, citizens may be more critical of the state of 
democracy in their own country, when they have access to information for how democracy works in 
more democratic countries. Conversely, more aware citizens may be satisfied with democracy when 
others are not, because they find satisfaction in the delivery of political goods, where others may still 
look to other signs, like the state of the economy or the responsiveness of the government in other 
policies, to shape their opinion about the state of democracy in their country (Bratton, Mattes & 
Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes & Bratton 2007). 
  Others have hypothesized that certain features common in African cultures will likely 
inhibit support for democracy. For example, a “parochial rural culture may limit the radius of 
interpersonal trust to the immediate scope of the village, neighborhood or clan,” (Mattes & Bratton 
2007: 196) thus decreasing a more general level of civic cooperation, which is necessary for a more 
democratic culture to arise (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1993).  By this reasoning, we may expect 
that those who live in rural areas and/or have low levels of co-national trust will be less supportive 
of democracy, generally.  Also, at a basic level, support for democracy as a system of governance 
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partially relies upon some agreement on the identity of the political community itself (Mattes & 
Bratton 2007: 196). If a respondent identifies more with their respective ethnic group, for example, 
than the nation, she may be relatively apathetic to the type of political system that is institutionalized 
at the national level, and thus, exhibit less support for democracy. These particular cultural 
explanations have found little support among studies that have tested for their effects on support 
for democracy (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes & Bratton 2007).   
A final cultural theory argues that support for democracy somewhat hinges on a person’s 
belief that citizens should be in a position to hold leadership responsible. As Michael Bratton (1992: 
93) argues, decades of living under neopatrimonialism and authoritarianism may have bred a passive 
political culture in many African countries wherein people come to perceive government as a 
caretaker and do not accept that their role as citizens will be to question or hold leadership 
accountable. Put differently, a culture of passivity may negatively impact support for democracy as a 
system, because, in a basic sense, democracy institutionalizes government accountability to the votes 
of citizens. To this end, both Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) and Mattes and Bratton 
(2007) found that risk tolerance (interpreted to be the opposite of a passive culture) is positively 
associated with support for democracy. However, in the same way that a “culture of passivity” was 
likely formed or reinforced by the political impacts of authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism, 
democratization may also have a lasting impact on society’s political culture. Especially in the cases 
of more endogenously derived democracies, wherein broad-based domestic democracy movements 
were influential to the decision to politically liberalize, it is imaginable that some pre-existing passive 
cultural attitudes will be challenged and replaced with attitudes that demand accountability from 
government as a result of democratization.69  
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 However, it may also be true that those countries that had more endogenously derived transitions had a more active 
political culture to begin with, which would partly explain the rise of a domestic democracy movement in these 
countries.  
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Like the “culture of passivity,” the debate about the role that government performance 
might play in shaping support for and satisfaction with democracy highlights the possible impact 
that the exogeneity of a transition might have on attitudes towards democracy. Specifically, this 
debate is generally framed in terms of viewing citizens as either valuing democracy intrinsically, or as 
an end in it and of itself, or instrumentally, as a means to achieve a policy or economic outcome. If a 
citizen views democracy to be instrumental to raising their own economic standard of living, or that of 
their nation, their support for and satisfaction with democracy will be related to perceived notions of 
whether the elected government is having a positive impact on their own or the nation’s economic 
prospects, as well as the government’s performance in providing other goods which may raise their 
standard of living, like social services (Mattes & Bratton 2001a). Through this perspective, our 
expectations about cross-national variation in support for democracy can then be directly informed 
by the findings outlined in chapter three. Specifically, exogenous democratization was found to have 
a hampering effect on changes in social service delivery. Thus, if citizens hold a more “instrumental” 
view of democracy, those in exogenously derived democracies may likely be disillusioned with its 
performance, due to the unresponsive nature of government, as well as less attached to democracy 
as a system. Instrumental evaluations are somewhat dangerous for the consolidation of democracy 
more generally; when support for democracy is instrumentally driven, the public will only be as 
committed to democracy as their opinions of government performance on other policies are 
favorable. 
Conversely, if citizens are more likely to evaluate democracy intrinsically, the lack of 
responsiveness of exogenous democratization, for example, will be unlikely to impact support or 
satisfaction with democracy. Instead, support for the system should be independent of any policy 
performance and satisfaction with democracy in the country will be dependent upon a person’s 
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evaluation whether the elected government respects the political rights and civil liberties of its 
citizens, regardless of government performance in other areas (Mattes & Bratton 2001a).  
This important line of inquiry, whether citizens evaluate democracy in mostly intrinsic or 
instrumental terms, has received considerable attention within the literature on African public 
opinion, and elsewhere.  Bratton and Mattes (2001a) dealt with this issue head on in a paper entitled 
“Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?” They reported finding that 
government performance is indeed important to a person’s support of democracy and that approval 
of the democratic system hinges more on the government’s ability to guarantee political rights than 
economic goods (Bratton and Mattes 2001a). This finding has since received additional empirical 
support in Mattes and Bratton (2007).70 However, regarding the impact of government performance 
on satisfaction with democracy, Mattes and Bratton (2007) and Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 
(2005) found that both economic and political performance is associated with higher satisfaction 
with democracy. These findings underline the high probability that citizens hold multiple views or 
criteria by which they judge the quality of democracy within their country.  
Exogenous democratization may also have a negative impact on democratic attitudes, 
because those in exogenous democracies will theoretically have less opportunity to engage in a 
bottom-up democratic civil society. Similar to having access to information and having more 
cognitive awareness, having an active associational life is also linked to higher support of democracy 
through the mechanism of “political learning.” Specifically, citizens are expected to obtain 
democratic skills and attitudes when they are members of civil, religious, or political organizations 
(Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993), which will make them more supportive of democracy 
generally. Such membership is also thought to have a positive impact on satisfaction with democracy 
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 To some degree, Fails (2009) challenges these findings. He argues that we should look at citizen evaluations of both 
the substantive and procedural dimensions of political goods and finds that citizens who judge the regime to be more 
successful in substantive democratization are actually less likely to be committed democrats. 
151 
 
because it helps citizens’ feel more “incorporated into the modern democratic polity” (Mattes and 
Bratton 2007: 196).  Moreover, repeated participation in democratic processes or a public movement, 
which calls for more democracy, may also generate, reflect, or reinforce a stronger sense of support 
for the system (Lindberg 2006; Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000). With practicing democracy, citizens 
get to learn more about the processes of how democracy works and will value its outcomes more 
fully. However, it is important to note that not all participation and social group activity will likely 
have this effect. Imaginably, participating in an election marred with violence and fraud may produce 
disillusionment with democracy more generally, and decrease satisfaction with democracy within the 
country. Finally, other group identification may spur satisfaction with the democratic system for 
more “realist” reasoning. Supporters of the ruling party, for example, may be more satisfied with 
democracy because they perceive themselves as likely beneficiaries of the current democratic 
outcome (Finkel, Sabatini and Bevis 2000). The same may be said for those who identify with the 
majority ethnic group. 
 These caveats aside, if democratic civil society engagement does teach lessons about 
democracy and give people greater appreciation for the democratic system, then we may expect that 
countries that have a more active civil society will be comparatively more supportive of democracy. 
In the case of exogenously derived democracies, however, where domestic broad based pro-
democracy movements are likely to be weak or non-existent, citizens will likely have had fewer 
opportunities to join or interact with democratic organizing. Exogenous democratization may not 
give citizens the same opportunity to engage in pro-democracy civil society, where a certain level of 
support for the system may be generated.  
Possible Negative impact of Exogenous Democratization  
Reforms that arise out of an exogenous democratization are the product of negotiations 
between domestic ruling elites and international actors. While it has been established that the impact 
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of democratic reforms on the material lives of citizens in this setting is likely to be limited, an 
exogenously derived democratization may also have a negative impact on support for and 
satisfaction with democracy. A truly exogenous democratization is likely to mean little more than a 
change of the formal rules that the same elites in power previous to the transition play by. Thus, 
aside of institutionalizing regular elections, exogenous democratization will likely do little to change 
the relationship between ruling elites and citizens. Politics, thus, is experienced, from the citizen’s 
perspective, without any real and/or substantive tangible change to their daily lives. They will likely 
feel no further incorporated or empowered politically. Without real transitional implications on the 
lives of its citizens, exogenous democracies may produce a sense of cynicism regarding what benefit 
democracy, as a system, is likely to afford, and for the potential of democracy to change things in the 
future. Additionally, democratization for exogenously derived democracies occurs in spite of a lack 
of a strong domestic democratic movement. The under-development of a democracy focused, civil 
society, pre-transition, may carryover post transition. As a result, citizens of exogenously derived 
democracies may have had less exposure to democracy promotion civil society and would have been 
given fewer opportunities to learn lessons of the merits of democracy from civil society engagement. 
To the extent that this type of civil society activity promotes support for democracy, exogenous 
democratization may be associated with less attachment to democracy.  
 
Data, Variables, and Estimation Strategy 
Afrobarometer 
To examine the possible impact that exogenous democratization has on support for and 
satisfaction with democracy I turn to data from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer Survey, 
which was dispersed between March 2008 and June 2009. In addition to being Afrobarometer’s 
most recent round, this round also offers the most country coverage (20 sub-Saharan African 
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countries).71 Still caution should still be taken when interpreting the results to be representative of 
the entire region. For example, the Afrobarometer undersamples countries where English is not the 
official language, non-democracies and those involved in civil war (Mattes and Bratton 2007: 193). 
Additionally, and more specific to the exogeneity scale developed in chapter 3, the survey 
oversamples countries that receive a 1 on the exogeneity scale and undersamples countries that score 
a 0 and 2. Specifically to this point, according to the scale outlined in chapter three, nearly 20% of 
sub-Saharan Africa are considered to have endogenously derived regimes, about 25% of transitions 
are considered to be influenced significantly by both domestic and foreign influences, and almost 60% 
of regimes are thought to exogenously derived. However, in the 20-country Afrobarometer sample, 
the break down is 10% endogenously derived, 40% mixed pressures, and 50% exogenously 
derived.72 Appendix III includes a break down of the Afrobarometer sample by exogeneity score. 
The discrepancies between these samples may reveal a skewed sense of what impact exogenous 
democratization has on attitudes towards democracy.  
Dependent Variables: Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy 
With these caveats aside, this research does benefit from the range of questions, which gauge 
attitudes towards democracy that are included on the Afrobarometer. Four measures gauge a 
respondent’s attachment to or support for democracy as a system. Specifically, the first, which I will refer to 
as prefer democracy, asks the respondent to indicate which of the three following statements come 
closest to their view: “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,” “in some 
circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable,” or “for someone like me, it doesn’t 
matter what kind of government we have.” The other three ask related questions of whether a 
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 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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 In chapter three, Uganda’s score was a 0 on the exogeneity scale, because its first multiparty elections were in 2006, 
which was outside of the time period examined in chapter three (1990 to 2005). However, this chapter focuses on 
Afrobarometer data from 2008/2009. Thus, Uganda’s exogeneity score was recoded to reflect the fact that it had 
undergone a transition into multiparty politics. Consistent with the rubric outlined in chapter 3, Uganda’s score is a 2 on 
the scale because the President, Yoweri Museveni remained in power after the first multiparty election.  
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respondent approves, on a 5 point scale with “strongly disapprove” coded as a 5, of the following 
alternative governance systems to a democracy: “only one political party is allowed to stand for 
election and hold office,” “the army comes into govern the country,” “elections and 
parliament/National Assembly are abolished so that the President/Prime Minister can decide 
everything.”  Given that these three questions all speak to a similar concept, a factor was generated 
from the responses to these questions, which I will call, reject alternatives.73  
Three other questions ask for more specific opinions regarding particular freedoms and 
procedures associated with democracy and, to a certain extent, allow an assessment of how deep a 
respondent’s attachment is to democracy. Each asks respondents to choose one statement that they 
agree most with, from a set of two. The first asks about civil society freedom, by giving a choice of 
the following two statements: “government should be able to ban any organization that goes against 
its policies,” or “we should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government 
approves of it.” The second asks for an opinion on press freedom, with the following two 
statements: “government should be able to close newspapers that print stories it does not like” or 
“the news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut 
down.” Finally, the last question gauges a person’s assessment of the necessity of fair elections, 
with the following two statements “since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt 
other methods for choosing this country’s leaders” or “we should choose our leaders in this country 
through regular, open and honest elections.” For all three questions respondents are asked to choose 
from the following responses: (4) agree very strongly with the second statement, (3) agree with 
second statement, (2) agree with the first statement, or (1) agree very strongly with the first 
statement (higher values mean agreement with more freedom or the importance of regular elections).  
                                                        
73 Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (Eigenvalue = 1.81), which explains 60.2 % of the 
common variance. The item loadings on the common factor are the following: reject one-man rule (0.74), reject military 
rule (0.77), and reject one-party rule (0.82). 
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Another factor was generated based on the responses of two questions that approximated 
the respondent’s satisfaction with democracy within their country. The first of these questions asked 
respondents how much of a democracy their country was today? Possible responses to this were: (1) 
not a democracy, (2) a democracy with major problems, (3) a democracy, but with minor problems 
or (4) a full democracy. The second question asked “overall, how satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in [your country]? Possible responses to this question included (0) my country is 
not a democracy, (1) not at all satisfied, (2) not very satisfied, (3) fairly satisfied, and (4) very satisfied. 
The factor generated based on the responses from these two questions will be referred to as 
democracy satisfaction.74 
Multilevel Modeling 
The estimation strategy used to examine the influence of exogenous democratization on 
attitudes towards democracy had to take into account the fact that the variables of interest are 
measured at multiple levels. To this end, random effects generalized least squares regression models 
were used that grouped data by country for most models. However, in the case of democracy 
preference, the responses to the question are not ordered, thus a multinomial logit was more 
appropriate to use to examine the effects of the exogeneity of democracy on the various responses 
to that question. In this model, instead of clustering the data by country, country dummies were 
included as additional control variables.  
Controls Used in Support for Democracy 
Several variables were included in the regression models to control for the possible 
influences of other mitigating factors. The specific information on the measurements used to 
approximate these control variables, like the survey question wording and, when applicable, details 
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 Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (Eigenvalue = 1.52), which explains 76.1 % of the 
common variance. The item loadings on the common factor are the following: opinion of democracy (0.87), and 
satisfaction with democracy (0.87).  
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on the construction of factor variables are included in appendix IV. In general, the controls used 
replicate or come as close as possible to the controls used Mattes and Bratton’s (2007) research 
which nearly exhaustively examined the determinants of support for and satisfaction with democracy 
in Africa. Finally, because the hypotheses underlining most of the control variables’ effects on 
support for and satisfaction with democracy were discussed in the literature review, I only briefly 
summarize the rationale here.  
In models predicting support for democracy, gender, education, urbanity, and a rating of the 
respondent’ s own living/economic conditions were controlled for to approximate the 
demographics that modernization theory predicts will be important for the support of democracy. 
Several variables were also included to capture the “learning” hypotheses, which argues that people 
with greater access to, or are more likely to seek out, information on politics are likely to learn more 
of the merits of democracy and thus, support it at a higher rate. To this end, I included a measure of 
the respondent’s access to news, knowledge of their leadership, and interest in national politics. 
Additionally, I include a measure of how many years the respondent has lived under democratic rule 
since they turned eighteen. This specific measurement approximates a “life-time learning” 
hypothesis that argues that adults constantly gather new information, and evaluate lessons about 
political regimes based on their accumulative experience in living under them (Achen 1992; Rose, 
Mishler & Haerpfer 1998). “If true, regime preferences and evaluations should differ not by 
generation, but according to cumulative individual experience with a range of differing regimes,” 
(Mattes & Bratton 2007:198).  For a similar reason, I also controlled for measures that approximate 
the extent of a respondent’s associational life; respondents may also learn about the merits of 
democracy from their activity with civil society organization, are also expected to obtain democratic 
skills and attitudes when they are members of religious, civil, or political organizations (Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti 1993). Thus, measures approximating membership in civil society 
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organizations and the proclivity of a respondent to be active in political organizing were controlled 
for. In a similar vein, whether the respondent identifies closely with any political party was 
controlled for to capture another dimension of their involvement in national political civil society.  
Both retrospective and prospective, micro and macro evaluations of the economy, as well as 
the respondent’s opinion of the government’s handling of economic policies, were controlled for to 
account for the hypothesis that respondents may displace their (dis)satisfaction with the economy on 
to their evaluations of the country’s democratic experiment. Evaluations of political goods were 
included for similar reasoning. Specifically, a measure of perceived government corruption, an 
opinion as to whether their respective ethnic group is treated fairly and trust in leadership were 
controlled for to account for the possibility that ill feelings towards elites/government might be 
transposed onto democracy, more broadly. Also, the perceived quality of other political goods like 
the insurance of freedoms and general responsiveness, (i.e. performance evaluations on the delivery 
of several social service policies) were controlled for to, again, account for a different dimension of 
the hypothesis that people displace judgments of how democracy is experienced in their country to 
their broader evaluation of democracy as a system. Finally, I include controls for ruling party 
affiliation and identification with the majority ethnic group in a country to account for those that 
might support democracy because they view themselves as having disproportionate benefits from 
the current political system.  
Finally, cultural hypotheses discussed in the literature review were also controlled for. Those 
that identify with the nation, rather than an ethnic group, might have more concrete opinions about 
the political system at a national level and so a control variable is included which approximates 
identification. A measure of co-national trust is included under the idea that those who distrust co-
nationals may not want to support a political scheme like democracy, where cooperation with co-
nationals is necessary. Finally, a “passive” sense of citizenship is controlled for; those that are 
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uncomfortable with seeing themselves in a role of holding leadership accountable may have less 
support for democracy. 
Controls Used in Satisfaction with Democracy 
In several cases, the hypothesis of how a variable might impact support for democracy also 
extends to its possible impact on satisfaction with democracy; so several of the same variables used 
in support for democracy models are also used in the model predicting satisfaction with democracy. 
For example, evaluations of the economy, government responsiveness, quality of leadership (trust in 
leadership and perceptions of government corruption), and whether the respondent thought their 
respective ethnic group was treated fairly, were also included in the model predicting satisfaction 
with democracy to account for the possibility that a respondent’s satisfaction with policy 
performance or the ruling elites will convert into satisfaction with their country’s democracy. 
Similarly, measures of identification with the ruling party or majority ethnic group were also 
controlled for to account for the possibility that these respondents will be more satisfied with how 
democracy works in their favor.  
Modernization type demographics, like wealth, education, urbanization, and gender, and 
variables that approximate the likelihood for a respondent to form opinions from lessons learned 
about national politics, like access to news, knowledge of leaders, interest in politics, and years lived 
past the age of eighteen in a democracy, were included for slightly different reasoning then the 
rationale that underlined their inclusion in support for democracy models. Both sets of hypotheses 
highlight those that will likely support democracy because of what it represents as a system. In the 
case of modernization theory, likely support will come from those that value the idea that democracy 
decentralizes political power, giving the capitalist class more of a chance to hold leadership 
accountable. However, it is less clear what this possible relationship implies for satisfaction with 
democracy. In the case of a “hybrid” regime, for example, it may be the case that those who are 
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likely to pull for broader democratization will be satisfied with democracy in their country because it 
has become more democratic then it was in the past. Conversely, they may be less satisfied with 
democracy because they feel that the country’s democracy has not yet reached its potential.  
In the case of “learning” theorists, they argue that the more people learn about politics, the 
more they will value the intrinsic freedoms democracy affords. However, it is less clear what role 
these variables will play on satisfaction. Political knowledge may increase satisfaction with 
democracy, when a country is becoming more democratic then it used to be. However, those that 
learn about politics in their country or are more cognitively developed, are more likely to also have 
access to information which will be critical of the quality of democracy in their country, which could 
induce dissatisfaction. Also, they will be assumingly more saturated in information about the how 
democracy operates, elsewhere, in more democratic countries, which may induce a “comparative” 
dissatisfaction. This is similarly the case with measures, which capture the extent of a respondent’s 
civil society activity. To the extent that civil society activity educates a person on the nature of 
politics in a country, this activity could impact satisfaction both negatively or positively.  
Unlike models that approximate support for democracy, I did not control for cultural 
variables. I could not think of any reason why the cultural type variables, like national identification, 
co-national trust, and passive citizenship would impact satisfaction with democracy. I also did not 
control for the evaluation of the state of specific political freedoms in their country (like freedom of 
speech and free elections), because it would closely approximate the dependent variable: satisfaction 
with democracy.  
 
Results 
 The results of the support of democracy models are displayed in tables 1 and 2. Specifically, 
in table 1, I display the results of a multinomial logit model predicting responses to the prefer 
160 
 
democracy question. While, I display GLS regression models predicting the rejection of 
alternatives factor, and responses to the civil society freedom, press freedom and the necessity 
of fair elections questions in table 2. While these models all relate to attachment to democracy 
generally, or specific elements of democracy, they all focus on a different dimension of attachment 
to democracy. In the first table a more general question about preferring democracy is asked, while 
the second table displays the results from more specific questions asked. These more pointed 
questions help to paint a more robust look at how citizens are affected by the exogeneity of a 
transition. Finding a consistent associated effect of the exogeneity of a transition, or any other 
variable, across these models should increase confidence that such a relationship indeed exists.  
Table 1 displays the results of the multinomial logit regression for the “prefer democracy” 
dependent variable. As mentioned previously, country dummy variables were also included in this 
model to account for national specific variations, however their effects are unreported. The baseline 
in this case is statement two: “in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be 
preferable.” In column one, is the influence of the control variables on the chance that someone 
would choose, the first statement: “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”, over 
the baseline. In the second column, is the estimated effects of the control variables on the chance 
that someone would choose the third statement: “for someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind 
of government we have” over the baseline The results indicate that the exogeneity of a transition is 
actually positively and significantly related to a respondent agreeing with “democracy is preferable to 
any other kind of government” over “a non-democratic government can be preferable. In the 
second column, the results indicate that the effect of an exogenous transition on being apathetic to 
the regime type is not significant.  
While the second finding is not necessarily unexpected, finding a positive effect on 
exogenously derived democratic citizens preferring democracy is interesting and somewhat 
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unexpected. However, caution should be taken with putting much value in this finding. This 
question is quite broad and asks a general question about preferences about democracy, in the 
abstract. Others have noted that such questions may lead researchers down blind alleys (Canache, 
Mondak and Seligson 2001). People have various definitions about what democracy is, and thus 
broad questions about the concept may result in incomparable responses. This might be most 
expected in exogenous democratization; if citizens in these settings do feel particularly distant from 
the political system of their country, their views about what democracy is may be highly variable. 
Thus, it is important to examine what effect exogenous democratization has on more specific 
questions about elements of liberal democracy, to understand if this finding is robust or if it is, 
indeed, a blind alley. This is addressed in table 2.  
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Table 1: Multinomial Logit, Prefer Democracy 
 
 Choosing Statement 1 
(Prefer Democracy) 
Choosing Statement 3  
(No Preference) 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Exog 0.75** 0.35 0.32 0.28 
Living Conditions. 0.02 0.04 -.07** 0.03 
Education 0.03 0.03 0.07*** 0.02 
Urban -0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 
Male 0.02 0.09 0.14** 0.06 
Age in democracy -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Access to News -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Political Knowledge 0.01 0.05 0.12*** 0.04 
Political Interest -0.02 0.06 0.14*** 0.05 
Active Civil Society 0.11** 0.05 0.12*** 0.04 
Member society -0.10** 0.05 -0.13*** 0.04 
Partisanship -0.36*** 0.09 0.08 0.07 
Economic policy eval 0.16*** 0.06 -0.20*** 0.04 
Pros. Ec. Eva. 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Retro ec eval -0.08* 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Corrupt -0.11** 0.05 -0.17*** 0.04 
Trust leadership 0.01 0.05 0.07* 0.04 
Ethnic -0.05 0.05 -0.07** 0.03 
Gov perf 0.09 0.06 -0.06 0.04 
Free speech 0.09* 0.04 0.21*** 0.03 
Free elect 0.08* 0.04 0.19*** 0.03 
Ruling Party 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.08 
Majority ethnic -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.07 
Nat id -0.10*** 0.04 0.05* 0.03 
Passive factor 0.04 0.04 -0.06* 0.03 
Trust -0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.03 
Constant -0.16 0.64 0.45 0.49 
Log likelihood -6811.67   
Prob> chi2: 0.00 Pseudo R2: 0.08 N: 10783 
*** p<0.01(two-tailed) , ** p<0.05 (two-tailed), * p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
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Table 2: Exogenous Democratization and Attachment to Democracy 
 
 Reject Alts. Civil Society 
Freedom 
Press Freedom Prefer Elections 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Exogeneity -0.05*** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Living Sit. -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Education 0.04*** 0.01 -0.02*** 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Urban 0.04** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 
Male 0.03* 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Age in Democ 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Access to News 0.02** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.02* 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
Political Knowledge 0.12*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
Political Interest 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.02 0.02* 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
Active Civil Society 0.06*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Assoc. Member  -0.02** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 
Partisanship 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 
Economic policy eval. -0.10*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.07*** 0.01 
Pros. Econ. Eval. -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
Retro. Econ. Eval.  0.00 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 
Corrupt Gov’t 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Trust in Leadership -0.04*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 
Ethnic Fair Treatment -0.05*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
Gov’t Resp.  -0.02 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02* 0.01 
Free Speech 0.07*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 
Free Elections 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Ruling Party  -0.18*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02 -0.08*** 0.02 -0.06** 0.02 
Majority Ethnic  -0.07*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02 0.04* 0.02 -0.12*** 0.02 
National ID -0.02** 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Passive Culture -0.10*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.01 -0.08*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
Trust Co-Nationals 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Constant -0.16** 0.07 3.05*** 0.08 3.31*** 0.07 2.79*** 0.08 
     
Prob>chi2: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  
overall: 
between:  
within: 
0.10 
0.57 
0.07 
0.04 
0.28 
0.03 
0.05 
0.19 
0.04 
0.03 
0.26 
0.02 
N 10838 10780 10857 10933 
*** p<0.01(two-tailed) , ** p<0.05 (two-tailed), * p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
 
 
In contrast to table 1, table 2 reveals that the exogeneity of a transition has a negative and 
significant effect on the proclivity of a respondent to reject alternative regime types to democracy, a 
respondent’s view of whether the citizens should be able to join any civil society organization and 
whether the news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being 
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shut down. This set of results paints an almost robust picture that the exogeneity of a transition may 
indeed have a negative effect on attachment to democracy and, possibly, helps to illustrate the 
weakness of the findings of table 1, which were based on a more general and abstract concept of 
democracy. However the negative effects found, in table two, prove to be quite modest. Specifically, 
moving from the minimum level of exogeneity (0) to the maximum (2), results in about a 0.10 
decrease on the reject alternatives factor variable, which has a range from -3.44 to 0.98. Similarly the 
same shift from minimum to the maximum level of exogeneity, results in about a 0.10 to 0.12 
decrease on the four point scales of a person’s proclivity to view free organization and free press as 
important for the country. However the same shift from a minimum to a maximum value of the 
passive culture measure results in much larger estimated impacts. Specifically, the shift from 
minimum to maximum of passive cultural attitudes results in a 0.37 decrease in the proclivity of a 
person to reject democracies alternatives, 0.55 decrease in a person’s view of free organization as 
being important, and a 0.30 decrease in a person’s view of free press being important. This 
comparison highlights the relatively small estimated effect that the exogeneity of a transition has on 
support for democracy. Finally, the exogeneity of the transition’s negative impact on whether a 
person thinks that fair and honest elections should be used to select the country’s leadership is not 
statistically significant. 
Putting aside considerations regarding the size of the effects, these results beg the question: 
why might an exogenous transition negatively impact attachment to democracy more generally and 
feelings about free organization and media, but not elections? At the bare minimum, exogenous 
transitions still involve the establishment of multiparty elections, while other institutions or cultural 
attitudes towards government may remain unchanged. Thus, citizens of both exogenously and 
endogenously derived transitions both experience the practice of elections, and thus any effect of an 
exogenously derived transition may be muted when it comes to impacting opinions on elections.  
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 The results in table 1 also support and challenge some of the other theories regarding the 
determinants of attachment to democracy. For example the political learning hypotheses are 
consistently reaffirmed through these analyses, as all variables associated with political 
knowledge/learning (access to news, political knowledge and political interest) are significantly and 
positively related to attachment to democracy, across all models. All other groups of variables, in 
contrast, do not have consistent effects across the models nor are their significant effects consistent 
with theoretical expectations. For example with modernization type variables, a person’s quality of 
living situation, a proxy used for wealth, is unexpectedly negatively related to attachment to 
democracy. Puzzlingly, education’s effects are found to be both positive and negatively influential to 
attachment to democracy. In the cases of gender and urban dwelling, however, when significant, 
they are as expected, positively related to attachment to democracy.  
Similarly, when the effects of civil society involvement, as measured through whether 
someone engages in various civil society activities (active civil society), are found significantly related 
they are so in the expected positive direction. However, membership in civil society groups has a 
negative impact on attachment to democracy in three out of four models and partisanship has no 
effect at all in three out of four models. The impact of evaluations on the economy and economic 
policy also has mixed effects across variables and models. This is also the case with the impact of a 
person’s evaluation of political goods provided by the government. Trust in leadership, when 
significantly related is mostly also negatively related to attachment to democracy. This might reflect a 
person’s willingness to bend the democratic rules to retain the leaders they trust. A similar sentiment 
might make sense of the consistent and negative effect of feeling like a person’s ethnicity is treated 
fairly on attachment to democracy; one may be willing to compromise democracy if it means their 
particular ethnic group will be treated fairly under an undemocratic system. Ruling party attachment 
and membership in a majority ethnic group have significant but mixed effects across models. 
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Cultural variables have mixed success, as well. On the one hand, as discussed above, an expressed 
passivity is consistently and negatively associated with attachment to democracy. Similarly, expressed 
trust in co-nationals is found to impact support for democracy in the expected direction, when 
significant. In contrast, national identification, when significant, is unexpectedly found to have a 
negative impact on attachment to democracy. Finally and surprisingly, a person’s evaluation of 
whether the government has performed well in providing social services (government 
responsiveness) does not have a consistent or positive effect on attachment to democracy. 
To summarize the exogeneity of a transition has had a ‘mixed’ record with regard to its 
possible effect on attachment to democracy. On the one hand it is negatively associated with 
rejecting democracy’s regime alternatives, and support for the ideas that the press should be free and 
that people should freely organize. While the exogeneity of a transition’s estimated negative effects 
on attachment are relatively small, finding a negative association confirmed the hypotheses that 
exogenous democratization may undermine the consolidation of democracy more generally. 
Conversely, though, exogenous democratization was also found to positively impact a person’s 
preferences with democracy and it was found to have no significant effect on support for free 
elections. Next I turn to examining the effect that the exogeneity of democracy has on satisfaction 
with democracy.  
 Table 3 displays the results of the GLS regression model used to predict satisfaction with 
democracy within the respondents’ country. Exogeneity is found to be negatively associated with 
satisfaction with democracy, but like the negative effects found with attachment, the size of the 
effect seems relatively small. In this case, moving from the minimum level of exogeneity (0) to the 
maximum (2), results in a 0.06-point decrease in satisfaction with democracy, which is a factor 
variable with a range of -2.49 to 1.50. However, moving from a non-ruling party supporter to a 
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ruling party supporter results in a 0.16-point increase in satisfaction, which is more than double that 
of the effect of exogeneity.  
 
 
Table 3: Exogenous Democratization and Satisfaction with Democracy 
 
 Democratic Satisfaction 
 Coef. Std. Err. 
Exogeneity -0.03** 0.01 
Living cond 0.03*** 0.01 
Education -0.06*** 0.00 
Urban 0.01 0.02 
Male -0.03* 0.02 
Democ Live 0.00 0.00 
Access to News 0.01 0.01 
Political knowledge 0.06*** 0.01 
Political Interest -0.01 0.01 
Active society -0.01 0.01 
Civil Society 0.03*** 0.01 
Partisanship 0.10*** 0.02 
Econ perf. 0.07*** 0.01 
Pros econ eval 0.05*** 0.01 
Retro econ eval 0.03*** 0.01 
Corrupt gov’t -0.11*** 0.01 
Trust leadership 0.30*** 0.01 
Ethnic fair treat -0.10*** 0.01 
Gov responsive 0.08*** 0.01 
Ruling party 0.16*** 0.02 
Majority ethnic -0.06*** 0.00 
   
R2 Overall: 0.27 
Within: 0.21 
Between: 0.50 
Prob>chi2: 
0.00 
N:11591 
*** p<0.01(two-tailed) , ** p<0.05 (two-tailed), * p<0.1 (two-tailed) 
 
 
The other control variables included in this model have, in many cases, very different effects 
on satisfaction with democracy than they had on attachment to democracy. For example, all 
modernization type variables have the opposite effect in this model then what they had in table 1. 
Higher quality living condition is associated with more satisfaction, higher levels of education and 
being a male, however, is associated with dissatisfaction. With the exception of political knowledge, 
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political learning variables are not associated with satisfaction with democracy. Civil society 
involvement is found to be positively associated with satisfaction. Similarly, all variables 
approximating economic evaluations are positively associated with democracy. This indicates that 
people color their views on the quality of democracy with their views about the economy and 
economic policies. As expected, people are more likely to be satisfied with their democracy when 
they trust their leadership, are a ruling party supporter, and feel that their government is not corrupt. 
However, unexpectedly a person’s view of whether their ethnic group is treated fairly and 
membership with the majority ethnic group is negatively associated with satisfaction with democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
The above analyses paint a nuanced, if not complicated, picture of exogenous 
democratization’s effect on attachment to and satisfaction with democracy. I find that the 
exogeneity of a transition’s impact on attachment to democracy is mixed. In three out of the five 
related analyses, exogenous democratization was found to have a negative relationship on support 
for various measurements of democracy, but the effect has been relatively small. When asked if a 
respondent prefers democracy, the exogeneity of a transition has a positive effect, which somewhat 
contradicts the story told by the previously mentioned models. However, the findings of this table 
might be less trusted, as they probe responses to a more general question of democracy preferences, 
which are notoriously unreliably and incomparable. Additionally, with regard to the attachment to 
free and fair elections, I do not find a significant effect of exogeneity. This, particular null finding, 
might be understood in light of the fact that citizens of exogenously derived democracies, at 
minimum, share the experience of elections in common with those of endogenously derived 
democracies; thus, their attachment to elections may not be significantly different. Finally, I also find 
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that exogenous democratization is negatively related to satisfaction with democracy, however the 
effect is again estimated to be relatively small. 75  
Given these results and the importance of this inquiry, it is clear that these relationships, as 
well as a deeper examination into the mechanisms that may explain how exogenous democratization 
may impact attitudes towards democracy, deserve further attention. This chapter started with the 
unstated assumption that the unintended consequences of foreign led democracy promotion are 
likely to be reflected in how people view their country’s democratic experiment. This dissertation 
has thus far argued that in exogenous democracies multipartyism was adopted by elites for a, largely, 
instrumental purpose of appealing to international actors. Due to the end of the Cold War and a 
reassessment of Western foreign development strategies, multipartyism became a commodity in high 
demand from international donors in the post-Cold War era. However, there is no guarantee that 
something else, exogenous to Africa, may change to influence the incentives of its leadership away 
from multipartyism. For example, something may reduce the value that Western donors put on 
multipartyism when they consider what governments they will fund and punish. Without these 
incentives, the leadership of the most exogenously derived democracies may find it in their own 
interest to undermine the democratic concessions they made in the past, however limited or shallow 
they may have been. Thus it may be the case that the future of the democratic experiment in Africa’s 
exogenous democracies will one day rely on how willing the broader public is to defend it. If there 
are negative impacts of exogenous democratizations on people’s attachment to and satisfaction with 
democracy, the consolidation of a more liberalized polity in much of the continent may be in 
jeopardy. 
 
                                                        
75
 I explored whether the small estimated effects were the product of misspecified mediating relationships between 
exogenous democratization and passive cultural attitudes, active civil society involvement and government 
responsiveness, using the analyses outlined in (James & Brett 1984). I did not find evidence that any of these three 
variables were substantially mediating the effects of the exogeneity of a transition on democracy attitudes.  
170 
 
Conclusion: Africa’s Unresponsive Consolidation or a Way Forward? 
 
When foreign actors and external events serve as the primary source of influence for a 
government to adopt multiparty elections it is highly probable that the responsive nature and 
substance of any ensuing electoral democracy will suffer.  Thus, any impact a transition towards 
multiparyism is expected to have on the quality of life in Africa should be understood within the 
context of the variation of its origins. When derived endogenously, democratization is associated 
with enhanced social service delivery and increases in the general quality of life. In other words, 
democracy likely operates as it is expected to, giving elected officials political incentives to respond 
to the needs of their broader constituencies (Deacon 2003; Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003; Ghobarah, Huth and Russett 2004; Meltzer and Richard 1981).  
 However, when the pressure to adopt democratic reforms comes primarily from foreign 
sources, those reforms, however substantial they may be in other respects, have done little to bring 
Africans responsive governments. Indeed it is not the case that exogenous democratization has a 
negative impact on social service delivery or that it deteriorates responsiveness; instead this 
dissertation has illustrated that it likely has no effect at all. Instead of needing to respond to new 
institutional incentives, the underlying political game in these settings is characterized by its ability to 
maintain continuities with the past. Despite a renegotiation of formal rules and institutions, the 
detached relationship between citizen and policy maker persists, and the link that is expected to bind 
policy making to the expressed needs of citizens is not formed. Instead, the political playing field at 
home is likely to remain imbalanced and the ineptness of the opposition to hold a ruling party in 
check or act as a viable political alternative for voters will remain significantly unchanged.  
African regimes have been categorized in this dissertation along a rubric, which is meant to 
approximate the relative importance of foreign and domestic actors in the decision to adopt 
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multiparty elections. The empirical results in chapter 3, based on the effect of the interaction of this 
“exogeneity of a transition” measure with the degree to which a regime has politically liberalized on 
quality of life indicators, support my hypotheses. Endogenous democratization is associated with 
positive changes in social services, while exogenous democratization is not. Over the past two 
decades, leaders of exogenously derived democracies have failed to respond to Africa’s most basic 
health and education needs.  
In addition to documenting the absence of democratization’s effect on social service delivery, 
I have also explored exogenous democratization’s possible negative impacts on other important 
elements of a polity. Exploring the role that exogenous actors played in Zambia’s democratic 
evolution, for example, illustrated several likely unintended consequences of foreign democracy 
promotion efforts. Within that case I found that donors played a role in giving exogenously derived 
democracies relatively weak democratic boundaries within which to operate and that ruling elites test 
those boundaries towards authoritarianism when it is politically necessary for them to secure 
domestic power. This particular lesson from Zambia’s case helps to highlight the role that foreign 
actors have had in the consolidation of hybridity in so many of the exogenously influenced transition 
countries.  
Also, I found that elites in these settings have the ability to undermine the progress of 
responsive-inducing reforms, like decentralization, and often have the political incentives to do so as 
well. Reforms which are aimed at increasing government responsiveness often require ruling elites to 
relinquish central control over development finance, accept checks on the central 
government’s/executive’s power, and/or defend a free and fair democratic playing ground. 
Domestic and endogenously derived political will to do fulfill any of these requirements is necessary, 
but desperately hard to come by in an exogenously derived democratic setting.  
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Finally, also explored in this dissertation was whether exogenously derived democracy might 
have a negative impact on public attachment to and satisfaction with democracy, both of which are 
considered prerequisites to a democratic system’s consolidation. Especially in an exogenously 
derived democracy, where elite support of democracy is assumingly somewhat dependent upon 
foreign influence, democratic consolidation may at some point have to rely more heavily upon the 
public’s commitment to defend the democratic experiment. I ultimately find some support for the 
idea that exogenously derived democratization negatively impacts attachment to and satisfaction 
with democracy.  
While the negative effect of exogenous democratization on attachment to democracy found 
was estimated to be modest, it is still arguably alarming. If support for democracy wanes as a result 
of exogenous democratization, foreign democracy promoters may be undermining their own efforts 
to induce eventual domestic ownership and the sustainability of democracy. The gravity of this 
possibility demands that research on this possible negative externality of exogenous democratization 
be further pursued. Related future research should focus on parsing out the underlying mechanisms 
that cause exogenous democratization to decrease attachment to democracy, as different drivers 
would require different policy responses.  
If citizens in this environment are less supportive of democracy because they have had less 
interaction with domestic democratic civil society, and thus, fewer opportunities learn about and 
gain an appreciation for the democratic system, interested donors or domestic groups, can respond 
and maybe counteract this effect by increasing their activity in democratic awareness and education 
campaigns. However, exogenous democratization may negatively impact attachment to democracy 
in other ways. Frustrated with the lack of impact the exogenously derived democracy has had on 
their lives or the observable politics in the country, citizens may become jaded with the system as a 
whole. If this is the driving mechanism that associates exogenously derived democracy and less 
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attachment to democracy it is less clear what policy makers or domestic democracy advocates can do 
to counteract the negative effect.  
 
Unresponsive Democratization and Foreign Democracy Promotion 
The findings represented in the preceding chapters beg additional questions about the merits 
of foreign democracy promotion policies. The most significant and perhaps most obvious is, should 
the findings prompt donors to reconsider current forms of democracy promotion or democracy 
promotion in its entirety? On the one hand, this dissertation has illustrated that foreign promoted 
democratization is associated with a lack of government responsiveness, especially when it is not 
mirrored with a domestic democratic movement. Perhaps, quite obviously, if responsive 
democratization is the primary goal of donors, and in light of its likely unintended consequences, 
donors should re-evaluate democracy promotion efforts.  
However, this conclusion is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, democracy promotion 
efforts obviously have many goals, and its merits should be judged against them all, not just its 
ability to induce responsiveness. For example, if targeted democracy promotion, like sanctioning or 
aid giving for the purposes of democratization can be credited for some of the real positive changes 
that have been made across the continent in terms of increases in political rights and civil liberties, it 
should not be abandoned totally. These positive changes in political rights and civil liberties enhance 
a different dimension of the quality of life of Africans.  
However, dis-guarding democracy promotion foreign policy because of its likely impact on 
inducing an unresponsive democracy is, perhaps, also misguided. As, illustrated in chapters 2 and 3, 
direct or targeted democracy promotion efforts were not always necessary to induce a somewhat 
exogenously derived democracy. Put differently, not all exogenously derived democracies suffered 
aid sanctioning for not democratizing or received foreign aid for holding multiparty elections. 
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Instead, as described in chapter 2, the post-Cold War period ushered in a new international 
paradigm for many African leaders. With the loss of the Soviet Union as a potential foreign patron 
many saw it advantageous to hold multiparty elections to attract the patronage of Western donors; 
the value of this particular portion of a regime’s extraversion portfolio rose. In other words, a new 
international norm was ushered in wherein multipartyism was perceived as important and almost 
necessary to have credibility with donors.76 Thus, ending targeted democracy promotion will, in my 
opinion, likely not completely disincentivize exogenous democratization, or bring an end to 
multiparty elections, for example, in exogenously derived democracies. While, in this hypothetical 
scenario, governments would not face sanctions for democratic backsliding, many would, in my 
opinion, still find it in their interest to hold elections to appease what is now perceived to be the new 
electoral norm, or the sensibilities of the main donors.  
Thus, to summarize, while this dissertation offers insights into some of the unintended 
consequences of democracy promotion, it probably contributes much more ambiguously towards a 
general policy debate about democracy promotion. Despite its impact on institutionalizing 
responsive democracy, to the extent that democracy promotion aids in securing higher levels of 
political rights and civil liberties, it should probably not be abandoned. Also, ending targeted 
democracy promotion policies, like sanctioning or rewarding regimes for their undemocratic or 
democratic behavior, will likely not change which regimes Western governments favor or the 
perceptions of recipient nations. As long as there is a real or perceived notion that multipartyism is 
favored among the main donors, regimes that are vulnerable to their relationship with donors will 
likely continue to have multiparty elections. Through this reasoning, exogenously induced 
democracies are likely to persist, with or without targeted democracy promotion policies.  
                                                        
76
 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) discuss signaling norms as a type of international norm. The spread of multipartyism in 
Africa during the 1990s seems to be a signaling norm by their discussion; arguably, the spread norm of an emphasis on 
multiparty elections was generated by state leaders reacting to changes in the international environment, and was then 
widely shared and enforced by members of the international community.  
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In terms of policy implications, then, perhaps the focal point should turn to whether an 
exogenous democratization can “become endogenous.” The “endogenization” of a democracy 
would require that an exogenously derived democracy gain a deeper sense of domestic legitimacy 
wherein domestic civil society would have greater ownership of the political system. Like 
endogenous democracies, one would expect an endogenized democracy to contain that ever-
important policy loop, wherein elected officials have the political incentive to act for the needs and 
demands of their citizenry.  A focus on this brings up the following relevant policy questions: What 
conditions are necessary for the endogenization of an exogenously democracy? What role might 
donors or other actors play in endogenizing a ‘surface level’ democracy? I discuss these questions 
next, using the case of Ghana as a possible endogenized exogenously derived democracy. 
 
The Endogenization of an Exogenously Derived Democracy 
In light of Ghana’s clearly exogenously influenced democratic transition, Ghana’s post-
transition democratic transformations are anomalous. Unlike the vast majority of Africa’s 
exogenously influenced democracies, there have been many signs that Ghana’s democracy has 
obtained a significant degree of “endogeniety.” In this section, I discuss what Ghana’s case might 
offer in terms of generalizations of where an endogenization of an exogenously derived democratic 
experiment is likely occur and whether there are any policy implications that can be derived for the 
donor community in encouraging endogenization.  
Ghana’s Exogenously Influenced Democratization 
  Ghana’s road to multipartyism was marred by many of the characteristics one might think 
are typical of an exogenously derived democracy. Like so many African countries, prior to the 
transition the Rawlings regime was heavily dependent upon IFI and donor support at a time when 
both communities were openly expressing their preferences for democratization (Sandbrook 2000: 
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chapter 5; Haynes 1993). To that point, some observers interpreted the timing of Rawlings’s 
announcement of a transition to multipartyism as a direct attempt to further attract and maintain the 
support of the donor community; he did so only four days before the influential donors’ conference 
in Paris (Quaye 1995; Adejumobi 2000: 65). Additionally, while some domestic demands for 
democracy were present, they were heavily repressed, and as a result not well organized or 
particularly vocal. Ghana did not experience, for example, mass demonstrations against the 
government in the period leading up to the democratic transition (Sandbrook 2000: 27).  
Also like many other exogenously influenced transitions, the regime’s ability to suppress 
possible domestic opposing forces was further echoed in the nature of the transition. Once it was 
apparent that the regime would have to accept multipartyism to maintain support from its foreign 
donors, the Rawlings government institutionalized reforms swiftly (Sandbrook 2000; Adjemobi 2000: 
66-67). One observer noted “the PNDC (ruling party) apparently believed that the key to ‘reform-
with-survival’ lay in the element of surprise and in close control of the transition agenda” (ACR: 
1992/1994). This close control of the transition was articulated in “every phase of the transition 
process, including the process of constitutional engineering, establishment and control of the 
electoral body, subversion of electoral rules and regulations, abuse of the electioneering process, 
voters’ registration and the conduct of elections” (Adejumobi 2000: 67). This level of control over 
the transition, and possible vote-rigging, paid off for Rawlings; amid an oppositional boycott he won 
the first multiparty election in November of 1992 and re-secured an institutionally tilted electoral 
playing field as the incumbent in the subsequent election in 1996, which he also won (Adejumobi 
2000: 70).  
Signs of Endogenization 
 Although Rawlings’s decision to concede multiparty elections was clearly heavily influenced 
by exogenous factors and the transition was heavily controlled, democracy today in Ghana shows 
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several signs of a certain degree of endogenization. After its inaugural 1992 multiparty election, 
Ghana not only went on to observe four successive multiparty elections (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008), 
but the quality of each election improved over electoral cycles (Gyimah-Boadi 2009) and other 
democratic institutions, like the Electoral Commission, freedom in the media, and the judiciary have 
significantly strengthened (Gyimah-Boadi 2009).  
Additionally, two of these elections resulted in party turnover and the political party 
dynamics have crystalized into a fairly stable two-party system (Morrison 2004). Whereas electoral 
quality and party turnover are important signs of a strengthening of the democratic character of a 
country’s formal institutions, they may also give some insights into the endogenization of the 
democracy. Both speak to the decreasing ability with which the initial ruling party was able to distort 
democratic institutions and repress the opposition to maintain its incumbency. Also, in the cases of 
achieving party turnover and establishing a stable two party system, specifically, Ghana’s democratic 
climate illustrates a rise of a strengthened opposition. Theoretically this gives voters a viable 
alternative at the poles and, in turn, politicians an electoral incentive to respond to the needs of 
voters.  
Equally important to looking to the formal institutional setting to establish endogenization, 
is an examination of the political culture. Endogenous democratic transitions occur due to domestic 
political dynamics and are likely the articulation of a strong domestic demand for democracy and an 
organized civil society. This political culture is an essential signal of endogenization. Also, an 
endogenized democracy will sustain itself even if external pressures to be democratic subside, and 
thus it requires strength in a popular and domestic ownership of the regime type. Although, it is 
impossible to be certain that Ghana’s democracy will continue to thrive in absentia of an external 
environment favorable to democracy, there are several signs in Ghana’s current political 
environment that signify that its democracy has endogenized in this respect. For example, several 
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observers have noted that civil society organizations in Ghana have grown in numbers and influence, 
and especially so in organizing interests around elections and for advocacy of various policy reforms 
(Gyimah-boadi 2009). Additionally, democracy in Ghana not only enjoys overwhelming public 
support, as data from four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys suggest, (Abdulai and Crawford 2010) 
but the Ghanaian public demonstrates a high degree of democratic engagement.  Voter turnout 
since Ghana’s second election has been above 70% (Gyimah-boadi 2009; Abdulai and Crawford 
2010). 
Finally, this dissertation has suggested that endogenous democracies will more likely induce 
responsiveness in social service delivery due to a created policy-feedback loop between electorally 
incentivized politicians and engaged citizens. Thus a final signal of an endogenous and responsive 
government is that this type of policy-feedback loop be present. Giovanni Carbone’s (2009) research 
into the evolution of healthcare policy in Ghana speaks to this point and confirms that, at least with 
respect to Ghanaian health policy, a policy-feedback loop has developed in Ghana’s democracy:  
“The overall result was a vibrant democratic life that generated strong pressures for 
governing parties to answer to the social concerns of the voters. A key social demand, in 
particular, related to the health sector and to the limited and unequal access to drugs, 
services and facilities under the so-called cash-and-carry system. The opposition was quick in 
exploiting health issues to challenge the ruling party, to articulate an electoral platform that 
would win it power, and, once in office, to adopt health policy changes that would help it 
gain a second mandate. It is difficult to overestimate the relevance of electoral competition 
in Ghana’s recent politics of health reform” (Carbonne 2009: 14). 
 
Ghana’s case reveals that the nature of the birth of a democracy does not necessarily 
determine a country’s democratic legacy. Its controlled and exogenously influenced transition has, by 
many signals, given way to a highly domestically legitimate and vibrant democracy.  Comparatively, 
Ghana’s democracy beat the odds; it is a hopeful case in light of what this dissertation has thus far 
documented for the vast majority of Africa’s exogenously influenced democracies. Naturally, this 
anomaly raises the following important questions: how was this “endogenization” achieved?, can it 
be replicated elsewhere?, and what policy lessons can be derived from the case, particularly for the 
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donor community, for the pursuit of trying to encourage endogenization elsewhere?  Clearly, 
Ghana’s case merits much more research than what this dissertation has time to explore. However, 
below I discuss one possible explanation for Ghana’s endogenization, as well as what policy 
implications might be derived from the case.  
Ghana’s Party Roots as a Source of Endogenization 
Several scholars credit Ghana’s competitive electoral environment and current democratic 
culture to the depth and nature of Ghana’s political party roots (Sandbrook 2000: 37; Morrison 2004; 
Witfield 2009). Ghana’s two current main parties (NDC and NPP) articulate two political traditions 
that emerged during decolonization (Witfield 2009; Sandbrook 2000: 117-120). “Political identity in 
Ghana has been formulated largely by the ideologies of the Nkrumahists and Danquah-Busiasts” 
(Morison 2004: 436). And although Ghana experienced a lot of regime instability post independence 
(four republics and three military regimes), the country also had a fairly regular showing of 
competitive elections; elections have been held in Ghana ever 6.2 years (Morrison 2004: 427; 
Sandbrook 2000: 37). This regularity in practicing competitive elections facilitated these two parties’ 
position in becoming the default institutions with which Ghanaians would organize themselves 
when a competitive election arose. Put differently, due to the regular and semi-frequent 
opportunities for political parties to arise, the political traditions that the NDC and NPP reflect 
avoided fading away from Ghana’s political party imagination.  
Further, the two parties have historically maintained a high two-way competitive 
environment; the two traditions (under various party names) have alternated in government and 
winners of competitive elections have usually only polled about 55 percent (Morrison 2004: 427). 
This competitive environment might be due to the fact that the political traditions provide an 
“ideological image” for Ghana’s parties, which helps to transcend ethnic, regional, urban/rural and 
class cleavages (Witfiedl 2009). Ghanaians can generally see either party as a viable alternative in 
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power.  In fact, the outcome of Ghana’s elections usually relies on a large percentage of potential 
swing voters, which also underlines Ghana’s highly politically competitive environment (Witfield 
2009).  
While the immergence and early sustainability of Ghana’s fourth republic was clearly foreign 
influenced, it may have been the underlying competitive nature of democratic politics that eventually 
led to this case of “endogenization.” As discussed above, the consolidation of a politically 
competitive and thriving democracy in Ghana is partially, if not mainly, attributable to its domestic 
history of experiencing somewhat regular multiparty elections wherein political interests articulated 
themselves largely within two stable political traditions/parties. Arguably, through this perspective, 
one might assume that Ghana had an exceptional democratic foundation underneath its bouts with 
authoritarianism and instability. Once the government was pressured or incentivized enough from 
exogenous circumstances to institutionalize the formal structures of democracy, Ghana’s stable 
competitiveness and democratic culture awakened.  
While it is clear that this case warrants more research into other possible explanations, this 
perspective may still offer some generalizations about the proclivity of a democracy to “endogenize.” 
For example, perhaps Ghana’s case illustrates that the endogenization of an exogenously derived 
democracy is likely to happen where the country has a pre-existing historical tradition of democratic 
competitive politics. Cases like this might only need the formal institutional structures of multiparty 
politics to be protected and encouraged by the outside until the competitive, domestic political 
atmosphere has time to further institutionalize itself. Thus, donors interested in encouraging the 
endogenization of democracy should focus their pressure to more fully democratize, and efforts to 
strengthen opposition parties on cases where an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian government 
faces an opposition with historic legitimacy, and where competitive politics has historically cut 
across social cleavages. Ghana’s case also illustrates the self-reinforcing power of a democratic 
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culture. Civil society activity and popular demand in Ghana is high and this is crucial for establishing 
a policy loop between citizens and elected officials. In this respect Ghana’s case can also highlights 
the importance of democratic education, and democratic civil society organizations can have on 
endogenization. This may also be another avenue for donors to interject their influence in.  
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has focused on the impact that the origins of democratization has on the 
subsequent character of a country’s democracy. While this emphasis proved necessary to 
understanding the absence of responsive government in many of Africa’s democracies, the resulting 
research has shed light onto important, related questions that deserves future attention. For example, 
much can be gained into research into establishing the other contextual environments that are most 
conducive for a “responsive” democracy to emerge. While the nature of a democracy’s origins is 
clearly important to this story, Ghana’s case illustrates that it is not the entire story. This focus may 
highlight when foreign democracy promotion for multipartyism will eventually result in an 
endogenized case of democracy and/or what foreign democracy promoters can do to encourage the 
endogenization of democracy. Additionally, the micro-processes of how policy loops form and what 
institutional setting they are likely to form in, seems to be particularly relevant to this project. As this 
dissertation illustrated, the widely assumed notion that competitive elections are sufficient to 
incentivize the establishment of a policy loop was a fallacy. It is important that research revolves 
around the contextual environment of when and how such policy loops form, and also, how such 
policy loops function. These micro-processes seem to strikingly under-researched. Research into 
these questions will not only allow us to make more sense of the unresponsive nature of African 
governments, but it will continue to offer more insight as to how foreign donors can assist in 
encouraging the a greater substance democracy.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Data Sources and Measurement for Chapter 2 Analyses 
Variable Source/Measurement 
Civil Liberties From: Freedom House 
GDP per capita  From: IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database; Measured as the log of 
GDP per capita (PPP)  
Literacy Rate From: World Bank’s Development Indicators; Measured as the log of (1+ 
adult literacy rate) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
From: Alesina et al. (2003) 
Legacy From: Bratton and van de Walle (1997:79). 
Historisis Measured as the number of years prior to 1989 that the country was a de 
facto or de jure one party state. Every count starts from independence, but 
in the cases of Liberia and Ethiopia, they start at 1960. 
GDP Growth From: World Bank’s Development Indicators (Sao Tome and Principe’s 
figures came from the World Economic Outlook); Measured as the GDP 
growth annual percent. 
Oil From: Ross (Forthcoming); Measured as a dummy variable for whether or 
not the country has rents from oil exports (the value per capita of their 
export revenue over the cost per capita of their oil production) that 
represent at least 1% of GDP  
Protests From: Bratton and van de Walle (1997).  Values of 0 imputed for 
Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, and Senegal, after email exchange with 
Nicolas van de Walle (10/23/2009). 
Elections Self collected from multiple sources (heavily drawn from Lindberg 2003); 
Measured as the number of elections (presidential and legislative elections) 
that are at least 6 months apart from one another. 
Soviet From: Dunning (2004); Measured as a dummy variable for whether or not 
the country was a former Soviet client. 
French Self coded; Measured as a dummy for whether or not the country was a 
French colony 
Aid as a % of 
exports 
From: World bank’s World Development Indicators. 
SAL  From:  www.imf.org  
Conflict From: PRIO; Measured as a dummy variable for if the state had internal 
conflict (type 2,3 or 4) of 1000+ deaths 
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Appendix II: Summary Statistics of Data Used in Chapter 3 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max. 
Life Expectancy (1990) 48 52.81 7.79 32 70 
Δ Life Expectancy (1990-2005) 48 0.67 7.00 -17 16 
Infant Mortality (1990) 48 96.94 34.38 17 169 
Δ Infant Mortality (1990-2005) 48 -14.13 16.67 -53 20 
Undernourishment % (1992) 43 32.64 15.54 2.5 66 
Δ Undernourishment % (1992-2005) 43 -3.56 13.26 -29 43 
Primary Enrollment (1991) 43 57.02 23.22 15 96 
Δ Primary Enrollment (1991-2005) 40 12.85 17.28 -27.29 43.77 
Secondary Enrollment (1990) 45 21.40 15.24 4.8 65.98 
Δ Secondary Enrollment (1990-2005) 35 13.33 12.10 -6.97 47.36 
Δ Democracy Score (1990-2005) 47 1.31 1.46 -2.5 4 
Average Population (1990-2005) 48 13.20 20.3 0.08 117 
Conflict  48 0.58 0.50 0 1 
Average Urbanization (1990-2005) 48 34.94 15.91 7.81 81.28 
Age of Democracy 48 9.88 8.69 0 40 
Ethnic Fractionalization 47 0.66 0.23 0 0.93 
Authoritarian 48 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Exogeneity 47 1.40 0.77 0 2 
GDP per capita, (PPP), ln 47 6.21 1.01 4.85 9.04 
Control of Corruption (1996-2005) 48 -0.62 0.59 -1.71 0.82 
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Appendix III: The Exogeneity of Transitions by Afrobarometer Sample, Chapter 5 
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Appendix IV: Details on the Question Wording and Construction of Control Variables Used, 
Chapter 577 
 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
Passive 
Citizenship 
 
Factor Variable created based on the responses to two questions, which both ask the 
respondent to what degree they agree with two statements. The first set of statements 
are: 
 
1) Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders.  
Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority” 
 
The second set are: 
 
2) Statement 1: Government is like an employee; the people should be the bosses 
who control the government 
Statement 2:  People are like children; the government should take care of them 
like a parent.  
 
Possible responses to both are:  
1) Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 
2) Agree with Statement 1,  
3) Agree with Statement 2,  
4) Agree very strongly with Statement 2 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 1.02), which 
explains 51.06% of the common variance.  
 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
National 
Identification 
 
Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [Ghanaian] and being a 
[Respondent’s Ethnic group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings? 
 
1) I feel only (respondent’s ethnic group) 
2) I feel more (respondent’s ethnic group) than [Ghanaian] 
3) I feel equally [Ghanaian] and (respondent’s ethnic group) 
4) I feel more [Ghanaian] than (respondent’s ethnic group) 
5) I feel only [Ghanaian] 
 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
Trust in  
Co-nationals 
 
How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other [Ghanaians]? 
 
0) Not at all 
1) Just a little 
2) I trust them somewhat 
3) I trust them a lot 
 
                                                        
77
 All question wording and responses reflect how the variable was recoded for analyses, and may not be consistent with 
the original version of the Afrobarometer survey.   
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M
o
d
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o
n
 
Living 
Conditions 
 
In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions? 
 
1) Very Bad 
2) Fairly Bad 
3) Neither good nor bad 
4) Fairly good 
5) Very good 
 
*This was the closest question the Afrobarometer had to “income” 
 
M
o
d
e
rn
iz
a
ti
o
n
 
Gender 
0) Female 
1) Male 
M
o
d
e
rn
iz
a
ti
o
n
 
Urban  
0) Rural 
1) Urban 
M
o
d
e
rn
iz
a
ti
o
n
 
Education 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
0) No formal Schooling 
1) Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling) 
2) Some primary schooling 
3) Primary school complete 
4) Some secondary/high school 
5) Secondary school completed/high school completed 
6) Post-secondary qualifications, other than University 
7) Some University 
8) University Completed 
 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
Years in 
Democracy 
The number of years since the age of 18 that the respondent has lived under a 
democratic system.  
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L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
News 
 
Factor Variable created based on the responses to three questions, all of which ask 
respondents how often the respondent gets the news from specific sources: 
 
1) Radio 
2) TV 
3) Paper 
 
Possible responses to all three are:  
0) Never 
1) Less than once a month 
2) A few times a month 
3) A Few times a week  
4) Every day 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 1.79), which 
explains 59.86% of the common variance.  
 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
Political Interest 
 
When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political 
matters: 
 
0) Never 
1) Occasionally 
2) Frequently 
 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
 
Political 
Knowledge 
 
Factor Variable created based on the responses to two questions, both of which ask 
respondents to correctly identify the name of various politicians: 
 
1) Respondent’s Member of Parliament 
2) Finance Minister 
 
Responses were coded as:  
0) Incorrect or guess 
1) Correctly Identified 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 1.09), which 
explains 54.54% of the common variance.  
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Evaluations of 
the Economy 
 
Two Factor Variables were created based on the responses to four questions: 
 
Retrospective Macro Evaluation: 
2) Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: 
Economic Conditions in this country? 
 
Prospective Macro Evaluation: 
3) Looking ahead, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: 
Economic Conditions in this country? 
 
Retrospective Micro Evaluation: 
4) Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: 
Your living conditions? 
 
Prospective Micro Evaluation: 
5) Looking ahead, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: 
Your living conditions? 
 
1) Much worse 
2) Worse 
3) Same 
4) Better 
5) Much Better 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted two factors, with eigenvalues of 2.39 and 
1.09 respectively; Collectively they explain which explains 87.10% of the variance. 
Prospective economic evaluations loaded highly and similarly on the first factor, and 
retrospective economic evaluations loaded highly on the second.  
E
c
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Economic Policy 
Performance 
 
Factor Variable created based on the responses to five questions, all of which ask how 
well or badly the current government is handling the specific economic policies: 
  
1) Managing the economy 
2) Improving the living standards of the poor 
3) Creating jobs 
4) Keeping prices down 
5) Narrowing gaps between rich and poor 
 
The following possible responses apply to all five questions:  
 
1) Very badly 
2) Fairly badly 
3) Fairly well 
4) Very well 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 3.18), which 
explains 63.63% of the common variance.  
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Free Speech 
 
In this country, how free are you: To say what you think? 
 
1) Not at all free 
2) Not very free 
3) Somewhat free 
4) Completely Free 
 
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l 
G
o
o
d
s 
E
va
l.
 
Free Elections 
 
On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, 
held in [year]. Was it:  
 
1) Not free and fair 
2) Free and fair, with major problems 
3) Free and fair, but with minor problems 
4) Completely free and fair 
 
P
o
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c
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l 
G
o
o
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s 
E
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Trust Leadership 
 
Factor variable created based on the responses to four questions, all of which ask how 
much the respondent trusts each of the specific people/institutions in power: 
  
1) The President 
2) Parliament 
3) National Election Commissioner 
4) Local Government Councilor 
 
The following possible responses apply to all four questions:  
 
0) Not at all 
1) Just a little 
2) Somewhat 
3) A lot 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 2.68), which 
explains 66.93% of the common variance.  
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Perceived 
Government 
Corruption 
Factor variable created based on the responses to six questions, all of which ask how 
many of the following people do the respondents think are involved in corruption of the 
following groups: 
 
1) The President and Officials in his/her Office 
2) Members of Parliament 
3) Assembly Men/women 
4) Government Officials 
5) Tax officials 
6) Judges 
 
The following possible responses apply to all six questions:  
 
0) None 
1) Some of them 
2) Most of them 
3) All of them 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 3.90), which 
explains 65.00% of the common variance.  
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o
li
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l 
G
o
o
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s 
E
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l.
 
Fair Treatment 
of Ethnicity 
 
How often are [respondent’s ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government? 
 
0) Never 
1) Sometimes 
2) Often 
3) Always 
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Perceived 
Government 
Responsiveness 
 
Factor variable created based on the responses to seven  questions, all of which ask how 
well the current government is following the specific policies/problems: 
 
1) Reducing crime 
2) Improving basic health services 
3) Addressing educational needs 
4) Providing water and sanitation services 
5) Ensuring everyone has enough to eat 
6) Maintaining Roads and Bridges 
7) Providing a reliable supply of electricity 
 
The following possible responses apply to all six questions:  
 
1) Very badly 
2) Fairly badly 
3) Fairly well 
4) Very well 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 3.40), which 
explains 48.51% of the common variance.  
 
C
iv
il
 S
o
c
ie
ty
 
Partisanship 
 
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
 
0) No 
1) Yes 
 
C
iv
il
 S
o
c
ie
ty
 
Civil Society 
Member 
 
Let’s turn to your role in the community. Now I am going to read out a list of groups 
that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official 
leader, an active member, an inactive member or not a member: Some other voluntary 
association or community group? 
 
0) Not a member 
1) Inactive member 
2) Active member 
3) Official leader 
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C
iv
il
 S
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c
ie
ty
 
Active in Civil 
Society 
 
Factor variable created based on the responses to three questions, all of which ask 
whether a person would engage in the following activities if they had the chance: 
 
1) Attend a community meeting 
2) Get together with others to raise an issue 
3) Attend a demonstration or protest march 
 
The following possible responses apply to all three questions:  
 
0) No, would never do this 
1) No, but would do if had the chance 
2) Yes, one or twice 
3) Yes, several times 
4) Yes, Often 
 
Principle components factor analysis extracted a single factor (eigenvalue = 1.82), which 
explains 60.63% of the common variance.  
 
P
o
te
n
ti
a
l 
W
in
n
e
rs
 
Member of 
Majority Ethnic 
Group 
 
Coded as a 1 or 0 if the respondent identified him/herself has a member of the 
numerical majority ethnic group.  
 
For Botswana, all Tswana tribes are coded as the majority. For Lesotho, anyone not 
identifying as European, was coded as part of the majority. All Cape Verdeans were 
coded as part of the majority. Both Hausa and Foulani in Nigeria were coded as the 
majority. Most information regarding which ethnic group was the numerical majority was 
taken from the database on “www.joshuaproject.net”  
P
o
te
n
ti
a
l 
W
in
n
e
rs
 
Ruling Party 
Supporter 
 
If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote 
for? 
 
Coded as a 0 or a 1 for whether the respondent stated that they supported the ruling 
party at the time of 2008 (when the survey was distributed). 
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